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Draft:Dispute settlement under Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (DSA)

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Dispute settlement under Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) is an out-of-court procedure that enables users to ensure content moderation decisions by online platforms are reviewed by independent bodies. Within the European Union, users can challenge decisions such as content removal, account suspensions, or demonetization through certified dispute settlement bodies, offering an alternative to judicial proceedings.

Article 21 is part of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act), which entered into force in November 2022 and is applicable across the EU since 17 February 2024. As of November 2025, nine out-of-court dispute settlement bodies (ODS bodies) have been certified, including User Rights and Platform Control in Germany, Appeals Centre Europe in Ireland, and ADROIT in Malta..[1].

Background and Objectives

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With out-of-court dispute resolution, the DSA aims to make online platforms more accountable for their moderation decisions and to protect the fundamental rights of users. This includes protecting online freedom of expression[2]. Until the DSA's implementation, there were no specific european mechanisms to challenge platform moderation decisions outside of courts and platform internal systems. While users could take legal action, this was often costly and time-consuming[3]. This meant that moderation decisions to delete online content or block user accounts were often not challenged and remained in force, no matter how unjustified they might have been.

Article 21 DSA closes this gap. It supplements the so-called notice and action mechanisms, which the DSA requires online platforms to provide in accordance with Art. 16 DSA, as well as the internal complaint procedure provided for in Art. 20 DSA. With the help of these procedures, users can request an internal review by the platform. Subsequently, the complaint can now be submitted to an out-of-court dispute resolution body, thanks to Article 21.

That being said, the DSA expressively states that this possibility of out-of-court dispute resolution does not affect the right of users to take legal action at any time. Indeed, they are intended to resolve disputes faster and more cost-effectively, while preserving the option for users to take cases before national courts.

Article 21 DSA also fits into a broader context of existing out-of-court dispute settlement mechanisms in the EU. In particular, Directive 2013/11/EU on consumer dispute resolution (Alternative Dispute Resolution – ADR) remains unaffected by the newest mechanism. This directive ensures that consumers have access to certified ADR bodies in the event of contractual disputes (e.g. online purchases). The ADR bodies remain responsible for contractual disputes, while the ODS bodies under Article 21 DSA focus on content moderation and related platform decisions.

Article 21 DSA does not oblige Member States to set up new dispute resolution bodies, but allows them to support or provide such bodies themselves[4].

Scope of Application

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Online Platforms, especially Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs)

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Article 21 applies to online platforms in general and very large online platforms such as Facebook, Instagram or TikTok.  According to Article 33 DSA, online platforms are considered very large if they have an average monthly number of at least 45 million active users in the Union. VLOPs are expected to generate the majority of disputes due to their size and user base[5].

Dispute Types

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It covers disputes relating to decisions addressed in Article 20(1) DSA. The disputes covered by the scope of out-of-court dispute settlement include:

  • Removal or restriction of content (posts, reels, stories, comments)
  • Account suspension or termination
  • Demonetization or payment suspension
  • Decisions not to act on user reports of illegal content

Platforms are required to provide easily accessible information about how to file complaints—typically in the notification of the moderation decision or in the help sections of the website.

Based on the list laid out in Article 20, there are two main scenarios in which users can take their case to ODS bodies under Article 21 of the DSA.

1. User Appeals Against Platform Action: A user challenges a moderation decision that has already been made and affects their own content or account, such as the removal of a post or an account suspension. Article 21 can be particularly useful to a person that had a post taken down because of an alleged breach of the platform’s rule, especially when the platform mistakenly or disproportionately applied its own rules (e.g.: Adult Nudity, Harassment and Bullying etc.).

2. Reporter Appeals Against Platform Inaction: A user or organization that reported content challenges the platform's decision not to remove the reported content[6]. For example, users can report content they deem inappropriate or in breach of certain platform rules (e.g.: Hate Speech, Graphic content, Nudity etc.).

In both scenarios, users can base their complaints on either violations of the platform guidelines or violations of statutory law, depending on the scope of the ODS body involved.

Empirical research shows that the majority of proceedings are conducted on the basis of violations of the platform guidelines, as it is mainly what platforms look at when rendering decisions[7].

Procedural Framework

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How it works

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Article 21 of the DSA sets out only a few requirements for the procedure before an out-of-court dispute resolution body which preserve its simplicity.

Users can select any certified ODS body in the EU competent for their dispute. The European Commission maintains a public list of all certified bodies. Users initiate the procedure through online forms, providing information about the platform's decision, the content at issue, and grounds for challenge.

Both parties —user and platform— must engage "in good faith" with the selected ODS body in order to find a solution. The ODS body examines the dispute neutrally and develops a balanced proposal for dispute resolution (e.g., reinstatement of deleted content or confirmation of the platform's decision).

A platform may refuse to participate in the procedure under certain strict conditions: namely, if the same dispute has already been dealt with by a court or another dispute resolution body. This way, “double proceedings” are avoided. In other cases, an unfounded refusal to cooperate constitutes a violation of the DSA and may be sanctioned by the competent authorities. Failure to engage in good faith can result in penalties[2].

It is important to note that the settlement issued by the ODS body is not a binding decision. The platform is therefore not obliged to implement recommendations – the DSA focuses instead on cooperation and the incentive of cost consequences. However, multiple factors create compliance incentives:

First, the transparency reporting requirements under Article 24 DSA oblige VLOPs to publicly report on their handling of out-of-court dispute settlement. Concretely, this means that a systematic refusal to follow ODS decisions will become visible to regulators, users and civil society, affecting negatively the platform's image. Second, for VLOPs, the risk-mitigation obligations under Article 35 DSA require them to show that they effectively address systemic risks, including those arising from flawed content moderation and redress mechanisms. Finally, reputational effects and the prospect of increased regulatory scrutiny further incentivise VLOPs to implement ODS decisions: non-compliance can damage user trust, attract negative media and NGO attention, and prompt closer oversight or enforcement action by Digital Services Coordinators and the Commission.

Timeframes and Decisions

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ODS bodies must issue decisions within 90 days, extendable to 180 days for highly complex cases (Article 21 (4) DSA). Decisions can have various outcomes: they may recommend that platforms reverse their decisions, uphold the original decision, or find the dispute inadmissible. In any case, the outcome is communicated to the parties in writing, usually with a statement of reasons.

Cost Structure

In order to remove financial barriers for users, the DSA states that the procedure must be free of charge for users or available only for a nominal fee. In practice, this means that users generally do not pay any fees for initiating and conducting arbitration. Funding is provided primarily by the online platforms involved: if the body rules in favor of the user, the platform provider must bear all the fees of the ODS body and reimburse the user for all reasonable other costs (such as postage, etc.). However, the online platforms will only pay fees to the ODS body that remain reasonable and do not exceed costs incurred.

If the ODS body rules in favor of the platform, the user does not have to reimburse any fees or costs of the proceedings—unless the body finds that the user has clearly acted in “manifest” bad faith. This is the case, for example, if a user abuses the complaint procedure to cause the online platform to bear the costs, but not because they are concerned about content that needs to be moderated (eg. intentionally posting illegal content just to create costs for the platform). Only in this case can the user be required to pay.

In general, the DSA requires that any fees charged by ODS bodies to platforms must be reasonable and cover costs at most. Both parties must be informed transparently about any fees that may be incurred or the calculation method before the proceedings begin[8].

Examples

Certification Requirements for ODS bodies

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Out-of-court dispute resolution bodies must meet strict requirements to be authorized to operate under Article 21 of the DSA. A key element is an approval and certification procedure carried out by the relevant national authority, the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC). The DSC is the responsible authority every member state has to designate so that the EU regulation is enforced[9]. In Germany for example, the Federal Network Agency ("Bundesnetzagentur") takes the role of the DSC.

Upon application, a body must demonstrate that it meets all the conditions set out in Article 21(3) of the DSA. Only then will the DSC grant a license for a maximum of five years, which is renewable.

To obtain certification, bodies must meet the conditions laid out by Article 21(3):

  1. Impartiality and Independence: the ODS body must be completely independent of online platforms and users, including financially. Neither platform operators nor complainants may have a controlling influence on the ODS body. Conflicts of interest must also be ruled out at the level of the individual decision-makers and any bias must be excluded[10].
  2. Expertise: the decision-makers at dispute resolution bodies must demonstrate expertise either in relation to illegal content or in relation to the application of the general terms and conditions of online platforms. The DSA therefore leaves it unclear whether decision-makers must have completed legal training. Legal scholars assume that this requirement applies when it comes to assessing illegal content. With regard to the application and enforcement of general terms and conditions, specific training in the general terms and conditions law of the member state whose law applies is sometimes considered sufficient. Upon admission, the DSC specifies the subject areas in which the body has expertise (e.g., certain categories of illegal content or platform types). Certifications can therefore be limited to specific areas of expertise. Depending on their expertise, out-of-court dispute resolution bodies can be certified to review specific platform guidelines or standards of national or EU law.
  3. Fair Remuneration of decision-makers: The members or case workers of the body must not be remunerated on a performance-related basis in order to avoid any financial incentive for a particular outcome.
  4. Accessibility and electronic procedures: The dispute resolution service offered must be easily accessible via electronic means of communication. In particular, users must be able to initiate the procedure online and submit all relevant documents electronically. This is important because cross-border cases often arise and rapid communication is required. In addition, the body must be able to handle procedures quickly, efficiently, and cost-effectively in at least one official EU language. The accreditation specifies in which official EU languages the body can handle cases (many bodies offer multilingual procedures, e.g., English plus the national language).
  5. Efficiency: It is meant to resolve disputes rapidly, with streamlined and resource-efficient procedures that keep costs low for the parties involved, while also operating in at least one of the official languages of the European Union.
  6. Fair and Transparent Procedures: The body must operate according to clear and fair rules that are public and easily accessible and comply with applicable law, in particular the DSA itself. For example, deadlines, the rights of the parties, the complaint procedure etc. should be laid down in rules of procedure (e.g. rules of procedure by User Rights , rules of procedure by ADROIT). Most bodies provide for purely written or electronic proceedings in their rules of procedure, without any oral hearings taking place. The ODS bodies' case reviewers are free to form their own opinions and convictions about proceedings.

If an organization meets these criteria, the national coordinator grants approval. This approval is throughout the EU: any body certified under Article 21 is automatically qualified to handle disputes from other member states. Conversely, all online platforms in the internal market must participate in proceedings before such approved bodies, even if the certification was granted in another country. Member States can establish their own dispute resolution bodies or promote existing institutions.

Even after certification, the conciliation bodies are subject to a certain degree of supervision by the national DSCs. Mainly, all accredited bodies must report annually to the coordinator that accredited them (e.g. 2025 Transparency Report by Appeals Centre Europe, 2025 Transparency Report by User Rights). They must at least provide information on the number of cases received, their outcome (results), the average duration of proceedings, and any problems or shortcomings in their activities. Further information must also be provided upon request. For their part, the national coordinators prepare a report every two years on the functioning of “their” dispute resolution bodies. These reports include, in particular, a list of the number of cases per body, information on outcomes and average duration, a description of any systematic problems or sector-specific challenges and examples of best practice, as well as recommendations for improvements, if necessary. The aim is to identify at an early stage whether the system is working effectively or needs to be adjusted (e.g. activity report by German DSC).

Coordinators must also notify the EU Commission of all certified bodies (and any subsequent revocations of approvals). The Commission publishes this information centrally on a public website and keeps it up to date. This has now been implemented through an online EU register containing a list of all accredited ODS bodies with details of their website, the competent DSC authority, areas of expertise, languages, and certification date.

A DSC must revoke accreditation if it determines that the body no longer meets all the conditions. Before revocation, the body must be given the opportunity to comment. In practice, this means that, for example, a conflict of interest that becomes known, unfair procedural practices, or a loss of personnel could lead to the loss of certification. Revocation is also reported to the EU Commission and published by it.

Implementation Challenges

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Platform Compliance Issues

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Early data from Appeals Centre Europe shows that in 67% of overturn cases, platforms failed to provide content necessary for review despite good faith engagement obligations. Consequently, the ODS renders decisions favoring users by default[11]. This suggests significant strategies of non-engagement by the platforms (eg. scope disagreements, technical difficulties to locate the content, etc.).

Statement of Reasons Quality

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Many platforms' statements of reasons under Article 17 DSA do not fully comply with legal requirements —as they are often not clear nor specific— which creates difficulties for ODS bodies[2]. Several legal experts engage in the debate whether deficient statements should lead to automatic case overturn and has been in favor of a differentiated approach. The Academic Advisory Board, a panel of international legal researchers linked to User Rights that discusses how ODS bodies ought to function, advises to overturn decisions on formal grounds where the platform fails to specify them[12]

User Awareness

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Some platforms have not adequately disclosed ODS availability to users, somehow making Article 21 "Europe's best-kept secret".[6]. For example, the absence of a dedicated help page and clear mention within internal appeals flows will keep users unaware of this existing pathway. Such limited visibility can raise compliance concerns with Article 21(1) DSA, which requires platforms to ensure information about access to ODS is “easily accessible”, “clear” and “user-friendly” on their interface. It also raises concerns on compliance with Article 25 DSA that prohibits dark patterns on social media platforms[11]

Procedural Diversity

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Different ODS bodies have adopted varying approaches to scope of review, procedural rules, and third-party participation. It may raise concerns about consistency and potential forum shopping, depending on rules choices[13].

Regulatory Context

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Role of the DSC and the European Commission

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The Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) in the Member States play a central role in the implementation of Article 21 of the DSA. As newly created regulatory authorities, they are responsible for monitoring and enforcing the DSA at national level. In the context of out-of-court dispute resolution, they perform the following tasks in particular:

Approval and certification: The DSC reviews applications from organizations wishing to become conciliation bodies and grants certification if all requirements are met. In doing so, it documents the areas of expertise and languages of the body. Many DSCs have published a detailed applicant guide on how to meet the certification conditions and what evidence and documentation to provide. Certification is always carried out by the DSC of the country in which the body is based, but is valid throughout the EU. If the above mentioned transparency reports by the ODS bodies lead to suspicion of violations of the DSA, the DSC can initiate investigations. If it finds violations of the approval criteria, it must revoke the approval. In practice, DSCs also continuously check whether the ODS bodies conduct their proceedings swiftly and fairly and whether users accept the offers.

Enforcement against platforms: The DSC is also the point of contact if platforms fail to fulfill their obligations. If, for example, a platform unjustifiably refuses to cooperate with an ODS body, this can be punished by the DSC as a violation of the DSA. The national coordinators have sanctioning powers; in Germany, for example, the Federal Network Agency as DSC can impose fines of up to 6% of global annual turnover for violations. For very large online platforms (VLOPs), the EU Commission is the primary enforcement authority – it would therefore ultimately take action if a VLOP systematically disregarded Article 21. In practice, DSCs and the Commission work together through a cooperation mechanism to ensure a uniform approach.

Complementary role of the European Commission

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Under Article 21, the European Commission primarily has coordinating and supporting functions.

It can develop guidelines or recommendations via the newly created European Board for Digital Services, e.g., to promote the consistent application of Article 21. In the initial phase, information was exchanged between the DSCs in particular to ensure a coordinated interpretation of Article 21.

The Commission assumes a supervisory role when it comes to VLOPs (very large platforms). If, for example, a VLOP consistently refuses to accept conciliation procedures or to implement their results, the Commission could intervene within the scope of its DSA enforcement powers.

Overall, national coordinators and the EU Commission complement each other: the former ensure the establishment and quality of dispute resolution bodies and national oversight, while the Commission keeps an eye on the big picture and ensures a uniform level of protection.

Preservation of Judicial Rights

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Article 21 explicitly preserves users' rights to initiate judicial proceedings at any stage, ensuring compliance with the right to effective judicial remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.[14]

ODS bodies do not replace courts, but operate as an additional, voluntary avenue of redress that users can choose to engage with – or abandon – without forfeiting their right to go before an independent tribunal.

By requiring that ODS bodies be independent, impartial, and meet certain quality and transparency standards, Article 21 helps to ensure that users are not steered into low-quality or biased procedures that could undermine their Charter rights in practice.

Instead, the DSA creates a structured, affordable, and relatively swift mechanism through which users can contest platform decisions, particularly in situations where going to court would be too costly, time-consuming or complex.

Impacts

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Article 21 represents an unprecedented regulatory approach, creating "private quasi-courts" for content moderation disputes[2]. According to scholards, it could have an impact on rule of law, effectiveness of non-binding decisions, and potential for forum shopping if bodies apply different standards[15]. Because Article 21 relies on certified out-of-court bodies rather than courts, it inserts private or semi-private adjudicators into disputes that often implicate freedom of expression and other fundamental rights[16].

Still, out-of-court dispute settlement may not only facilitate individual redress but also generate information about recurring moderation disputes, which could help reveal broader enforcement patterns relevant to DSA oversight and, indirectly, to systemic-risk analysis[17]. Results showing 75% overturn rates at Appeals Centre Europe have highlighted both the value of independent review and serious questions about platform content moderation quality[18].

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References

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  1. ↑ "Out-of-court dispute settlement bodies under the Digital Services Act (DSA) | Shaping Europe's digital future". digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu. Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Ruschemeier, Hannah; Quintais, João Pedro; Nenadić, Iva; De Gregorio, Giovanni; Eder, Niklas (2024-09-10), Brave New World, doi:10.59704/46b8611eb2d96a84, retrieved 2026-04-01
  3. ↑ Bengi Zeybek, Joris van Hoboken, Ilaria Buri (2022-05-04). "Redressing Infringements of Individuals' Rights Under the Digital Services Act". DSA Observatory. Retrieved 2026-04-01.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ↑ Dr Daniel Holznagel (2023-09-21). "Art. 21 DSA – What to expect?". CR-online.de Blog (in German). Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  5. ↑ "European Union: Commission Publishes List of Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines under Digital Services Act". The Library of Congress. Archived from the original on 2025-07-10. Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  6. 1 2 O'Donovan, Brian (2025-10-01). "Nudity, bullying and hate speech among appeals complaints". RTÉ News.
  7. ↑ Kaushal, Rishabh; Van De Kerkhof, Jacob; Goanta, Catalina; Spanakis, Gerasimos; Iamnitchi, Adriana (2024-06-05). "Automated Transparency: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Digital Services Act Transparency Database". Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. FAccT '24. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery: 1121–1132. doi:10.1145/3630106.3658960. ISBN 979-8-4007-0450-5.
  8. ↑ Fabio, Lutz Riede, Theresa Ehlen, Tobias Timmann, Laura Knoke, Jan Niklas Di (2025-10-31). "DSA decoded #8: Out-of-court dispute resolution settlement – a new regime". Passle. Retrieved 2026-04-01.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  9. ↑ Jaursch, Julian (2022-10-31). "Platform oversight". Verfassungsblog: On Matters Constitutional (in German). doi:10.17176/20221031-220344-0. ISSN 2366-7044.
  10. ↑ Gradoni, Lorenzo; Ortolani, Pietro (2025-03-12). "Vying for the Scales". Verfassungsblog. doi:10.59704/281ae3f68d546081. ISSN 2366-7044.
  11. 1 2 Jahangir, Ramsha (2025-10-08). "What We Can Learn from the First Digital Services Act Out-of-Court Dispute Settlements?". Tech Policy Press. Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  12. ↑ Academic Advisory Board. "Reporting and Transparency of Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement Bodies under Article 21 DSA" (PDF). Discussion Report. Retrieved 2026-03-06.
  13. ↑ Fabio, Lutz Riede, Theresa Ehlen, Tobias Timmann, Laura Knoke, Jan Niklas Di (2025-10-31). "DSA decoded #8: Out-of-court dispute resolution settlement – a new regime". Passle. Retrieved 2026-04-01.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  14. ↑ "February 8, 2024 - DSA Observatory". 2024-02-08. Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  15. ↑ Dr Daniel Holznagel (2023-09-21). "Art. 21 DSA – What to expect?". CR-online.de Blog (in German). Retrieved 2026-04-01.
  16. ↑ van de Kerkhof, Jacob (2025). "The DSA's Tower of Babel: On Digital Services Coordinators and Freedom of Expression". European Journal of Risk Regulation. 16 (4): 1392–1417. doi:10.1017/err.2025.10034. ISSN 1867-299X.
  17. ↑ Husovec, Martin (2024-08-29), "Content Moderation: Outline", Principles of the Digital Services Act (1 ed.), Oxford University Press, pp. 185–201, doi:10.1093/law-ocl/9780192882455.003.0010, ISBN 978-0-19-288245-5, retrieved 2026-04-10{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  18. ↑ Appeals Center Europe. "Transparency Report 2024/2025" (PDF).
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