Draft:Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (Canada)

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Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy

Bureau du surintendant des faillites
Agency overview
Formed	December 1, 1932
Type	Agency responsible for regulating the insolvency profession; ensuring compliance in the insolvency process; documenting and investigating complaints related to the insolvency process.
Jurisdiction	Canada
Headquarters	C.D. Howe Building, 235 Queen Street, Ottawa, ON
Employees	374 (2025–26).
Annual budget	C$ 56 million (2025-2026)
Agency executive	Elisabeth Lang, Superintendent of Bankruptcy
Parent department	Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada
Website	https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/office-superintendent-bankruptcy/en

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB; French: Bureau du surintendant des faillites; BSF) is a Government of Canada agency operating under the authority of the Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development.

The OSB is headed by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, a Governor in Council appointee vested with independent statutory and quasi‑judicial powers, and functions as a vote‑net revenue organization, funding its operations by recovering its costs through the insolvency process.

Organization

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy operates from the OSB National Headquarters, located in Ottawa, Ontario. It is responsible for overall policy development, regulatory oversight and coordination of the insolvency system.

In addition to its headquarters, it maintains a dozen regional offices across Canada: Vancouver (British Columbia); Calgary (Alberta); Edmonton (Alberta); Saskatoon (Saskatchewan); Winnipeg (Manitoba); Hamilton (Ontario); London (Ontario); Toronto (Ontario); Ottawa (Ontario); Montréal (Québec); Quebec City (Québec); Halifax (Nova Scotia). The OSB Regional Offices deal with the day-to-day administration of files, interact with debtors, creditors and Licensed Insolvency Trustees, and are designated points of contact for the service or notification of legal proceedings involving the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

i. Superintendent of Bankruptcy

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy heads the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and is appointed by the Governor in Council for a renewable term of up to five years. The Superintendent supervises the administration of all estates and matters to which the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) applies.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy’s statutory mandate includes licensing and regulating Licensed Insolvency Trustees, issuing binding directives, maintaining public records of insolvency proceedings and trustee licences, and intervening in court proceedings as if a party where necessary to protect the integrity of the regime. In practice, these responsibilities are carried out through the OSB’s national headquarters and regional offices, with many powers being exercised by OSB officials acting under delegation from the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. For operational purposes, materials that must be provided “to the Superintendent” are routed to the Superintendent’s division offices as specified in directives, which are carried out by OSB staff. Employees needed to assist the Superintendent are appointed under the federal Public Service Employment Act.

ii. Deputy Superintendents & Associate Deputy Superintendents

Under the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, the OSB is organized into several functional branches: Operations; Innovation & Transformation; Regulatory Policy & Public Affairs; Integrity & Enforcement; Corporate Services; Corporate Secretariat & Registry. These branches are each led by senior executives acting as "Deputy Superintendent" or "Associate Deputy Superintendent".These senior officials oversee day-to-day program delivery, including oversight of Licensed Insolvency Trustees, regional operations, complex case supervision, policy development and stakeholder engagement, while implementing the priorities set out in the OSB’s business plans and public communications.

iii. Official receivers

Official receivers are federal employees in the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy who are appointed by the Governor in Council to supervise estate administration by the trustees; they are deemed to be officers of the court.Official receivers operate in local “divisions” and must report each bankruptcy originating in their division to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. In practice, each trustee is typically linked to a division-office team of three official receivers, with each member responsible for a distinct aspect of oversight.

Their statutory functions include accepting assignments in bankruptcy, issuing Certificates of Appointment, conducting inquiries and investigations of bankrupts, reporting possible bankruptcy offences to the court, and convening and chairing meetings of creditors where required. They also receive Division I proposals and may chair creditors’ meetings related to those proposals; for consumer proposals, they receive filings, may request that administrators apply to the court for a review of a proposal, and chair creditors’ meetings when appropriate.

iv. Bankruptcy Analysts

Bankruptcy Analysts are federal employees in the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy who are responsable for supervising trustee's administrations of estates. An individual Licensed Insolvency Trustee is "generally associated with a team of three analysts in a division office, namely a Senior Bankruptcy Analyst (SBA), a Bankruptcy Analyst (BA) and an Assistant Bankruptcy Analyst (ABA). Bankruptcy Analysts are posted across Canada in Regional and Division Offices and are responsible for tasks such as reviewing estate administration, conducting compliance work, preparing court interventions and supporting investigations and policy initiatives. Senior Bankruptcy Analysts typically perform similar work at a higher level of complexity, lead or mentor analyst teams, and play a greater role in complex files and national projects within branches such as Operations and Integrity and Enforcement.

v. Bankruptcy Investigators

The OSB’s Integrity & Enforcement branch centralizes the agency’s expertise for complex cases and enforcement activities. According to a 2022 presentation by the Superintendent to the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP), this branch supervises CCAA and more complex BIA files, conducts professional conduct investigations, applies conservatory measures, and brings together the OSB’s Special Investigations Units to focus on criminal offences and serious non-compliance in the insolvency system. Investigators and senior investigators in this branch review complaints received through the OSB’s complaint mechanisms, analyze evidence, liaise with law-enforcement and other regulators where appropriate, and recommend administrative or disciplinary action by the Superintendent against Licensed Insolvency Trustees, debtors or other stakeholders. Their work underpins the OSB’s stated objective of protecting “the integrity of Canada’s insolvency system” and maintaining public confidence in the regime.

vi. Regulatory Policy and Public Affairs Officers

The OSB also maintains a Policy and Regulatory Affairs branch, which supports the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in developing, communicating and updating the regulatory framework for insolvency in Canada. Policy and communications officers in this branch work on issues such as reviewing directives and regulations under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, coordinating public consultations, publishing notices and position papers, and producing guidance for Licensed Insolvency Trustees and other stakeholders.

History

i. Early federal insolvency legislation (1869-1880)

Two years after Confederation, Canada enacted its first federal insolvency statute, the Insolvent Act of 1869, which established the role of the “official assignee” (a precursor to today’s Licensed Insolvency Trustees), though no formal regulatory body was created to oversee the profession. At the time, official assignees were nominated by local Boards of Trade or Chambers of Commerce. This framework was modified by the Insolvent Act of 1875, in which the federal government assumed control over the nomination process. Note that both of these statutes applied exclusively to insolvent traders.

However, in the years following the assumption of control by the federal government, the nomination process "quickly degenerated into a patronage scheme". Concerns rapidly mounted about the conduct of official assignees, particularly with respect to inflated fees, delays in administering estates, lack of competence, and instances of collusion with both debtors and creditors. These issues further undermined confidence in the federal regime and contributed to its growing unpopularity.

Additionally, a prolonged worldwide economic depression between 1874 and 1878 led to widespread commercial failures and growing public dissatisfaction with the Canadian insolvency regime. In response, Parliament enacted the Insolvency Acts Repeal Act in 1880, effectively repealing federal insolvency legislation in 1880.

ii. Absence of federal insolvency legislation (1880-1919)

Regarding corporate insolvencies, it soon became apparent that in the absence of a federal Insolvency Act, there was no efficient mechanism to wind up insolvent companies. Therefore, Parliament adopted in 1882 the Insolvent Banks, Insurance Companies, Loan Companies, Building Societies and Trading Corporations Act, later known as the Winding-Up Act. This Act provided for a convenient way to liquidate insolvent companies in the absence of a general insolvency law by creating a court-controlled liquidation framework distinct from bankruptcy. Under the procedures of the Winding-Up Act, the title remained with the company under a liquidator’s control, the Crown was not bound, and no "act of bankruptcy" had to be proved to wind up an insolvent or deemed-insolvent company. The Winding-Up Act was amended in 1889 to include solvent companies, thereby broadening the statute’s corporate scope beyond strictly insolvent companies.

As for personal bankruptcies, no federal insolvency law applied to individuals during the period 1880–1919. Thus, individuals in financial distress could only seek relief under provincial laws. At the time, provincial insolvency statutes required debtors to assign their property to a trustee licensed by the province. The trustee, overseen by the inspectors (creditors), was responsible for liquidating the estate, with fees and expenses paid out of the debtor’s assets. A defining feature of the provincial insolvency legislation was that creditors were not allowed force a debtor to assign their property to a trustee.

iii. Enactment of the federal Bankruptcy Act and the shift to a federal insolvency framework (1919)

By 1917, growing support emerged for the enaction of a federal bill regarding insolvency, leading to the establishment of a Canadian Bar Association committee that would be charged with drafting it. However, opposition arose from some businessmen and provincially licensed trustees who feared that a lawyer-drafted statute would replace the provincial system of creditor-controlled administration with court-supervised proceedings. In response, the Canadian Credit Men’s Trust Association, one of the largest trustee firms of the period, commissioned Henry Platt Grundy, a Manitoba lawyer, to draft a bill designed to preserve creditor control and retain the main features of provincial insolvency legislation. As a result, Parliament enacted the Bankruptcy Act in 1919, based on Grundy's earlier draft.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1919 introduced significant reforms to Canada’s insolvency regime, most notably by expanding the federal framework to encompass both individuals and corporations and by allowing limited companies to make proposals to creditors prior to the issuance of a receiving order or the filing of an assignment. In addition, the federal government reasserted control over the appointment of insolvency professionals, now referred to as “trustees” or “authorized trustees.” Trustees were now appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Canada, and qualification required only the posting of security in the amount of 8,000 CAD$. However, this regime proved short-lived: it was abandoned following the amendments of 1923, after which trustees could be selected directly by creditors without formal federal appointment.

iv. Amendments to the federal Bankruptcy Act (1923)

It was hoped that the administrative system introduced by the 1919 Bankruptcy Act, modeled on the prevailing practice under the provincial insolvency legislation, would forestall the abuses that had discredited the earlier insolvency legislation. However, in the years that followed, many complaints emerged across Canada regarding debtors that were bribing creditors or employing fraudulent means to obtain consent for proposals and thereby avoid bankruptcy.

Additionally, it became apparent that, under the new 1919 Bankruptcy Act, the majority of estates were not entrusted to the seasoned trustee organizations that had managed most provincial insolvency matters. At the time, the position of trustee attracted many inexperienced and unqualified individuals; given the limited caseload, open solicitation became common and often led to collusion and substandard administration of estates.

In response, Parliament passed the 1923 Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act, which introduced several changes to the earlier statute. Among them was a provision barring debtors from submitting a proposal until after being declared bankrupt and the first meeting of creditors had been held. It also created the Office of the Custodian to address abuses in the selection of trustees, particularly in voluntary assignments that allowed debtors to nominate their own trustee. The custodian functioned as the de facto initial trustee in every estate, taking possession of the debtor’s property and safeguarding it until a trustee was appointed at the first meeting of creditors. In practice, the custodian was almost invariably appointed as trustee; accordingly, the Office of the Custodian proved redundant and was eventually abolished in 1949.

v. Creation of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (1932)

In the years following the 1919 and 1923 reforms, a rise of complaints regarding the bankruptcy trustees' conduct and fraudulent practices was observed, leading to numerous investigations into these practices. The Annual Report of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy for the Calendar Year 1934 listed some of the fraudulent practices committed by bankruptcy trustees prior to 1932:

"Fraudulent bankruptcies, defaulting and absconding trustees, collusion and connivance between debtors and trustees, solicitation of assignments, excessive costs, and unnecessary, delays in the administration of estates were among the principal abuses alleged to exist..." (p. 5)

Abuses surrounding the appointment of trustees were particularly common at the time. Robert H. Thayer's Report on Bankruptcy Administration in Canada, published in 1930, identified fraudulent insolvency trustees as one of the main concerns of the Canadian insolvency system; for example, he reported having heard of bankruptcy trustees 'filing fictitious creditor claims to control the election of the trustee'. Notably, Thayer's report concluded that there was a need for a system that will protect creditors from dishonest Trustees and permit only competent and trustworthy organizations to conduct a liquidation business'.

The abusive practices used by bankruptcy trustees in the 1920s were also studied thoroughly by the Canadian Bar Association, which led to the publication of the Report of the Special Committee on Bankruptcy on August 28, 1931. While the Canadian Bar Association's report did not recommend any changes to the substance of the Bankruptcy Act itself, it did recommend that the administration of the Bankruptcy Act needed to be changed.

Richard Bedford Bennett, 11th Prime Minister of Canada

Following the publication of the Canadian Bar Association's report, a Special Committee of the House of Commons was formed to investigate the allegations brought forward. After their investigations, the members of the Committee concluded that the best remedy moving forward would be to issue licences to trustees and to supervise their activities.

The following year, the Special Committee's conclusions lead the conservative government of Prime Minister R. B. Bennett to pass The Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act, which officially came into force on December 1, 1932, and created the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy as a department under the Ministry of Finance. This department was intended to serve as an independent and impartial authority, responsible for providing official supervision of trustees in the administration of estates under the Bankruptcy Act.

Sometime during the following decade, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy was transferred from the Ministry of Finance and it started operating as a branch of the Department of Justice until 1966.

vi. Legislative reforms (1966-1667)

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the number of complaints concerning fraudulent bankruptcies rose considerably, accompanied by criticisms that the existing investigatory framework was inadequate to address the issue. In response, Parliament enacted An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act in 1966, which expanded the investigative powers of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Notably, the amendments authorized the Superintendent of Bankruptcy to investigate offences under any Act of Parliament, irrespective of whether they occurred before or after the bankruptcy. The 1966–1967 Annual Report of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy outlined the changes to the Superintendent’s responsibilities following the 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act as follows:

"Before the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, the main responsibility of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy was to supervise the trustees in their administration of estates in bankruptcy. The 1966 amendments give the Superintendent additional powers of investigation and inquiry with respect to irregularities or offences that may have been committed prior to the bankruptcy."

— Annual Report of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (1966-1967), p. 3

That same year, the enactment of the Government Organization Act officially transferred the administration of the Bankruptcy Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act and Part I of the Winding-up Act to the Registrar General of Canada. On October 1, 1966, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy started operating under the authority of the Department of Registrar General. This department was subsequently abolished the following year, with the functions of the Registrar General being assigned to the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. As such, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy was yet again transferred and began operating under the authority of the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in 1967.

Beginning in 1967, a new policy was also introduced governing the issuance of insolvency trustee licences, aimed at improving the qualifications and professional standards of new applicants. Under the new criteria, applicants were required to demonstrate a sound knowledge of insolvency law and practice, maintain a good reputation within their community, be financially stable, and possess experience in bankruptcy administration or the opportunity to acquire such experience. Applicants were also required to appear before a Board of Examination as a condition of entry into the profession, a requirement that proved to be a significant barrier. For example, only 32% of candidates met the prescribed standards and were granted licences between 1968 and 1970 (79% as of 2023).

vii. Adoption of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (1992)

Between 1932 and 1992, the substantive role of the Superintendent remained largely unchanged. Ultimate decision-making authority continued to rest with the responsible Minister, who was not bound by the Superintendent’s recommendations regarding licence applications, renewals, or disciplinary measures. Although the Superintendent played an advisory role in these matters, this structure attracted criticism. In particular, the 1970 Tassé Report emphasized that “the procedure for disciplining the trustees should not only be, but appear to be, entirely free from political interference.”

Concerns were addressed with the introduction of a new regulatory regime under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which came into force on August 1, 1992, and was later refined through amendments in 1997 and 2009. Under this framework, the Minister’s role was eliminated, and the Superintendent was granted authority to make licensing and disciplinary decisions.

In 1993, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs merged with the Department of Industry, Science and Technology; the newly formed department was renamed Industry Canada in 1995. The department's name was changed in 2015 to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada.

Mandate and areas of activity

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is responsible for protecting the integrity of Canada’s insolvency system.: It also has "a public policy role in ensuring that the overall system (i.e. the trustee community, the courts and the OSB) works in harmony to maintain the bankruptcy and insolvency system in Canada". The OSB's main areas of activity are described on their website

"The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is responsible for supervising all estates and matters to which the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act applies, as well as certain matters under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The OSB licenses and regulates the insolvency profession; supervises the administration of estates in bankruptcy, commercial reorganizations, consumer proposals and receiverships; maintains a public record of BIA and CCAA filings; records and investigates complaints from debtors and creditors regarding the insolvency process; and ensures compliance through maintenance and enforcement of the regulatory framework."

Regulation of the insolvency profession

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is the federal agency responsible for the regulation of the insolvency profession in Canada. It is in charge of developing and enforcing professional standards for estate administration in order to preserve the integrity of the Canadian insolvency system.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy is responsible for the licensing of insolvency professionals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In 1934, there were 351 bankruptcy trustees authorized to operate in Canada by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Over the following decades, this number slowly grew, reaching a total of 500 trustees by 1966. On the other hand, between 1971 and 2001, the number of annual filings with the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy skyrocketed from under 10,000 to over 100,000; as a result, the number of bankruptcy trustees increased sharply, reaching approximately 900 in 2002. As of 2023, there were 1,185 Licensed Insolvency Trustees authorized to operate in Canada by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

Before 2016, the professional designation of authorized insolvency professionals was 'Trustee in bankruptcy'. However, since the publication of the OSB's Directive no. 33 - Trustee Designation and Advertising in 2015, insolvency professionals authorized by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy to operate in Canada are now referred to as 'Licensed Insolvency Trustees'.

i. Licensing process

The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act confers to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy the authority to issue directives establishing the criteria to be applied when determining if an applicant has the qualifications to receive a LIT licence. The latest directive outlining these licensing criteria is Directive No. 13R8 - Trustee Licensing, issued in 2023. According to the Superintendent's directive, a candidate must be solvent and of good character and reputation. Additionally, the candidate must have completed the Chartered Insolvency and Restructuring Professional Qualification Program, the Chartered Insolvency and Restructuring Professional National Insolvency Exam and the Insolvency Counsellor's Qualification Course. Once a candidate has completed the prerequisites, they are allowed to apply for a trustee licence using the OSB Licence Administration Application.

Upon receiving an application for a trustee licence, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy must initiate an investigation to assess whether the applicant meets the qualifications, based on the licensing criteria set out in the Superintendent's directives. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy may refuse to issue a trustee licence if the applicant is insolvent or has been convicted of an indictable offence that would impair their ability to fulfill the fiduciary duties of a trustee. It is also important to note that the insolvency trustee's license may be revoked by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy if they no longer meet the conditions that enabled them to obtain it.

After validating that the candidate has completed the prerequisites, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy will invite the candidate to appear before the Oral Board of Examination. According to their website, the Oral Board of Examination shifted in 2013 from assessing candidates' knowledge to assessing their competencies. These competencies are listed on their website. Licensing candidates can choose an Oral Board Examination focused on the consumer or commercial context to assess their competencies. If they are successful, they would then receive a licence that is limited to the chosen area. They may later develop competence in the alternate area and apply to sit a subsequent Oral Board Examination to remove the limitation, or continue to practise solely as a Licensed insolvency trustee in consumer or corporate matters.

After assessing the candidate's performance, the board will provide its recommendations, along with the reasons, to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Before the issue of a trustee licence, the applicant must pay the fees associated with the licence; as of 2025, the licence application fees were 359.81 CAD$. Additionally, the trustee must pay every year the annual licence renewal fees to renew their licence; as of 2025, the licence renewal fees were 1,019.52 CAD$. If the trustee does not pay the annual licence fees, their licence ceases to be valid.

ii. Issuance of directives

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy has the authority to issue directives relating to the administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The directives can be issued to official receivers, Licensed insolvency trustees, administrators of consumer proposals and insolvency counselors; every person to whom a directive was issued must comply with it. However, the court is not bound by the directives of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

The Superintendent’s directives set out the day-to-day procedures and standards for Licensed insolvency trustees and other participants in the insolvency system—everything from licensing requirements to debtor assessment and counselling, surplus-income standards, handling estate funds and banking, proofs of claim, proxies, quorums and voting at creditor meetings, realization of estate assets, as well as the prescribed forms and electronic filing. In short, they function as the OSB’s operational rulebook, consolidating procedures, forms, and policy positions for consistent practice across Canada.

iii. Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP)

The Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP) is a non-profit association incorporated in 1979 to promote the professionalism and education of its members across the country. As of 2024, it represented nearly 1,400 members across Canada. While its membership is voluntary, most Licensed insolvency trustees operating in Canada are members of the association. As such, member LITs must respect the professional standards established by the association.

The Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals sets professional standards through its Bylaws, Rules of Professional Conduct, and Standards of Professional Practice, as well as mandatory continuing professional development for members. It enforces these standards through a discipline process addressing professional misconduct, incompetence, and incapacity.

Ensuring compliance in the insolvency process

i. Compliance monitoring and complaints

Since the establishment of the office in 1932, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy has played a central role in overseeing the conduct of participants in insolvency proceedings through a formal complaints function. Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Superintendent is tasked with collecting and maintaining complaints submitted by creditors and other interested parties, and may initiate investigations where warranted. A comparable responsibility exists under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act with respect to complaints involving court-appointed monitors. This oversight function has remained a consistent feature of the regulatory framework, with the volume of complaints reaching roughly 1,200 per year by 2010.

Acting under the general mandate to supervise the administration of all estates and matters under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy may “make or cause to be made any inquiry or investigation” into the conduct of Licensed insolvency trustees and estate administration, and uses that to run inspections, file reviews, theme-based audits, and complaint-driven probes. Licensed insolvency trustees are obliged to cooperate under the Code of Ethics for Trustees, so non-cooperation itself can ground further action

ii. Investigative powers of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy

Under section 10 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is granted broad powers to inquire into and investigate situations where there are signs that an offense may have been committed in relation to an estate or matter governed by the Act; it is an offense for any individual to contravene to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy's investigations and enquiries started under section 10. After obtaining evidence that an offence to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or the Criminal Code of Canada occurred, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is then required to report the findings to the Deputy Attorney General of the province concerned.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy is also granted powers to make inquiries and investigations of estates or other proceedings filed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which includes investigations into the conduct of a Licensed insolvency trustee; the Superintendent of Bankruptcy has access to and may make copies of all books, records, data, documents and papers that are relevant to the inquiry or investigation. Additionally, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy has the authority to access, examine, and make copies of a Licensed Insolvency Trustee’s banking accounts in which estate funds may have been deposited, including all deposit slips, cancelled cheques, and other related documents. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy may also appoint someone else for the purpose of the inquiry or investigation and delegate to them the powers related to it.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy may also, with leave of the court granted on an ex parte application, examine the books, records, documents, and deposit accounts of any person named in the order when there are reasonable grounds to believe that estate property or funds have not been properly disclosed or administered; furthermore, for that purpose and under a warrant from the court, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy may enter and search any premises.

iii. Conservatory measures

To protect estates pending or during discipline, the Superintendent may issue conservatory measures—such as freezing estate bank accounts, directing preservation of books and records, instructing how estate assets are to be dealt with, or directing the Official Receiver not to appoint a trustee to new files—where specified triggers exist (e.g. serious concerns, investigation underway, non-payment of levies, criminal conviction, or pending licensing decision). These orders are binding on those notified and operate as a powerful interim control mechanism over a trustee’s practice.

Professional conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings

When an investigation suggests that a Licensed insolvency trustee has not properly performed duties, breached the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, the Superintendent's Directives, or the Criminal Code of Canada, or that action is required in the public interest, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy may initiate formal professional conduct proceedings that can lead to licence sanctions. The process includes written notice setting out proposed measures and reasons, an opportunity for the LIT to be heard, and a decision with reasons that may impose conditions, suspend or cancel the licence, or order restitution or other corrective steps.

In professional conduct proceedings, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (or delegate) may compel attendance of witnesses from anywhere in Canada, require production of documents and electronic data, administer oaths, and receive evidence with flexible procedure aimed at fairness and efficiency. These quasi-judicial powers anchor the disciplinary process in a robust evidentiary framework comparable to that of an administrative tribunal.

The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act requires that notices of intended disciplinary measures, evidence filed, and written reasons in professional conduct decisions form part of a public record (subject to limited confidentiality protections), and treats the Superintendent for these purposes as a federal board, commission, or other tribunal subject to judicial review.

i. Professional conduct investigations

Responsibility for examining the professional conduct of trustees originates in the statutory powers granted to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act. In practice, this function is carried out by designated bankruptcy analysts within the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Upon initiation of an investigation, the analyst is formally authorized to act and may be supported by legal counsel assigned to the file, while the Licensed Insolvency Trustee concerned is notified of the process.

A duty of cooperation is embedded in the regulatory framework governing Licensed Insolvency Trustees, requiring them to assist the Superintendent in the exercise of oversight functions. This obligation, reflected in the Code of Ethics for Trustees and extended to monitors under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, applies throughout any inquiry into professional conduct. It requires trustees to respond fully, accurately, and promptly to requests for information made in the course of an investigation.

The conduct of the investigation rests solely with the assigned investigator, who operates independently from both the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and the Licensed Insolvency Trustee concerned. This independence is maintained through an internal separation of functions, whereby individuals responsible for investigative activities are institutionally distinct from those who may later exercise decision-making authority. This framework of separation has been acknowledged and upheld in multiple judicial decisions.

ii. Professional Conduct Report

Upon completing the inquiry, the investigator prepares a report summarizing the evidence and determining whether any regulatory response is justified. If the record does not substantiate misconduct, the matter may be brought to a close without further steps. Even where instances of non-compliance with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act are identified, the investigator may conclude that formal sanctions are unnecessary, having regard to the seriousness of the conduct and the suitability of alternative corrective measures.

At this stage, matters may also be resolved without proceeding to a hearing where the evidence supports regulatory action. Any such resolution requires the agreement of both the Licensed Insolvency Trustee and the investigator, and must be approved by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Where an agreement cannot be reached, the parties may be offered the opportunity to engage in mediation with an independent third party, on a voluntary basis.

Following completion of the professional conduct report, the Licensed Insolvency Trustee is formally notified that proceedings may be initiated. This notice outlines the statutory powers available to the Superintendent, sets out the concerns at issue and the supporting evidence, identifies the possible consequences, and provides the trustee with an opportunity to respond and be heard.

iii. Pre-hearing Proceedings

Upon service of the notice and the professional conduct report, the Licensed Insolvency Trustee has 30 days to indicate, with reasons, whether a hearing is sought and, if so, whether it should proceed in writing or orally. Failing such a request, the matter may be determined on the record without further notice. Where the Superintendent of Bankruptcy elects to assign the adjudicative function to a delegate, the trustee is advised of this decision in writing.

Prior to the hearing, the adjudicator will convene at least one pre-hearing conference to refine the issues in dispute, confirm that all relevant information has been exchanged, clarify procedural expectations, and establish a timetable for the proceedings. Such a conference may be initiated by the adjudicator or held at the request of a party.

Public records and insolvency statistics

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is required to maintain a public record of all proposals (since 1966) and bankruptcies, licences issued to insolvency trustees, appointments or designations of administrators made by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, and notices of appointment submitted by Official Receivers to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy; it is also required to provide, upon request and payment of the prescribed fees, any information contained in the public record.

Additionally, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy may maintain any other records related to the administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that the Superintendent of Bankruptcy considers advisable, and may also enter into agreements to provide compilations of all or part of the information contained in the public record.

i. Historical Bankruptcy Statistics (1933-1965)

Insolvency statistics between 1933 and 1965

Across 1933 to 1965, Canada recorded 65,957 bankrupt estates. The annual volume of bankrupt estates recorded fell from 2,608 in 1933 to a wartime low of 264 in 1945, before rising steadily to a peak of 5,333 and 5,023 in 1964 and 1965. From 1945 trough to the mid-1960s, the annual volume of bankrupt estates recorded increased by a factor of approximately 20.

Historical Volume of Bankrupt Estates

Year (1933-1966)	Bankrupt Estates Reported
1933	2,608
1934	1,411
1935	1,263
1936	1,154
1937	967
1938	1,074
1939	1,109
1940	1,003
1941	918
1942	725
1943	416
1944	273
1945	264
1946	269
1947	509
1948	799
1949	1,045
1950	1,275
1951	1,349
1952	1,434
1953	1,617
1954	2,265
1955	2,414
1956	2,849
1957	3,486
1958	3,229
1959	3,238
1960	3,641
1961	3,511
1962	4,297
1963	5,189
1964	5,333
1965	5,023

ii. Modern Insolvency Statistics (1966-2024)

Insolvency Statistics from 1966 to 2024

From the late 1960s to the late 1990s, total insolvency filings in Canada rose in long waves and then flattened. After the oil shocks and high inflation of the 1970s, filings climbed from 5,245 in 1969 to 23,882 in 1979, an increase of 356%, including a 57% jump in 1974 alone. The early 1980s recession and very high interest rates pushed totals up to 41,843 in 1982, 75% higher than 1979, before easing 24% by 1984 as growth returned. The early-1990s recession drove another surge from 55,356 in 1990 to 77,336 in 1992 and on to a late-decade high of 103,781 in 1997.

Through the 2000s, the annual number of insolvency filings grew steadily until the 2008 financial crisis. The following year, the annual number of insolvency filings peaked at 158,441 filings, up 59% from 2000. Through the 2010s totals stayed level, with 140,234 in 2010 and 140,858 in 2019.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, total insolvency filings fell sharply and then recovered above pre-pandemic levels. Totals dropped 29.6% from 140,858 in 2019 to 99,244 in 2020, fell another 6.8% to 92,572 in 2021, then rose 11.9% in 2022, 23.6% in 2023, and 12.1% in 2024 to reach 143,483, which is 1.9% above the 2019 volume.

As for proposals, they rose from a rare option to the dominant insolvency procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The annual volume of proposals stayed low through the 1960s to 1980s at roughly 200 to 600 per year, then expanded in the 1990s from 900 in 1990 to 11,840 in 1999, about a twelvefold increase. Growth continued in the 2000s from 14,529 in 2000 to 36,640 in 2009, up 152%, and nearly doubled in the 2010s from 43,468 in 2010 to 83,703 in 2019, up 93%. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the volume fell 23% from 2019 to 2020 and slipped a further 1.7% in 2021, then rebounded 71% to 109,672 in 2024. As a share of all insolvency proceedings, proposals rose from 1.6% in 1990 to 12.5% in 1999, 23.1% in 2009, 59.4% in 2019, and 76.4% in 2024. Proposals surpassed consumer bankruptcies for the first time in 2016 and remained the majority thereafter.

Annual Volume of Bankruptcies and Proposals (1966-2024)

Year (1966-2024)	Consumer Bankruptcies	Business Bankruptcies	Proposals
1966	1,903	2,774	286
1967	1,549	2,474	253
1968	1,308	2,481	310
1969	1,725	3,254	266
1970	2,732	2,927	315
1971	3,107	3,045	275
1972	3,086	3,081	228
1973	3,195	2,934	253
1974	6,992	2,790	220
1975	8,335	2,958	202
1976	10,049	3,136	211
1977	12,772	3,905	254
1978	15,938	5,546	234
1979	17,876	5,694	312
1980	19,025	8,595	403
1981	23,036	8,055	392
1982	30,643	10,765	435
1983	26,822	10,260	470
1984	22,022	9,578	389
1985	19,752	8,663	402
1986	21,765	8,502	543
1987	24,436	7,768	478
1988	25,823	8,146	503
1989	29,155	8,735	557
1990	42,740	11,716	900
1991	62,033	13,568	1,283
1992	61,587	14,379	1,370
1993	54,439	12,440	3,064
1994	53,538	11,390	3,151
1995	65,332	12,819	3,808
1996	79,504	13,599	4,953
1997	85,234	12,192	6,355
1998	75,423	10,795	8,762
1999	72,984	10,033	11,840
2000	75,087	10,060	14,529
2001	79,383	10,399	15,885
2002	78,163	9,463	17,062
2003	84,232	8,849	18,315
2004	84,408	8,136	18,379
2005	84,602	7,537	19,645
2006	79,245	6,747	20,667
2007	79,847	6,293	22,765
2008	90,610	6,164	26,460
2009	116,381	5,420	36,640
2010	92,694	4,072	43,468
2011	77,993	3,643	46,138
2012	71,495	3,236	48,020
2013	69,224	3,187	50,548
2014	64,839	3,116	54,314
2015	63,406	3,089	59,221
2016	63,372	2,884	63,471
2017	57,969	2,700	65,138
2018	55,091	2,677	71,078
2019	54,409	2,746	83,702
2020	32,880	2,108	64,256
2021	27,461	1,942	63,169
2022	24,586	2,621	76,379
2023	26,216	3,702	98,125
2024	29,040	4,771	108,255

iii. Annual Consumer Insolvency Rates (1987-2024)

Annual Consumer Insolvency Rates

From 1987 to 2024, Canadian consumer insolvency rates rose, peaked, dipped and then partially rebounded, while the mix shifted from almost exclusively bankruptcies to mostly proposals, in step with major economic shocks and legal changes. Overall consumer insolvencies climbed from about 1.3 per 1,000 adults in the late 1980s to 3.0 in 1991, almost entirely in the form of bankruptcies, reflecting the deep 1990–92 recession, high interest rates and rising unemployment. Through the mid-1990s and early 2000s, insolvencies stayed elevated in the 3.5–4.1 range as household debt grew with easier credit, but proposals slowly emerged from 0.0–0.1 in the early 1990s to about 0.6–0.7 by the early 2000s, helped by successive Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act reforms that made proposals a more accessible alternative. The series hits its high point in 2009 at 5.8, driven by the global financial crisis and 2008–09 Canadian recession, with bankruptcies still dominant but proposals now a visible share. After 2009, the total insolvency rate drifts down into the low-to-mid-4s by the mid-2010s, but this masks a structural shift: bankruptcies steadily fall from 3.5 in 2010 to below 2.0 by the late 2010s, while proposals climb from 1.6 to 2.8, becoming the main consumer insolvency tool. The sharp drop to 3.2 in 2020 and 2.9 in 2021 coincides with the COVID-19 pandemic, when massive income supports and credit deferrals suppressed filings despite severe economic disruption. Finally, as pandemic supports end and high inflation plus rapid interest-rate hikes strain household budgets, insolvencies rebound to 4.2 in 2024, with bankruptcies at just 0.9 and proposals at 3.4, confirming that consumer proposals now overwhelmingly dominate the Canadian insolvency landscape.

Per 1,000 Population Aged 18 Years and Older

Years	Consumer Insolvency Rates	Consumer Bankruptcy Rates	Consumer Proposal Rates
1987	1.3	1.2	0.0
1988	1.3	1.3	0.0
1989	1.4	1.4	0.0
1990	2.1	2.1	0.0
1991	3.0	2.9	0.0
1992	2.9	2.9	0.0
1993	2.6	2.5	0.1
1994	2.6	2.4	0.1
1995	3.1	2.9	0.1
1996	3.7	3.5	0.2
1997	4.0	3.8	0.2
1998	3.6	3.3	0.3
1999	3.6	3.1	0.4
2000	3.7	3.2	0.5
2001	3.9	3.3	0.6
2002	3.8	3.2	0.6
2003	4.1	3.4	0.7
2004	4.0	3.4	0.7
2005	4.1	3.3	0.7
2006	3.8	3.1	0.7
2007	3.9	3.1	0.8
2008	4.4	3.4	1.0
2009	5.8	4.5	1.4
2010	5.1	3.5	1.6
2011	4.6	2.9	1.7
2012	4.4	2.6	1.7
2013	4.3	2.5	1.8
2014	4.2	2.3	1.9
2015	4.3	2.3	2.1
2016	4.4	2.2	2.2
2017	4.2	2.0	2.2
2018	4.3	1.9	2.4
2019	4.6	1.8	2.8
2020	3.2	1.1	2.1
2021	2.9	0.9	2.0
2022	3.3	0.8	2.5
2023	3.9	0.8	3.1
2024	4.2	0.9	3.4

iv. Annual Business Insolvency Rates (1998-2024)

Canada annual business insolvency rates (1998-2024)

From 1998 to 2024, Canadian business insolvency rates show a long-term decline, with only modest cyclical bumps and one important statistical break in 2015, while business bankruptcies remain the dominant form relative to proposals. In the late 1990s, overall business insolvencies were very high—8.1 per 1,000 businesses in 1998, almost all bankruptcies (7.2)—but they fell steadily through the 2000s, reaching about 3.1–2.9 around the time of the 2008–09 global financial crisis. That crisis does not produce a spike comparable to consumers; instead, business rates just continue their gradual downward trajectory, likely reflecting a combination of restructuring, tighter lending standards and relatively quick macroeconomic recovery. Through the early 2010s, insolvency rates keep dropping, down to 1.6 in 2014, driven mainly by fewer bankruptcies (1.2), while business proposals stay low but persistent (around 0.4–0.9), indicating that proposals are used but remain secondary for firms compared to straight bankruptcy. The sharp apparent drop from 1.6 in 2014 to 1.0 in 2015 is largely artificial: in 2015, Statistics Canada changed the way it counts business units, adding roughly 1 million additional businesses to the denominator. This definitional change mechanically lowers the business insolvency rate from 2015 onward, so post-2015 values (around 0.9–1.1) are not directly comparable to earlier years. After that break, the rate is broadly stable through 2019, then falls again in 2020–21 (down to 0.7 then 0.6) during the COVID-19 pandemic, when massive income supports, subsidies and loan programs kept many distressed firms out of formal insolvency—creating “missing” business insolvencies similar to what we see for consumers. As pandemic supports are withdrawn and businesses face higher interest rates, inflation and lingering pandemic debt, the rate rises back to 1.1 in 2023 and 2024, with bankruptcies at 0.8 and proposals at 0.2, suggesting that while pressures on businesses have intensified again, proposals still play a relatively modest role compared with consumer files.

Per 1,000 Businesses

Year	Business Insolvency Rates	Business Bankruptcy Rates	Business Proposal Rates
1998	8.1	7.2	0.9
1999	6.3	5.5	0.9
2000	5.7	4.9	0.9
2001	5.8	4.9	0.9
2002	5.2	4.4	0.9
2003	4.8	4.0	0.8
2004	4.2	3.5	0.7
2005	4.1	3.4	0.7
2006	3.5	2.9	0.6
2007	3.2	2.6	0.5
2008	3.1	2.6	0.5
2009	2.9	2.4	0.6
2010	2.3	1.8	0.5
2011	2.0	1.5	0.5
2012	1.8	1.4	0.5
2013	1.7	1.2	0.4
2014	1.6	1.2	0.4
2015	1.0	0.8	0.3
2016	1.0	0.7	0.2
2017	0.9	0.7	0.2
2018	0.9	0.7	0.2
2019	0.9	0.7	0.2
2020	0.7	0.5	0.2
2021	0.6	0.5	0.1
2022	0.8	0.6	0.2
2023	1.1	0.8	0.2
2024	1.1	0.8	0.2

*Per 1,000 Businesses

v. Annual Statistics on CCAA Proceedings (2010-2024)

The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) is a federal law allowing insolvent corporations that owe their creditors in excess of 5 million CAD$ to restructure their business and financial affairs. CCAA proceedings are carried out under supervision of the courts. Although the CCAA was originally enacted in 1933, extensive use of it only began in the economic downturn of the early 1980s.

Annual Volume of CCAA Proceedings

Year	Domestic CCAA Proceedings
2010	35
2011	40
2012	39
2013	32
2014	25
2015	40
2016	42
2017	23
2018	20
2019	38
2020	60
2021	26
2022	38
2023	64
2024	74

External links

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy website

Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada

Superintendent of Bankruptcy

Licensed insolvency trustee