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My changes below are boldfaced. The only citations included below are those for my changes so it's easier to distinguish; I will ensure proper citations remain in the main article. Also note that I reordered the bullet points in the "Theoretical basis" section to represent their support in research and, more generally, to flow better.

Theoretical basis

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A number of theories have been proposed to explain the cognitive mechanism causing the phenomenon, though support for each is inconsistent:

  • Feature atypicality/anomaly recognition: When an entity possesses some feature or aspect that appears unexpected or otherwise violates one's prediction of how such a feature should appear on that entity.[1] This idea has strong underpinnings in predictability. Consider violation of human norms: If an entity looks sufficiently nonhuman, its human characteristics are noticeable, generating empathy. However, if the entity looks almost human, it elicits our model of a human other and its detailed normative expectations. The nonhuman characteristics are noticeable, giving the human viewer a sense of strangeness. In other words, a robot which has an appearance in the uncanny valley range is not judged as a robot doing a passable job at pretending to be human, but instead as an abnormal human doing a bad job at seeming like a normal person. This idea is often best captured by noticing that the uncanny valley is elicited when something which looks mechanical moves human-like, or, the converse, something which looks human moves mechanically.[2] This has been associated with perceptual uncertainty and the theory of predictive coding.
  • Category error: Varying degrees of ambiguity may sometimes qualify an entity as not easily understood or determined.[1] In such cases, a person's sorting or categorizing of an entity may be delayed or inaccurate. This idea is also referred to as category failure, category conflict,[1] or categorization difficulty.[3] Subtly, but importantly, this concept is sometimes labeled category confusion, but research support for this term is less strong.[4] This could be an extension of the concept of Sorites paradoxes: Stimuli with human and nonhuman traits undermine our sense of human identity by linking qualitatively different categories, human and nonhuman, by a quantitative metric: degree of human likeness. The following point elucidates the idea of category error.
  • Conflicting perceptual cues: The negative effect associated with uncanny stimuli is produced by the activation of conflicting cognitive representations. Perceptual tension occurs when an individual perceives conflicting cues to category membership, such as when a humanoid figure moves like a robot or has other visible robot features. This cognitive conflict is experienced as psychological discomfort (i.e., "eeriness"), much like the discomfort that is experienced with cognitive dissonance. Several studies support this possibility. Mathur and Reichling found that the time subjects took to gauge a robot face's human- or mechanical-resemblance peaked for faces deepest in the uncanny valley, suggesting that perceptually classifying these faces as "human" or "robot" posed a greater cognitive challenge. However, they found that while perceptual confusion coincided with the uncanny valley, it did not mediate the effect of the uncanny valley on subjects' social and emotional reactions—suggesting that perceptual confusion may not be the mechanism behind the uncanny valley effect. Burleigh and colleagues demonstrated that faces at the midpoint between human and non-human stimuli produced a level of reported eeriness that diverged from an otherwise linear model relating human-likeness to affect. Yamada et al. found that cognitive difficulty was associated with negative affect at the midpoint of a morphed continuum (e.g., a series of stimuli morphing between a cartoon dog and a real dog). Ferrey et al. demonstrated that the midpoint between images on a continuum anchored by two stimulus categories produced a maximum of negative affect, and found this with both human and non-human entities. Schoenherr and Burleigh provide examples from history and culture that evidence an aversion to hybrid entities, such as the aversion to genetically modified organisms ("Frankenfoods"). Finally, Moore developed a Bayesian mathematical model that provides a quantitative account of perceptual conflict. There has been some debate as to the precise mechanisms that are responsible. It has been argued that the effect is driven by categorization difficulty, configural processing, perceptual mismatch, frequency-based sensitization, and inhibitory devaluation.
  • Mortality salience: Viewing an "uncanny" robot elicits an innate fear of death and culturally supported defenses for coping with death's inevitability.... [P]artially disassembled androids...play on subconscious fears of reduction, replacement, and annihilation: (1) A mechanism with a human façade and a mechanical interior plays on our subconscious fear that we are all just soulless machines. (2) Androids in various states of mutilation, decapitation, or disassembly are reminiscent of a battlefield after a conflict and, as such, serve as a reminder of our mortality. (3) Since most androids are copies of actual people, they are doppelgängers and may elicit a fear of being replaced, on the job, in a relationship, and so on. (4) The jerkiness of an android's movements could be unsettling because it elicits a fear of losing bodily control.
  • Mate selection: Automatic, stimulus-driven appraisals of uncanny stimuli elicit aversion by activating an evolved cognitive mechanism for the avoidance of selecting mates with low fertility, poor hormonal health, or ineffective immune systems based on visible features of the face and body that are predictive of those traits.
  • Pathogen avoidance: Uncanny stimuli may activate a cognitive mechanism that originally evolved to motivate the avoidance of potential sources of pathogens by eliciting a disgust response. "The more human an organism looks, the stronger the aversion to its defects, because (1) defects indicate disease, (2) more human-looking organisms are more closely related to human beings genetically, and (3) the probability of contracting disease-causing bacteria, viruses, and other parasites increases with genetic similarity." The visual anomalies of androids, robots, and other animated human characters cause reactions of alarm and revulsion, similar to corpses and visibly diseased individuals.
  • Threat to humans' distinctiveness and identity: Negative reactions toward very humanlike robots can be related to the challenge that this kind of robot leads to the categorical human–non-human distinction. Kaplan stated that these new machines challenge human uniqueness, pushing for a redefinition of humanness. Ferrari, Paladino and Jetten found that the increase of anthropomorphic appearance of a robot leads to an enhancement of threat to the human distinctiveness and identity. The more a robot resembles a real person, the more it represents a challenge to our social identity as human beings.
  • Religious definition of human identity: The existence of artificial but humanlike entities is viewed by some as a threat to the concept of human identity. An example can be found in the theoretical framework of psychiatrist Irvin Yalom. Yalom explains that humans construct psychological defenses to avoid existential anxiety stemming from death. One of these defenses is 'specialness', the irrational belief that aging and death as central premises of life apply to all others but oneself. The experience of the very humanlike "living" robot can be so rich and compelling that it challenges humans' notions of "specialness" and existential defenses, eliciting existential anxiety. In folklore, the creation of human-like, but soulless, beings is often shown to be unwise, as with the golem in Judaism, whose lack of human empathy and spirit can lead to disaster, however good the intentions of its creator.
  • Uncanny valley of the mind or AI: Due to rapid advancements in the areas of artificial intelligence and affective computing, cognitive scientists have also suggested the possibility of an "uncanny valley of mind". Accordingly, people might experience strong feelings of aversion if they encounter highly advanced, emotion-sensitive technology. Among the possible explanations for this phenomenon, both a perceived loss of human uniqueness and expectations of immediate physical harm, are discussed by contemporary research.

Research

A series of studies experimentally investigated whether uncanny valley effects exist for static images of robot faces. Mathur MB & Reichling DB used two complementary sets of stimuli spanning the range from very mechanical to very human-like: first, a sample of 80 objectively chosen robot face images from Internet searches, and second, a morphometrically and graphically controlled 6-face series set of faces. They asked subjects to explicitly rate the likability of each face. To measure trust toward each face, subjects completed an investment game to measure indirectly how much money they were willing to "wager" on a robot's trustworthiness. Both stimulus sets showed a robust uncanny valley effect on explicitly rated likability and a more context-dependent uncanny valley on implicitly rated trust. Their exploratory analysis of one proposed mechanism for the uncanny valley, perceptual confusion at a category boundary, found that category confusion occurs in the uncanny valley but does not mediate the effect on social and emotional responses.

Some studies have found strong evidence suggesting that the eyes of a stimulus are among its most powerful motivators of uncanniness. One such study was conducted by Schein & Gray (2015), who found that regular human faces with the eyes removed elicited more uncanny feelings than stimuli with the nose removed or no changes at all. Further, they cited that, due to abnormalities in eye-contact and other social skills, individuals with autism may be less susceptible to experiencing the uncanny valley.[5]

A study by Carp et al. (2022) found little to support rhesus monkeys' experiencing the uncanny valley, but the monkeys did favor viewing the eyes over the mouth in realistic stimuli (continuum of altered rhesus monkeys). However, when a more prominent source of affective information was available (e.g., bared teeth), the monkeys did not primarily focus on the eyes of the stimulus.[6]

One study conducted in 2009 examined the evolutionary mechanism behind the aversion associated with the uncanny valley. A group of five monkeys were shown three images: two different 3D monkey faces (realistic, unrealistic), and a real photo of a monkey's face. The monkeys' eye-gaze was used as a proxy for preference or aversion. Since the realistic 3D monkey face was looked at less than either the real photo, or the unrealistic 3D monkey face, this was interpreted as an indication that the monkey participants found the realistic 3D face aversive, or otherwise preferred the other two images. As one would expect with the uncanny valley, more realism can result in less positive reactions, and this study demonstrated that neither human-specific cognitive processes, nor human culture explain the uncanny valley. In other words, this aversive reaction to realism can be said to be evolutionary in origin.

As of 2011, researchers at University of California, San Diego and California Institute for Telecommunications and Information Technology were measuring human brain activations related to the uncanny valley. In one study using fMRI, a group of cognitive scientists and roboticists found the biggest differences in brain responses for uncanny robots in the parietal cortex, on both sides of the brain, specifically in the areas that connect the part of the brain's visual cortex that processes bodily movements with the section of the motor cortex thought to contain mirror neurons. The researchers say they saw, in essence, evidence of mismatch or perceptual conflict. The brain "lit up" when the human-like appearance of the android and its robotic motion "didn't compute". Ayşe Pınar Saygın, an assistant professor from UCSD, stated that "The brain doesn't seem selectively tuned to either biological appearance or biological motion per se. What it seems to be doing is looking for its expectations to be met – for appearance and motion to be congruent."

Viewer perception of facial expression and speech and the uncanny valley in realistic, human-like characters intended for video games and movies is being investigated by Tinwell et al., 2011. Consideration is also given by Tinwell et al. (2010) as to how the uncanny may be exaggerated for antipathetic characters in survival horror games. Building on the body of work already performed for android science, this research intends to build a conceptual mapping of the uncanny valley using 3D characters generated in a real-time gaming engine. The goal is to analyze how cross-modal factors of facial expression and speech can exaggerate the uncanny. Tinwell et al., 2011 have also introduced the notion of an 'unscalable' uncanny wall that suggests that a viewer's discernment for detecting imperfections in realism will keep pace with new technologies in simulating realism. A summary of Angela Tinwell's research on the uncanny valley, psychological reasons behind the uncanny valley and how designers may overcome the uncanny in human-like virtual characters is provided in her book, The Uncanny Valley in Games and Animation by CRC Press.

Similar effects

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If the uncanny valley effect is the result of general cognitive processes, there should be evidence in evolutionary history and cultural artifacts. An effect similar to the uncanny valley was noted by Charles Darwin in 1839:

The expression of this [Trigonocephalus] snake's face was hideous and fierce; the pupil consisted of a vertical slit in a mottled and coppery iris; the jaws were broad at the base, and the nose terminated in a triangular projection. I do not think I ever saw anything more ugly, excepting, perhaps, some of the vampire bats. I imagine this repulsive aspect originates from the features being placed in positions, with respect to each other, somewhat proportional to the human face; and thus we obtain a scale of hideousness.

— Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle

A similar "uncanny valley" effect could, according to the ethical-futurist writer Jamais Cascio, show up when humans begin modifying themselves with transhuman enhancements (cf. body modification), which aim to improve the abilities of the human body beyond what would normally be possible, be it eyesight, muscle strength, or cognition. So long as these enhancements remain within a perceived norm of human behavior, a negative reaction is unlikely, but once individuals supplant normal human variety, revulsion can be expected. However, according to this theory, once such technologies gain further distance from human norms, "transhuman" individuals would cease to be judged on human levels and instead be regarded as separate entities altogether (this point is what has been dubbed "posthuman"), and it is here that acceptance would rise once again out of the uncanny valley. Another example comes from "pageant retouching" photos, especially of children, which some find disturbingly doll-like.

Another application of the uncanny valley was explored by Diel & Lewis (2022), namely as it drives liminal spaces, also colloquially referred to as the backrooms. This is an internet sensation describing negative feelings elicited from strange, eerie, or anomalous structural environments. This study found that uncanniness in physical environments might be better described by atypical features than by category confusion driven by ambiguity. Moreover, they concluded that deviating architectural features and social presence can work to determine the uncanniness felt by viewing structural entities.[7]

  1. 1 2 3 Burleigh, Tyler J.; Schoenherr, Jordan R.; Lacroix, Guy L. (2013-05). "Does the uncanny valley exist? An empirical test of the relationship between eeriness and the human likeness of digitally created faces". Computers in Human Behavior. 29 (3): 759–771. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2012.11.021. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  2. Saygin, Ayse Pinar; Chaminade, Thierry; Ishiguro, Hiroshi; Driver, Jon; Frith, Chris (2012-04). "The thing that should not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving human and humanoid robot actions". Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 7 (4): 413–422. doi:10.1093/scan/nsr025. ISSN 1749-5016. PMC 3324571. PMID 21515639. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  3. Yamada, Yuki; Kawabe, Takahiro; Ihaya, Keiko (2013-01). "Categorization difficulty is associated with negative evaluation in the "uncanny valley" phenomenon". Japanese Psychological Research. 55 (1): 20–32. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5884.2012.00538.x. ISSN 0021-5368. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  4. Mathur, Maya B; Reichling, David; Lunardini, Francesca; Geminiani, Alice; Antonietti, Alberto; Ruijten, Peter; Levitan, Carmel; Nave, Gideon; Manfredi, Dylan (2019-05-04), Uncanny but not confusing: Multisite study of perceptual category confusion in the Uncanny Valley, doi:10.31219/osf.io/89sf4, retrieved 2026-05-03
  5. Schein, Chelsea; Gray, Kurt (2015-11-26). "The eyes are the window to the uncanny valley: Mind perception, autism and missing souls". Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems. 16 (2): 173–179. doi:10.1075/is.16.2.02sch. ISSN 1572-0373.
  6. Carp, Sarah B.; Santistevan, Anthony C.; Machado, Christopher J.; Whitaker, Alexander M.; Aguilar, Brittany L.; Bliss-Moreau, Eliza (2022-07-11). "Monkey visual attention does not fall into the uncanny valley". Scientific Reports. 12 (1). doi:10.1038/s41598-022-14615-x. ISSN 2045-2322. PMC 9273626. PMID 35817791.
  7. Diel, Alexander; Lewis, Michael (2022-08). "Structural deviations drive an uncanny valley of physical places". Journal of Environmental Psychology. 82: 101844. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2022.101844. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: article number as page number (link)