Kyrylo Prystavnyi, known professionally as Avoure, is a Ukrainian DJ and record producer based in Los Angeles, California. He first gained recognition in 2018 with the release of his debut track Aura, which has accumulated over 125 million views on Youtube.[3] He has gained support in the electronic music scene since, collaborating with labels such as This Never Happened, Above & Beyond, Spinnin' Deep, and Anjunabeats.[1] His music has received support from artists including [[Lane 8], Diplo, Hardwell, Tiësto, and ZHU. In 2023, Avoure founded his own independent record label, Biome Recordings, which describes itself as a "fusion of melodic house, techno, breakbeat, and electronica".[1]
Avoure's first collaboration with Lane 8 (Daniel Goldstein) was with the track Voile. Their relationship began when a friend of Avoure from Saint Petersburg mentioned the possibility of sharing his music with Lane 8 via email. After informing him of his email address and an initial exchange between the two, Lane 8 invited him on a collaboration a month later.[4]
It is used in ceremonial, social, and traditional contexts among Indigenous groups in countries including Brazil, Peru, and Colombia.[7] Rapé is administered nasally using a blowpipe, either self-administered or applied by another individual.[8]
The term rapé is a Portuguese and Spanish word derived from the French word "râpé", which means "grated", referring to the grated tobacco traditionally used to make snuff.[9]
Rapé is a fine, dry powder composed primarily of tobacco and plant ash.[5] The tobacco species most commonly used, Nicotiana rustica, contains higher concentrations of nicotine than Nicotiana tabacum.[10]
Preparation typically involves drying and grinding tobacco leaves and combining them with ash derived from selected plants.[8] The specific composition varies between Indigenous groups and regions.[11]
The use of powdered tobacco in the Americas predates European contact.[12] Early European accounts of tobacco snuff use were recorded in the late 15th century following contact with Indigenous peoples of the Caribbean.[13]
Rapé contains nicotine, a stimulant alkaloid that affects the central nervous system.[16]
Chemical analyses of rapé products have identified additional compounds, including tobacco-specific nitrosamines and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.[6]
1234Wilbert, Johannes (1987). Tobacco and Shamanism in South America. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp.6–10.
12Stanfill, Stephen B. (2015). "Comprehensive chemical characterization of rapé tobacco products: Nicotine, un-ionized nicotine, tobacco-specific N'-nitrosamines, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and flavor constituents". Food and Chemical Toxicology. 82: 50–58. doi:10.1016/j.fct.2015.04.012. PMID25921431.
12Russell, Andrew (2015). The Master Plant: Tobacco in Lowland South America. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp.23–30.
12de Smet, Peter A.G.M. (1985). "A multidisciplinary overview of intoxicating snuff rituals in the Western Hemisphere". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 13 (1): 3–49. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(85)90029-3. PMID3883984.
↑Curtis, M.M. (1935). The Book of Snuff and Snuff Boxes. New York: Bramhall House. pp.12–15.
↑Stanfill, Stephen B. (2010). "Surveillance of international oral tobacco products: total nicotine, un-ionized nicotine and tobacco-specific nitrosamines". Tobacco Control. 20 (1): e2. doi:10.1136/tc.2010.036913. PMID20930060.
↑Schultes, Richard Evans (1984). "Fifteen years of study of psychoactive snuffs of South America: 1967–1982—a review". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 11 (1): 17–32. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(84)90035-6. PMID6200055.
↑Elferink, J.G.R. (1983). "The narcotic and hallucinogenic use of tobacco in Pre-Columbian Central America". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 7 (1): 111–122. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(83)90025-9. PMID6343717.
↑McKenna, Terence (1993). Food of the Gods: The Search for the Original Tree of Knowledge. New York: Bantam Books. p.336.
↑Lagrou, Elsje (1996). Shamanism and representation among the Kaxinawá. Florianópolis: Federal University of Santa Catarina. pp.197–231.
↑Jauregui, X. (2011). "Plantas con madre: plants that teach and guide in the shamanic initiation process in the East-Central Peruvian Amazon". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 134 (3): 739–752. doi:10.1016/j.jep.2011.01.042. PMID21277309.
↑Benowitz, Neal L. (1996). "Pharmacology of nicotine: addiction and therapeutics". Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology. 36: 597–613.
12Smokeless Tobacco and Some Tobacco-specific N-Nitrosamines. Lyon: International Agency for Research on Cancer. 2007. ISBN9789283212898.
↑Wolk, R. (2005). "Hemodynamic and autonomic effects of smokeless tobacco in healthy young men". Journal of the American College of Cardiology. 45 (6): 910–914. doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2004.11.066. PMID15766817.
Cerro MohinoraLocation of the upper and lower Sierra Tarahumara in Chihuahua, which borders the states of Texas and New Mexico.
On 19 April 2026, a diplomatic conflict between Mexico and the United States arose following the deaths of two CIA agents in an accident in the Sierra Tarahumara[es] of Chihuahua. The agents were traveling in a convoy alongside agents from the Chihuahua State Investigation Agency.
They had been returning from dismantling six sophisticated local narcotics laboratories that had been located through drone surveillance flights in an operation involving around one hundred officials, one of the most significant successes in years for Chihuahua’s prosecutor’s office and police.[1]
The Security Cabinet of Mexico expressed its condolences for the deaths of the four agents following the accident, and clarified that the foreign agents had not been authorized to participate in an operation in Mexico.[2]
One week after the incident, the United States Department of Justice announced that the governor of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, along with other members of his administration, would be extradited to the United States over alleged ties to the Sinaloa Cartel.[3]
Four passengers, two Americans and two Mexicans, died on the morning of 19 April 2026 when the vehicle they were traveling in crashed as they were returning from an operation led by Mexico's armed forces to dismantle clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the mountains of Chihuahua.[4]
President Claudia Sheinbaum stated that she had no knowledge of the presence of U.S. officials on Mexican soil and called on Washington and the State of Chihuahua for explanations regarding a possible violation of national sovereignty.[5]
The Los Angeles Times reported, based on sources familiar with the operation, that two other CIA agents traveling in a vehicle behind theirs climbed down a slope to assist their colleagues, but that by then it was too late. Journalist Steve Fisher's report states that the four U.S. agents who allegedly participated in the operation were dressed in uniforms of the Chihuahua State Investigation Agency (AEI) in order to blend in with Mexican officials. A CIA spokesperson declined to comment to the newspaper.[6]
On April 22, a proposal advanced in the Senate of Mexico from the Morena party calling for a working meeting with the governor of Chihuahua, María Eugenia Campos Galván, and the state prosecutor, César Jáuregui Moreno, so they could explain the alleged participation of two CIA agents in security operations in the state, the failure to properly inform the federal government, the lack of institutional coordination, and the consequences for national sovereignty.[7]
The ruling party pushed for both officials to explain the events in the state, arguing that there may have been a violation of the Constitution of Mexico and the National Security Law due to the participation of alleged foreign agents in actions carried out by the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office.[8][9]
On April 24, 2026, César Jáuregui Moreno resigned from his position as head of the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office following controversy over the entry of U.S. agents, allegedly CIA operatives, who died in the town of Morelos after the dismantling of the drug laboratories.[10][11] "With full respect for transparency, I present my irrevocable resignation as state attorney general. My actions have been guided by the protection of society and the full force of the state in confronting organized crime", the official said at a press conference.
He stated that the fight against crime also requires respect for legality and national sovereignty; however, he acknowledged that in the case of the deaths of the agents, "the information we initially had was inconsistent and warranted an investigation to understand their involvement in detail."
He admitted there were omissions in information handling and institutional management, which undermined the control and communication mechanisms he was responsible for ensuring.[12]
Following the resignation of former prosecutor César Jáuregui Moreno, Governor María Eugenia Campos Galván appointed Wendy Paola Chávez Villanueva as the new head of the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office, stating:[13] "I have appointed Wendy Chávez, current head of the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Women and Family, to lead this Specialized Unit; I am convinced that her career will ensure objectivity and full professionalism in clarifying the facts."
The Senate Constitutional Affairs Committee approved this Wednesday a motion to call a working meeting with the governor of Chihuahua, María Eugenia Campos Galván, and the state prosecutor, César Jáuregui Moreno, so they can report on the alleged presence of officers from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the state, following a highway crash in which four people died. The discussion of the resolution led to a heated confrontation between lawmakers from Morena and the National Action Party (PAN), who exchanged accusations and raised the tone of the debate over the scope of the summons and its political implications.
The resolution, promoted by Morena senator Juan Carlos Loera de la Rosa, was fast-tracked by the Senate’s leadership board and, during Wednesday’s debate, the opposition demanded that the scope of the call to Campos be expanded to include other officials from the ruling party, not just the opposition governor.
PAN senator Marko Cortés Mendoza proposed modifying the agreement to also include appearances by the Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection, Omar García Harfuch; the head of the Secretariat of National Defense, Ricardo Trevilla Trejo; and the Foreign Affairs Minister, Marcelo Ebrard. He also called for a diplomatic note to be sent to the United States requesting information about the presence of agents in Mexican territory, and for the Morena governors of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, and Baja California, Marina del Pilar Ávila Olmeda, to also appear over allegations related to organized crime.
The confrontation escalated when Morena senator Javier Corral Jurado, former governor of Chihuahua, accused the opposition of constructing a narrative based on “lies and fallacies,” and questioned the state government’s performance in public security. Meanwhile, Movimiento Ciudadano (MC) senator Luis Donaldo Colosio Riojas voted against the motion and criticized the legality of the procedure. He argued that the Constitutional Affairs Committee does not have the authority to summon state officials, warning that it violates the principle of federalism. “The Senate cannot summon a governor on this basis. If the issue is reviewing the presence of foreign agents, federal authorities are the ones who should appear,” he said. Colosio also criticized the fact that debate on important constitutional reforms was being displaced in favor of what he described as a politically motivated issue.
The debate included moments of high tension, such as PAN senator Lilly Téllez accusing Morena senator Gerardo Fernández Noroña of illicit enrichment, in an exchange that further heightened the confrontation. Finally, the resolution was approved with 13 votes in favor and one against. The committee chair, Morena senator Óscar Cantón Zetina, announced that the agreement will be forwarded to the Senate leadership board for possible discussion in the full chamber.
The approved document establishes a “respectful invitation” for the governor of Chihuahua and the state prosecutor to report on the events, as well as on possible violations of the National Security Law, failures to notify the federal government, and potential institutional coordination failures.
Slavery in the Dominican Republic has roots that date to the early 16th century.
Colonists and others on the Spanish mainland were forbidden from trading in slaves, but islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic were excepted from this rule. Laborious work in sugarcane and to a lesser extent tobacco necessitated this labor, as well as the lack of indigenous people in the Caribbean. Almost all of the slaves were brought from Africa via the triangular trade. Despite the prevalence of the Spanish slave trade in the Caribbean, Haiti is still the country with the most African-descended people in the Caribbean, although Brazil has about twice as many, albeit located in South America.
Oil wells on Lake MaracaiboPetroluem fields, pipelines, and refineries in Venezuela (1972)
The petroleum industry in Venezuela accounts for 15% of its GDP and 37% of its domestic energy consumption.[14][15]
Venezuela's oil exports also account for 80% of its total export revenue.[15]
By 1950, it had a GDP per capita of $5,550,[b] the third highest in Latin America. This was in comparison to other Latin colonies that were significantly more impoverished, like Brazil ($1,850) or Guatemala ($2,040).[16]
In 1922, the Barroso II oil well exploded in Zulia state, causing a million barrels of crude oil to burst out of the ground. This was when its promise as an oil-rich country was noticed.[19]
In the first decades after oil began to be exploited, foreign companies controlled production, infrastructure, and commercialization. One of the most important was Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, which came to control a substantial share of national production.
In 1960, Venezuela was one of the five founding countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, along with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Despite this leadership role, foreign companies continued to dominate the industry until nationalization in 1976.
In August 1971, under the presidency of Rafael Caldera, a law was passed that nationalized the country's natural gas industry, foreshadowing the broader oil nationalization to come.
The announcement occurred at the Mene Grande oilfield in Zulia. The transition to the oil industry being run by the state went well. Large American and other foreign companies invested in the country and were also hired by PDVSA for their expertise. Pérez allowed PDVSA to partner with foreign oil companies as long as it held 60% equity in joint ventures, along with other constraints.
During the 1980s, global oil prices plummeted. As global oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Venezuela's economy contracted and inflation soared; at the same time, it accrued massive foreign debt by purchasing foreign refineries, such as Citgo in the United States.
Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998 running on a socialist platform. He promised to use the country's oil wealth to reduce poverty in Venezuela, a serious problem at the time.
In 2002, many PDVSA employees went on strike against Chávez, who responsed by firing 19,000 workers from the company. This decision was later criticized, as it removed much of the company's technical expertise.
In 2005, Chávez began to provide subsidized oil to several countries in the region, including Cuba, with Petrocaribe being created later.
In 2007, the government decreed that PDVSA must hold at least a 60% stake in all heavy crude projects in the Orinoco Belt, forcing foreign companies to accept new contractual conditions or leave the country. As a result, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips withdrew from Venezuela.
In mid-2014, global oil prices tumbled and Venezuela's economy went into free fall. Since 2014, oil production in Venezuela has suffered from a poor oil market and Venezuela's insufficient funding of the industry.
In 2016, the oil production reached the lowest it had been in 23 years. The decline continued through subsequent years, with production hitting historic lows during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In January 2026, the Trump administration stated that it would fix Venezuelas oil industry while the U.S. was engaging in Operation Southern Spear. Maduro was captured in Caracas and taken to the U.S. on 3 January 2026.
Venezuela produces over 900,000 barrels of oil per day and has an estimated 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. These reserves account for roughly 17% of the global total, with most concentrated in the Orinoco Belt, where deposits are predominantly heavy crude. There is doubt about the reliability of this figure however, as it is self-reported and not verified by OPEC or another international organization.
At its peak in the 1970s, Venezuela's oil production reached 3.5 million barrels of crude oil per day. By contrast, Venezuela crude oil production was reported at 896,000 barrels per day in December 2025.
Venezuela's oil is abundant but it is known for being more expensive to extract from the ground than oil from the Persian Gulf, which lowers its profitability. The oil being heavy crude means special refineries are needed.
In 1986, PDVSA bought 50% of the United States gasoline brand Citgo from Southland Corporation and in 1990 the remaining half. This gave Venezuela a significant presence in the U.S. market.
PDVSA has not regularly disclosed its financial performance since 2014 and provides extremely limited public information, having not published annual reports or other documentation to improve transparency and corporate governance since 2016.
In 2023, Venezuela's oil exports totaled just $4.05 billion—dwarfed by Saudi Arabia's $181 billion and the U.S.'s $125 billion.
Most of Venezuela's modest oil production goes to China, an ally of the Maduro regime and major investor in the region, with Venezuela currently paying down an estimated $10-billion debt to China, covered in part by oil exports.
The United States bought about 23% of Venezuela's oil in 2023, but data shows that the U.S. didn't buy any in 2020 and 2021.
The United States has been involved in the Venezuelan oil industry.
has been imposing sanctions on Venezuela in some capacity since 2006, although full sanctions against petroleum trade itself did not occur until much later. For almost two decades, Washington has imposed sweeping sanctions against Caracas, the most significant of which have blocked oil imports from PDVSA and prevented the government from accessing the U.S. financial system.
To return Venezuela to its production highs of the early 2000s of around 3 million barrels per day would likely take around $180 billion in extra funding between now and 2040, according to energy intelligence firm Rystad Energy.
Corruption, mismanagement, brain drain, and a lack of repair and upkeep work on critical infrastructure, including throughout Venezuela's flagship Orinoco Heavy Oil Belt, have made operating without significant investment nearly impossible.
12"Venezuela Energy Information". enerdata.com.
Venezuela has the world's largest proven oil reserves at 304 billion barrels, however the country is ranked 18th in petroleum production due to its lower ability to extract it compared to other oil-rich nations.
In 2024, it was producing about 960,000 barrels of crude per day. The state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela corporation (PDVSA) has dominated the sector since it was founded in 1976, with the nationalization of the Venezuelan petroleum industry.
On 27 December 2025, an intercity bus fell into a ravine on the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, killing 16 and injuring 26 people. The bus was on a route coming from Guatemala City.
Road accidents are common in Guatemala, as the country is mountainous and road infrastructure is less developed than in other places. The Central American volcanic arc specifically the Sierra Madre de Chiapas crosses over much of the central and southern part of the country, and forms the Guatemalan Highlands. As such, it has a high rate of traffic fatalities relative to miles driven. Accidents of this kind tend to be more fatal compared to collisions as well. Totonicapán is located at a very high elevation, at almost 2,500 metres (8,200ft).
The Inter-American Highway is another name for the portion of the Pan-American Highway within Central America. Chicken buses regularly use the highway, as many citizens do not own their own form of motor transportation. The road connects Totonicapán to nearby cities like Quetzaltenango (27km (17mi) away) and Santa Cruz del Quiché. Highways in Guatemala are typically named after a department and a number, for example QUI-4. The Inter-American Highway passes through the center of Totonicapán.
José María Guízar Valencia, also known by his alias Z-43, is a convicted Mexican criminal. He was the leader of the Zetas Vieja Escuela, a splinter group of Los Zetas active in Tamaulipas.
He was arrested in Mexico City in 2018, being one of the 122 "priority targets" wanted by the Mexican government. The United States had offered a $5 million reward for his capture.[1][2][3]
José Crispín Salazar Zamorano, also known by his alias Don Adán, is the leader of the Los Salazar faction of the Gente Nueva criminal group in Sonora, also known as the Independent Cartel of Sonora.
Irving Eduardo Solano Vera, also known as El Profe or El Gato, is the founder of Gente Nueva, known as the Cártel Independiente de Sonora ('Sonora Independent Cartel') since 2023.
Los Blancos de Troya ('Trojan Targets') is a Mexican cartel that is one of the factions of the Cárteles Unidos. They are active in the Tierra Caliente of Michoacán as well as in Morelia.
El abatimiento de Oseguera Cervantes fue considerado por el gobierno de Estados Unidos como un "gran avance para el mundo" en la lucha contra el narcotráfico.[41] Funcionarios como el subsecretario de Estado Christopher Landau celebraron la operación, recordando que el gobierno estadounidense ofrecía una recompensa de hasta 15 millones de dólares por información que llevara a su captura[37][44]
Tras la muerte de "El Mencho", analistas en seguridad apuntaron a una posible lucha interna por el control de la organización o un intento de reconfiguración del mando del cártel, aunque las autoridades mexicanas se mantuvieron en alerta ante posibles repuntes de violencia derivados del vacío de poder.[40][43]
El 25 de enero de 2026, un grupo de hombres armados irrumpió en un campo de futbol y disparó contra 23 personas, resultando en 11 muertes y 12 heridos. La gobernadora de Guanajuato, Libia Dennise García Muñoz Ledo, anunció la reforzada seguridad en la región y la activación de un operativo conjunto con la Fiscalía General del Estado y fuerzas federales para atender a las víctimas y avanzar con la investigación. El alcalde de Salamanca, César Prieto, confirmó que 11 personas fallecieron en el lugar y 12 resultaron heridas, incluyendo una mujer y un menor de edad.
↑Most of the fighting took place in rural areas of the country, especially in the north and central highlands. According to records kept by the Contras, the departments with the most deaths were (in descending order): Jinotega, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Chontales, and Zelaya[4]
↑The Sandinistas won the majority of the combats against the Contras, but the 1990 election disarmed both sides, and ultimately led to a stalemate. This being said, they retook power in 2006 after Daniel Ortega won the election, although this time without hostilities.
The Contra War[a] was an armed conflict that took place from 1981 to 1990 in Nicaragua. The conflict started shortly after the Nicaraguan Revolution that led to the socialist Sandinista government ruling the country, and the various dissenting forces collectively known as the Contras.
The war took place within the broader context of the Cold War, drawing significant involvement from the United States, wbhich provided financial, logistical, and covert military support to Contra factions. The conflict resulted in substantial military and civilian casualties, widespread displacement, and economic disruption, and concluded after negotiated peace agreements an and national elections in 1990 that brought an opposition government to power.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) established a revolutionary government that enacted widespread social and economic reforms. Opposition to Sandinista rule developed from former regime supporters, rural conservatives, and indigenous communities. Beginning in the early 1980s, several anti‑government groups coalesced under the umbrella term “Contras” and began armed resistance against the Sandinista government.[1]
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was authorized by President Ronald Reagan to provide funding, training, and logistical support to Contra groups as part of a broader U.S. policy to counter perceived Soviet influence in Central America.[2]
Course of the conflict
The Contra War was primarily fought through guerrilla tactics by rebel forces, including ambushes, sabotage, and raids on government outposts. Sandinista forces responded with conventional military operations, conscripted troops, and militia units to defend territory, infrastructure, and population centers.[1]
Throughout the 1980s, the conflict drew international attention. In 1986, revelations about covert arms transfers from the United States to Contra forces, circumventing congressional restrictions, became central to the Iran–Contra affair.[3]
Tactics and strategy
Contra forces primarily used hit‑and‑run guerrilla tactics, focusing on disrupting Sandinista supply lines, attacking rural installations, and avoiding large‑scale engagements. The Sandinista government deployed conventional forces and militia units to secure towns, roads, and key infrastructure, often responding to rebel incursions with patrols and fortified defenses.[1]
Impact and casualties
Estimates vary widely, but thousands of combatants on both sides were killed or wounded during the conflict. Civilians were also affected through displacement, loss of livelihood, and damage to infrastructure. The war significantly disrupted Nicaragua’s economy and social structures, particularly in rural areas near the Honduran border.[1]
U.S. president Ronald Reagan took interest in the war from the very start, since his administration took office in 1981. Reagan was afraid that Nicaragua would turn into a "second Cuba", which by then was already under a communist government led by Fidel Castro for 16 years.[5]
The agrarian reforms and nationalization of land by the Sandinista government led many plantation owners and farmers to leave the country. The most common countries for emigration were Costa Rica and the United States. The first wave of about 120,000 Nicaraguans entering the U.S. happened in the 1980s during the Sandinista government. Many of these people were middle-class or wealthy before the revolution. The second wave occured in early 1989, after Hurricane Joan caused upheaval in the country.
By the late 1980s, international pressure and war fatigue contributed to negotiations for a peace settlement. Regional leaders, i.ncluding Costa Rican President Óscar Arias, promoted peace plans aimed at ending hostilities in Central America. Although fighting continued sporadically, a negotiated settlement and the 1990 general elections led to the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the eventual demobilization of Contra
forces.[1]
The Contra War remains a subject of historical debate regarding foreign intervention, human rights, and national reconciliation. The conflict’s effects on Nicaragua’s political landscape persisted into subsequent decades, influencing the country’s democratic and social development.[1]
The Esquipulas Peace Agreement peace agreement was signed by both parties in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The agreement stipulated the demobilization of the Contras, ending the war.
The causes of regional instability in Central America and the Caribbean are hard to ascertain, one proposed reason is that the two regions are split into many different countries; the Caribbean for its islands (the Antilles), and Central America for historical and political reasons that date from when it was a Spanish colony.
The Spanish colonial governments divided regions into captaincy generals and provinces, rather than separate states within one republic. This led to different regions developing identities as separate nations during the 16th-18th centuries. The various countries in South America were formed for similar reasons.
Groups in Mesoamerica & belowNicaragua is part of the 'Intermediate Area'
The area comprising modern-day Nicaragua has long been inhabited by various Indigenous groups.
The Pacific coast of Nicaragua was inhabited by groups like the Nicarao before the Spanish arrived. The areas further inland such as in Matagalpa Department were inhabited by other groups like the Cacaopera, and the areas in the east are inhabited by the Miskito people.
There are an estimated 450,000 Indigenous people living in Nicaragua today. The true number however is unknown, as the country does not collect ethnicity data in the census.
The Spanish conquest of Nicaragua killed hundreds of thousands of Indigenous people in Nicaragua through violence and disease. Estimated vary from 300,000 to over 2 million people killed during the 16th century.
This region is sometimes considered to be a part of Mesoamerica (along with El Salvador and parts of Honduras because some parts of Nicaragua spoke a Nahua language, as well as the fact that they shared other cultural traits with Mesoamerican groups.
However, one of the traits they lack is the cultivation of maize. As such, Nicaragua is usually not categorized as being in Mesoamerica, and is instead categorized as belonging to a region known as the Intermediate Area, extending from Nicaragua down to Costa Rica, Panama, the Guajira Peninsula, Zulia, and part of Colombia.
The Cacaopera people are primarily located in the Matagalpa Department. This group spoke a Misumalpan language which is now extinct. The language is unrelated to the other languages spoken in Nicaragua, coming from a different language family.
It has been suggested that the Cacaopera lost their language due to suffering heavy casualties in the first century of Spanish rule. They are still the primary group in Matagalpa today.
From 1954 to 1986, Guatemala was under a series of military leaders.
Eraín Ríos Montt, who was president from 1982 to 1983, is regarded as the most egregious leader. Torture, murder, and other human rights abuses increased significantly during his administration, until he was deposed in a coup.
The Inca expansion was the gradual process by which the Inca empire expanded its territory from Cusco to throughout much of the Andes mountains during the 15th and early 16th centuries. Its territory peaked in 1525, before the Spanish conquest.
Operation Red Christmas was an operation undertaken by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to relocate 42 Indigenous Miskito communities away from the Caribbean coast towards inland towns along the Coco River with Honduras, into new communities known as Tasba Pri (Free Land).
This operation was carried out in early 1982, at the outset of Contra actions against the Sandinista government, which were particularly intense in the northeastern region of the Caribbean (or Atlantic) coast.
Navidad Roja fue la operación de traslado de 42 comunidades de indígenas misquitos de la región nor-oriental de la Costa Caribe de Nicaragua desde la franja fronteriza del Río Coco con Honduras hacia el interior del país, a unas nuevas comunidades conocidas como Tasba Pri (Tierra Libre).[1] Esta operación se realizó a principios de 1982, en los inicios de las acciones de los Contras hacia el gobierno sandinista que fueron especialmente virulentas en la región nor-oriental de la costa caribeña o atlántica.
Severo Martóínez Pérez (1973). La Patria del Criollo: Ensayo de interpretación de la realidad colonial guatemalteca.
Modern Guatemalans have varying levels of Indigenous DNA that can be traced to the ancient Maya that inhabited the region.{{{1}}}
The western and central highlands of Guatemala are heavily Indigenous.
The geographical distribution of the modern Maya population is however very different from that of the height of the Maya civilization. The majority of the almost 8 million Maya in Guatemala live in the Guatemalan highlands a mountainous area in the central and southern part of the country, while only 2 million live in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico and northern Petén, where most of the major sites such as Tikal and Chichén Itzá have been found. Mayanists have hypothesized that this migration was due to the Spanish conquest and potentially the classic Maya collapse that happened more than 600 years earlier.true? Similar to Andean civilizations such as the Inca, the population gradually grew to be greater in the elevated mountains and highlands compared to the vast lowlands of the Petén, Yucatán and the Pacific coast of Guatemala. The terrain led to the development of different mutually unintelligible languages due to reduced contact between groups, such as the Quiché, Mam, and Kaqchikel languages.
During the regime of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, efforts were made to eliminate Maya languages and 'ladinize' the population (make more mestizo). These were successful in some departments, which are almost entirely Ladino and monolingual in Spanish today, despite having significant Indigenous ancestry.
Alta Verapaz is heavily indigenous and primarily populated by the Qʼeqchiʼ Mayan people. The 2018 census recorded 93% of the department's population as belonging to an indigenous group and 80% as belonging to the Qʼeqchiʼ Maya.
HelloTalk has been criticized for its use as a dating app. This has attracted controversy both within the community and in other online forums. Although its gial is to facilitate language learning. the app is ptimarily centered on its chat feature. Some people claim they started romantic relationships through using the app, usually long-distance relationships.
The company has been criticized for encouraging ita use in this way. through prominently featuring lartners of the opposite gender more often, as well as notifications in this vein. Peoplr have critized that HelloTalk no longer primarily focuses on improving language skills.
Reports that users of the app quickly ask language partners for their WhatsApp account raizes further concern over it being abused as a dating app. While HelloTalk aims to connect casual language partners{REF!
}from different countries, WhatsApp focuses on being an instant messaging app primarily used for communication between friends and family. Users who ask their partners to switch to WhatsApp rather than practice second language acquisition have been targeted by criticism as well. HelloTlak has not released any data about the gender of its users as of December 2025{check)
Microsoft Designer is an AI based image creation and design app by Microsoft originally released as a Windows 11 app, as well as on iOS and Android[3]. It is now also available as a web app and can use AI to generate images, edit images, make graphic design projects and icons. It is available on the Microsoft Store for desktop users.
The 2026 energy crisis in Peru began on 1 March 2026 due to a gas shortage following the rupture of the transport pipeline of Camisea natural gas. The pipeline break occurred during the 2026 Iran war, the coastal El Niño phenomenon, the debt of Petroperú, and the lack of construction of the Southern Peru gas pipeline,[4] leaving the country without natural gas supply—considered one of the cheapest resources for energy generation—and increasing electricity costs.[5] The government declared a state of emergency and ordered the suspension of fuel reserve requirements to address the situation.[6]
The shortage affected 83% of Lima metropolitan area,[4] which depends on natural gas for 60% of its goods and services.[7] Consequently, sales in the food sector and small businesses declined due to higher prices that consumers could not afford.[8] According to Peruvian minister Ángelo Alfaro, it was "the most serious crisis in the last two decades" in the country.[9]
In 2008, Peru experienced an energy crisis due to failures in electricity production plants dependent on the Camisea gas field. It was the first crisis of the 21st century.[10] Local media reported blackouts in parts of Lima and a lack of state planning regarding dependence on natural gas. President Alan García stated that there was sufficient gas supply in the country.[11] He later required Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP) to commit to building a redundant pipeline, though this was later waived under President Ollanta Humala.[12]
Between 2004 and 2026, at least 13 failures were reported in the pipeline.[13]
On 1 March 2026, a rupture was detected in pipelines operated by Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP) at kilometer point 43 (KP43) in Megantoni District, Cusco, where a flare was observed. TGP activated its emergency response plan and temporarily suspended gas transport systems. The Ministry of Health reported that 35 people were affected.[14]
Possible causes include human error or sabotage, though investigations were ongoing.
On 2 March, the government declared a 14-day emergency in natural gas supply and prioritized domestic consumption. Rationing measures were implemented.
From 3 March, long queues formed at stations supplying compressed natural gas (CNG). Transport operators reported switching to gasoline, reducing profits, while authorities warned against speculation.
Reports emerged of unsafe vehicle modifications to use LPG instead of CNG, leading to vehicle fires in Lima.
The crisis triggered protests and transport strikes, congressional inquiries, rising food and fuel prices, and disruptions in waste collection and logistics.
On 6 March, the government announced telework for the public sector and online education for schools and universities in Lima and Callao. These measures were criticized by business groups.
Repair progress advanced gradually: 48% by 9 March, 52% by 10 March, 74% by 12 March, and 90% by 13 March. Later that day, President José María Balcázar announced full restoration of the pipeline.
Despite restoration, supply normalization was expected to take weeks. The government proposed building a regasification plant to increase reserves. Congress also approved legislation promoting small modular reactors for electricity generation.
On 17 March, emergency measures were extended until 21 March.
↑The term is especially used in Guatemala in place of mestizo, possibly because mixed-race people in Guatemala have more indigenous ancestry than in other parts of the Americas.[1]
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