Wikipedia

User:DawnTheFirst/makhzen

< User:DawnTheFirst

The Makhzen (Arabic: المخزن, Moroccan Arabic: لمخزن, Berber languages: ⵍⵎⴻⵅⵣⴻⵏ, romanized: Lmexzen) is a traditional political power structure in Morocco, and historically in Tunisia prior to 1957. Centered on the monarch, it encompasses both formal governing institutions and informal networks of elites, ranging from nobles, senior military officers, landowners, civil servants, and other influential figures. In pre-colonial and during the French protectorate in Morocco, regions that were less directly controlled by the central state and that reflected the limits of Makhzen power, its authority was not uniform across the nation as it often depended on local alliances, negotiation, and coercion. This created a political divide between areas under direct state influence and areas where central control was weaker. Less directly controlled regions were described as Bilād al-Sība, a term which was used for areas outside the immediate reach of the Makhzen, highlighting the limitations of central power in Moroccan history prior to independence in 1956.

The Makhzen emerged as a political system through which Moroccan rulers structured political authority, taxation, and military power. Throughout various dynasties, it depended on a mix of centralized administration and partnerships with local elites, tribal leaders, and regional dignitaries to extend the monarch’s authority. Its effectiveness was sporadic across the nation, it was dependent upon the central authority's capacity to enforce loyalty and gather revenue. In regions where state control was more robust, the Makhzen wielded direct political and administrative power, whereas in more isolated areas, its influence was considerably diminished. This inconsistent reach rendered the Makhzen a versatile but precarious governance structure. During the French protectorate, the system underwent transformation but was not entirely abolished, and it continued to hold significant influence and sway in Moroccan political affairs following independence.

In modern day Morocco, the Makhzen continues to play a significant role within the political system, influencing the power relations among the monarchy, state institutions, and elite networks. It is closely linked to the Alaouite dynasty and the informal mechanisms by which political authority is exercised. Historically, the term was also used in Tunisia, where it referred to the Beylical political system prior to the monarchy's dissolution in 1957.

Etymology

edit

History

edit

Origins

edit

The Makhzen would begin to take shape in 17th-century Morocco under Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur of the Saadi Dynasty and would see heavy reforms and expansions under the Alaouites later on, the first versions of the Makhzen would be inspired by the Ottoman system. Following the Battle of Three Kings (Alcácer Quibir), the Saadi state strengthened its authority and began building a more organized system of governance. Ahmad al-Mansur expanded administrative control, reinforced court authority, and supported military modernization. These changes helped lay the foundations for the later Makhzen system, which linked the monarch to local elites and officials. The Makhzen was heavily supported and enforced by the military. [1][2] In addition to military support, al-Mansur drew religious support using sharifian lineage and Islamic symbolism to reinforce obedience and strengthen authority. These religious claims helped support the court’s authority and made the central state seem more legitimate across the sultanate.[3] The Saadi administration also depended on external individuals, including Moriscos, renegades, and captives, a significant number of whom contributed military, administrative, and technical skills to the state.[4] The military itself was comprised of professional musketeers and Saharan Phalanx alongside Sudanese and European slaves.[5]

After the although decisive and successful conquest of Songhai in 1591, the Makhzen system would be weakened financially, overextended Saadi resources and failed to deliver the stable gold revenues al‑Mansur had anticipated. Piling onto the issues, it would enter a succession related conflict after the death of al-Mansur in 1603. Competing claimants fragmented authority among opposing factions, leading to a gradual decline in the unity of the dynasty. This instability diminished the effectiveness of the centralized system established by al-Mansur. Local rulers such as tribe Zenata tribe chiefs would gain more power. Eventually, the Alaouites surfaced as the dynasty to reinstate and expand the Makhzen’s power. The Alaouites drew their legitimacy from moral authority and control of foreign trade, which temporarily preserved the country's domestic independence and autonomy from the Ottoman and European powers.[6]

Pre-Colonial Morocco & the Makhzen

edit

Expansion under the Alouites played a pivotal role in the rise of the Makhzen in Morocco.

Colonial & Post-Colonial Changes

edit

The Makhzen in Tunis

edit

Prior to independence in 1957, the Tunisian Makhzen played a major role in the structure of the Tunisian government.[7] Expanding from the medieval Iqta system and weakened dynasties such as the Hafsids in between the 13th and 16th centuries, the Tunisian Makhzen made deals with Arab Bedouin tribes, primarily the Banu Hilal. Centuries prior, the Fatimid Caliphate had intentionally unleashed the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, which were large tribes that were tasked with suppressing local rebels. The Hafsid sultans lacked the military manpower to conquer or expel these tribes and due to the state being incapable of collecting taxes and enforcing laws outside major coastal cities like Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse, the sultans chose to formalize their weakness by turning their rivals into the first structural components of the state. The central Dynasty would grant these select tribes autonomous control over sprawling rural territories.[8][9] In exchange, the tribes collected regional agricultural and nomadic taxes. The tribes would keep small portions of what they would make, and these tribes also would provide military service to the central Dynasty.[10][11]

When the Ottomans conquered Tunis in 1574 they would subsequently discover the Tunisian Makhzen. The Ottomans could not replace the Makhzen's system without angering local tribes, thus they founded the Makhzen of the Beylik of Tunis. The Ottomans chose to professionalize, institutionalize, and urbanize the system by the 18th century. [12] Tunis's Makhzen's fiscal structure was centralized, and new classes were introduced. The Mamluk Class which were loyal state servants, the Ottoman Beys imported, purchased, or captured young, non-Arab men (typically from Georgia, Egypt and Circassia) which were converted to Islam and educated in Tunis. As they had no native tribal family, no regional ties, and no local loyalties, they were dependent on the Beylik of Tunis and the Makhzen. Ottomans placed these Mamluks at the top of the Makhzen, giving them control over finances, the military, and diplomacy.[13][14] The introduction of the Mamluk Class removed tribal chiefs from power at the state level.[15] In addition to the introduction of the Mamluk Class, the Mahalla would be introduced, replacing the Hafsids old tax system.[16] The Mahalla would be lead by the Bey al-Mahalla, who would be the heir to the throne or a Mamluk General. The backbone consisted of elite Ottoman Janissary infantry and Turkish Cavalry. Alongside the military, the Mahalla system had a large envoy of royal scribes, bookkeepers, judges (Caïds), scholars, and diplomats. Hundreds of Camels and Mules would carry tents, ammunition, water, and iron chests to collect taxes. The Mahlla system would be divided into two seasons, the Summer Mahalla (Mahallat al-Sayf) and the Winter Mahalla (Mahallat al-Shita').[17] The Summer Mahalla would march north-west into fertile plains such as Béja and the Tell Atlas right after the summer to collect harvests.[18] While the Winter Mahalla would march southeast towards the arid Sahara and Oasis regions such as Gafsa and Tozeur during the date harvest seasons to extract revenue from nomadic herders and date farmers.[19] The Mahalla served as the primary instrument of statehood, This was the primary goal. Tribal leaders and regional governors (Caïds) were forced to meet the Mahalla at predetermined encampments to hand over their taxes.[20][21] Payments were made in money, grains, horses, oils, or dates. Typically, the Mahalla would collect taxes through diplomacy and intimidation, however if tribes refused to cooperate, they would face a scorched earth campaign, Ottoman troops would burn crops, confiscate livestock, destroy villages, and take hostages until demands were met.[22]

By the mid 19th century, the traditional Makhzen began collapsing from within due to aggressive, and poorly managed attempts at western modernization and industrialization.[23] Due to the Bankruptcy of Ahmad Bey I, who allocated large amounts of state revenues into factories, steamships, and a massive palace. The Mahalla system could not sustain these modern expenses. And in 1864, to pay mounting European debts the Makhzen doubled the majba, which was the primary poll tax. This triggered a massive country wide rebellion led by Ali Ben Ghedhahem.[24] The Bey used the remnants of the Makhzen and brutal mercenaries to crush the rebellion, completely bankrupting the treasury. And By 1869, the Makhzen surrendered its financial sovereignty to an International Debt Commission controlled by France, Britain, and Italy.[25] And when France officially invaded Tunisia and established a protectorate via the Treaty of Bardo in 1881, the Makhzen would undergo some changes.[26][27] The French reorganized the traditional Makhzen tribes into colonial auxiliary units.[28] Under a 1889 decree, southern territories were formally labeled Makhzen Lands. Local tribesmen were exempted from standard military conscription in exchange for serving in the Goums, which were paramilitary border police guarding the French Sahara. Secure under French military protection, the urban Makhzen families stopped being statesmen and became elites and wealthy landowners, they cooperated with French land legislation that systematically confiscated tribal collective lands and handed them over to French and Italian settlers.[29][30]

Following Tunisian independence in 1956, the nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba viewed the Makhzen as a tool for external forces to control and undermine Tunisia's sovereignty. In a single legislative act, Bourguiba abolished 37 regional Caïds, 49 Kahias, and 77 Khalifas. The entire regional administrative authority and structure of the Tunisian Makhzen families was abolished, and state controlled Governorates staffed by Neo-Destour party loyalists. Bourguiba passed sweeping asset-forfeiture laws targeting the old nobility and elites. The private properties and the diverging agricultural estates of the prominent Makhzen families were legally seized by the new state under charges of treason and collaboration with colonial forces.[31] And in 1957, Lamine Bey, the Beylik of Tunis at the time, was deposed, arrested, and stripped of his properties. By the time the Republic of Tunisia was declared, all Makhzen assets were liquidated.[32][33]

Structure & Organization

edit

Political Hierarchy

edit

Although the makhzen does not have a formal structure, it can be divided into eight tiers:

  • Head of State:
    • At the top of the makhzen is the King.[34] The King holds the title of Amir al-Mu'minin, or Commander of the Faithful. The King holds military, political and religious power. Although the King can be influenced by other members of the Makhzen.[35]

Administrative System

edit

Makhzen in Modern Morocco

edit

Relationship to the Alaouite Dynasty

edit

Influence on Government and Politics

edit

Corruption & Patronage

edit

Criticism and Support

edit

Impact on Moroccan Society

edit

References

edit
  1. ↑ Harrak 2018, p. 283
  2. ↑ Garcia-Arenal 2008, p. 31-55
  3. ↑ Garcia-Arenal 2008, p. 112
  4. ↑ Garcia-Arenal 2008, p. 101-117
  5. ↑ Harrak 2018, p. 284
  6. ↑ Ghoulaichi 2005, p. 8
  7. ↑ Hilleary 2020, p. 25-27
  8. ↑ Digital, Red Crow. "History Atlas". History Atlas. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  9. ↑ "The Banu Hilal, Banu Maqil and Banu Sulaym: History of the Settlement of Arab Tribes in Morocco - The Moorish Times". moorishtimes.com. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  10. ↑ Pattison 2024, p. 11
  11. ↑ Hilleary 2020, p. 18-23
  12. ↑ Abun-Nasr 1982, p. 33-37
  13. ↑ Oualdi 2016, p. 479-481
  14. ↑ Oualdi 2020, p. 47
  15. ↑ Oualdi 2016, p. 472-474
  16. ↑ Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 119-131
  17. ↑ Audet 2011, p. 105
  18. ↑ Audet 2011, p. 106-111
  19. ↑ Audet 2011, p. 111-113
  20. ↑ Audet 2011, p. 116
  21. ↑ Clancy-Smith 1994, p. 34
  22. ↑ Clancy-Smith 1994, p. 36-41
  23. ↑ Brown 1975, p. 261-283
  24. ↑ Perkins 2014, p. 20-24
  25. ↑ Perkins 2014, p. 30-32
  26. ↑ Aldrich 1996, p. 29-31
  27. ↑ Randier 2006, p. 33 The French kept the Bey on the throne and left the aristocratic Makhzen families in charge of the regional administration, Caïds stayed in power. To ordinary lower class Tunisians, the face of colonial oppression was still their own local Makhzen official.<ref>Perkins 1981, p. 74
  28. ↑ Perkins 1981, p. 63-72
  29. ↑ Perkins 1981, p. 78
  30. ↑ Clancy-Smith 1997, p. 212=229
  31. ↑ Alexander 2010, p. 29-34
  32. ↑ Moore 1965, p. 41-58
  33. ↑ Alexander 2010, p. 36
  34. ↑ Daadaoui 2011, p. 41
  35. ↑ Daadaoui 2011, p. 55
  36. ↑ Daadaoui 2011, p. 42
  37. ↑ "King Mohammed VI appoints Crown Prince Moulay El Hassan as Coordinator of the Offices and Services of the General Staff of the Royal Armed Forces". Atalayar. 2 May 2026. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  38. ↑ DC, Arab Center Washington (20 November 2025). "Morocco's Rif Rises against the Makhzen's Power". Arab Center Washington DC. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  39. ↑ "Makhzen Inc. or the ever more prosperous business empire of Mohammed VI's entourage - Running Story". Africa Intelligence. 10 April 2026. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  40. ↑ MASAITI, Amira EL (19 October 2025). "King Mohammed VI appoints new walis and governors across Morocco". HESPRESS English - Morocco News. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  41. ↑ Hissouf 2016, p. 43
  42. ↑ Saadi 2016, p. 14
  43. ↑ "Beyond the Model Reform Image: Morocco's Politics of Elite Co-Optation". www.giga-hamburg.de. Retrieved 31 May 2026.
  44. ↑ Soika 2026, p. 85-87
  45. ↑ Fatih 2019, p. 187
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:DawnTheFirst/makhzen&oldid=1358476054"