Talk:On Practice

Latest comment: 1 month ago by JArthur1984 in topic Archive of primary source version

Experiencing and Changing

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I think that when talking about understanding an object, you should go more into the process of experiencing it. Mao suggests having to change a thing in order to truly understand it. This is a problematic suggestion that may need to be tackled or at least mentioned. I do think there could be more talking about actually experiencing the thing you are trying to understand. There is more of an acknowledgement of needing to practice but much not more expansion on this idea. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Drobinson01 (talkcontribs) 21:33, 13 May 2012 (UTC)Reply

If you wouldn't mind posting the quote your referring to that would be really helpful for me. For now, my response is that I don't think that statement about change leading to understanding being particularly problematic. I think he is just reinforcing the notion that logical knowledge needs to be tested in order for it to be true knowledge. By changing something I think he means for people to apply their logical knowledge to it. By noting the results of this application people figure out the legitimacy of their logical theories. Since the application of logical knowledge to something will change it Mao says changing a thing leads to understanding it. --Sammcallister (talk) 01:33, 14 May 2012 (UTC)Reply

I think that this article goes quite in depth about the philosophy behind Mao's statements, but is somewhat hard to navigate. It could be helpful to split the philosophy section into subsections so that information can be found added and refuted more easily. I think only three sections are really necessary at this point: Logical Knowledge (the second two paragraphs) True Knowledge (third paragraph) and Response to Rationalists and Empiricists (final paragraph) Chaleff91 (talk) 17:41, 14 May 2012 (UTC)Reply

There is no one quote that I think should be added. I am suggesting going into more depth of how exactly Mao wants one to being "practicing." I think there could be more said about experiencing an object to understand it. It is explained that there needs to be practice and experience, but I feel there could be a better explanation of what exactly is meant by practice. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.133.197.231 (talk) 21:08, 14 May 2012 (UTC)Reply

Archive of primary source version

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As the page has developed, it seems no longer necessary to include this primary-sourced version of the content below.

Some of this could be good, but using secondary sourcing is best, and the prose should be made more encyclopedic and less essay like.

So that this can be re-worked, I have removed it from the article but archived it here:


According to Mao, logical knowledge results from the process of perceiving, cognizing, and conceptualizing.[1]:4–5 During the stage of perception individuals spend time interacting with the subject of their enquiry, and they merely absorb the impressions their senses are giving them. This stage allows people to become familiar with the matter they are interested in, for as they gather impressions individuals begin to recognize the essential elements of their subject. For instance, an individual observing trees comes to understand that trees do not always bear leaves. They realize birds use some trees as their home. Additionally, useful impressions can be derived from indirect experiences of a phenomenon. A person has to perceive physical things before understanding their "essence and internal relations".[2]:12 A dialectical process leads from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge.[2]:4

According to Mao, an indirect experience is just a direct experience of some other person's impressions.[1]:9 Therefore, indirect impressions still gather genuine information about a subject. Impressions eventually lead to the second step toward rational knowledge, cognition. At this point, individuals establish some general notions about their subject using the essential aspects that were impressed upon them. From there individuals begin conceptualizing; they use their reason to make judgments with the general notions their impressions supplied. These judgments are pieces of logical knowledge. They can be as mundane as judging that many trees lose their leaves during the winter, and as significant as Mao's example, the Chinese Communist Party can defeat their Japanese opposition.[1]:5

All logical knowledge must be put to practice in order to substantiate its truth-value. Logical knowledge requires this testing because of its circumstantial founding. Impressions, the origin of logical knowledge, are based upon the circumstances someone experiences. Circumstances change. Therefore, logical knowledge is subject to error. However, by putting their logically founded judgments into practice an individual can address the errors in their ideas. Practice does this by presenting individuals with new impressions, for practice involves interacting with the phenomenon being examined. These new impressions are used in the same way the older ones were. They inform judgments. The only difference is that these judgments are about the truth-value of the original logical knowledge.

True knowledge leads to the successful completion of an objective, and is derived from the continual amendment of logical knowledge. A piece of logical knowledge usually undergoes many changes before it can be called true knowledge, for the circumstances surrounding a certain objective can always change. These changes conjure new impressions that disprove older judgments. For instance, a married couple will have to adjust their plan to buy a house according to the strength of the housing market. The fiscal requirements for buying the house will change with the market, so the couple's plan will have to adhere to those changes. However, once the couple understands the fiscal requirements and their financial means are able, they can buy the house. In the same way all logical knowledge can become true knowledge. Said simply, for this to happen an individual must cognize the correct circumstances. This reliance on circumstances is exactly why practice is such an essential element of knowledge, for through practice an individual's ideas are constantly accounting for more circumstances while testing the assumptions of prior knowledge. Therefore, they can eventually encounter the circumstances that can catalyze true knowledge.

According to Mao, rationalists and empiricists do not follow the real path to knowledge, and he challenges these dissenters inability to recognize the proper use of practice.[1]:12 Rationalists do not recognize that interacting with reality is essential to understanding it. Without sensory impressions and tests how can you be sure a theory corresponds to reality? A rationalist might say because the theory makes sense. However, it makes sense that a bird walking across the street prefers walking to flying. The only way to reveal the true reason for the creature walking, a broken wing, is by observing it. An empiricist understands the importance of observing phenomenon. Mao thinks, they know that practice is important, but they do not know what to do with the information they have gathered from practice. Therefore, they cannot extract the essence of their impressions and therefore, cannot make useful judgments. Dialectical-materialism combines the perception empiricists hold dear with the cognition rationalists rely on, and as a result is the proper philosophy for attaining knowledge. Knowledge that the Chinese and all the peoples of the world can use to progress communism.[1]:20 JArthur1984 (talk) 03:08, 12 April 2026 (UTC)Reply

I should add that although two of the citations here are secondary source, I did retain them in the main page. JArthur1984 (talk) 03:09, 12 April 2026 (UTC)Reply
  1. 1 2 3 4 5 Mao Zedong, On Practice, On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing (1937).
  2. 1 2 Altehenger, Jennifer; Ho, Denise Y., eds. (2022). Material Contradictions in Mao's China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 978-0-295-75085-9.