The Revival Process (Bulgarian: Възродителен процес, romanized: Vazroditelen protses) was a government-enforced assimilation campaign in the People's Republic of Bulgaria.[1] It began on Gregorian Christmas 1984 and continued until December 1989.[2] The state imposed new Bulgarian names on about 850,000 people, banned public use of the Turkish language, and restricted religious and cultural practices.[3] The government declared the forced renaming complete on March 31, 1985, but restrictions on language, religion, and cultural practice remained until December 1989.[4] In 1989, state pressure led more than 300,000 Bulgarian Turks to leave in a migration that began on May 29, 1989.[f][5] After party leaders removed Todor Zhivkov on November 10, 1989, the new government under Petar Mladenov restored the right to hold Turkish names and eased religious and cultural restrictions on December 29.[6]
People protesting for the return of their birth names | |
| Date | December 1984–December 1989 |
|---|---|
| Location | Bulgaria |
| Type | Assimilation campaign |
| Target | Bulgarian Turks[a] |
| Perpetrator | |
| Outcome |
|
| Deaths | Various estimates[c] |
| Non-fatal injuries | Several thousand[d] |
| Arrests | Several thousand[e] |
Officials argued that Bulgarian Turks were descendants of Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam and Turkish culture, and presented the campaign as a restoration of Bulgarian origins.[7] Authorities implemented the renaming campaign by surrounding Turkish villages with security forces and military vehicles, while employers carried out some name changes at official direction.[8] Language, religious, and cultural restrictions were enforced through fines, surveillance, detention, and internal exile.[9] Deaths occurred during state suppression of protests and opposition to the campaign and in prison camps such as the Belene labor camp, though death toll estimates vary among sources.[g][10]
The campaign drew criticism from Turkish and Western officials and media outlets, human-rights organizations, and international bodies.[11] After 1989, the Revival Process was condemned by Bulgarian political, religious, and civic institutions.[12] Following the fall of communism in Bulgaria, legal mechanisms for name restoration were established and Bulgaria undertook minority-rights reforms.[13] On January 11, 2012, the National Assembly of Bulgaria formally condemned the Revival Process.[14]
Terminology
editThe Revival Process
editScholars describe the term "Revival Process" as a euphemism, but economist Rumen Avramov writes that its use has become difficult to avoid.[15][16][17][18] The term was first used at a Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Politburo meeting on January 18, 1985 by Georgi Atanasov.[19][20][21] The term was not widely used at first, but became more common.[17] The policy has been described as an assimilation campaign.[15][19][22][23]
Bulgarian Turks
editIn communist Bulgaria, Muslim communities overlapped, and some Slavophone Muslims and Muslim Roma identified as Turks, with the latter sometimes doing so to avoid stigma.[24][25][26] In Bulgaria, group identity often combined religion and ethnicity;[27][28] Slavophone Muslims living mainly among Turks tended to emphasize their Bulgarianness, while those living mainly among Bulgarians more often emphasized their Turkishness.[26][29] Officials used disputed ethnic categories, affecting people who did not fit official labels.[30][31] Turks and Pomaks were sometimes confused with each other by the state – deliberately or otherwise.[32]
Forced assimilation
editBackground
edit
Lighter shades indicate higher population density, while darker shades indicate lower population density.
Turkey's 1980 military coup led the nation to move away from some elements of Kemalism and undermined Turkey's "democratic credentials" internationally.[34][35][36] Turkey launched a military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed in 1983. The BCP leadership treated these developments as security concerns, though sources do not find evidence that the Bulgarian government expected a near-term invasion of Bulgaria.[34][37][38][39] Before the Revival Process, Turkey also faced Kurdish unrest and foreign-policy disputes with Greece, Iran, and the European Economic Community.[40][41] Turkey also restricted some minority groups and naming practices.[37][42] In 1981, Yugoslavia experienced unrest among its Muslim-majority Albanian minority.[37][43] Avramov writes that the final pre-campaign discussion of the "Turkish Problem" focused on security.[37] The Turkish minority also had a higher birth-rate than Slavic Bulgarians.[44][45][46][47] Laber reported contemporary projections suggesting that, if then-current trends continued, Turks could outnumber Slavs in the 21st century.[44]
By late 1984, communist Bulgaria belonged to organizations and treaties that protected minority rights, while continuing to implement assimilation policies in breach of those obligations.[48][49] The government was concerned about potential backlash from Turkey and Western nations, and it sometimes avoided extending previous measures to Turks.[50][51] According to the 1975 census, Turks made up about 8.4 percent of Bulgaria's population.[33][52] Turks lived mainly in northeastern and southern Bulgaria, notably Kardzhali Province.[53][54]
Scholars date Islam's introduction to Bulgaria to the 14th century, after the Ottoman conquest.[55][56] Two theories explain the emergence of Turks in Bulgaria.[57] One theory traces the Turkish community to migration from Asia Minor, while the second rejects such migration.[57][58] The Bulgarian communist government said any members of the Turkish minority who felt connected with Turkey emigrated to Turkey under a limited migration treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey in effect from 1969 to 1979.[59][60][61] It also said those who remained were Bulgarians Turkified in language and religion.[62][63][64][65] Bulgarian officials also cited physical-anthropological claims, including phrenological arguments, to assert that the studied Bulgarian Turks were morphologically Bulgarian.[66][67] The BCP framed the policy as part of building "real" communism and a classless society, both internally and in discussions with Soviet Union (USSR) officials.[68][65]
Soviet stances on Bulgarian minority policy also influenced Bulgaria.[22][69] Academic Vesselin Dimitrov linked the timing of the Revival Process to changes in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s that reduced external constraints on Bulgarian domestic policy.[70] The renaming campaign coincided with a renewed phase of the Cold War, weakened Soviet leadership, and Konstantin Chernenko's extended illness.[70][71] Avramov further refers to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and changes in power in the USSR from 1982 to 1985.[72] Bulgaria's consistently pro-Soviet foreign policy gave the Zhivkov government more room to pursue assimilation measures than other Soviet satellite countries had.[70][73] Academic Bojkov writes that Mikhail Gorbachev also gave tacit approval to Bulgarian minority policies.[74] Despite this, Bulgarian leaders denied Moscow's direct involvement in the Revival Process.[75]
Academic İbrahim Karahasan-Çınar identifies several theorists of the campaign besides Zhivkov:[76]
- Milko Balev - Central Committee secretary
- Georgi Atanasov - Central Committee secretary
- Pencho Kubadinski - Central Committee secretary
- Stoyan Mihaylov - Central Committee secretary
- Aleksandar Lilov[h] - Central Committee secretary
- Dimitar Stoyanov (internal affairs minister) - Internal Affairs minister
- Petar Mladenov - Foreign minister
- Georgi Tanev - Kardzhali District Committee (Bulgarian: Окръжен комитет, romanized: Okrazhen Komitet) first secretary[19]
Georgi Tanev said Bulgarian Turks had a strong group identity expressed through "language, tradition and customs", and that their social environment separated Turks from the body of the Bulgarian nation.[19] He submitted proposals to the BCP Politburo on how to address this situation, provided justification of grassroots support for renaming, and later rose through the communist state hierarchy.[19][78] Tanev later became internal affairs minister and received the Hero of the People's Republic of Bulgaria award, though his receipt of the award was not publicized.[19][78][79]
Karahasan-Çınar does not list Lyudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of Todor Zhivkov.[76] She had been a member of the BCP's Central Committee from the mid-1970s until her death.[i][30][80] Zhivkova championed Bulgarian culture and policies aimed at cultural revival.[30] Although she promoted a cultural revival that emphasized foreign ties, some figures around her favored a narrower understanding of Bulgarian culture.[30][81][82] After Zhivkova's death, many of her ideas and projects faded and her close associates were disfavored by the BCP.[83][84] Dimitrov writes that this helped non-inclusive ideas of cultural revival become dominant.[30]
Shortly before the Revival Process, the Bulgarian government introduced a new, unified identity system under the Unified System for Civil Registration and Administrative Services for the Population within the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works of Bulgaria.[85][86] The government tied the unified system to the planned mass issue of new documents by 1985.[85] State identification cards were required for access to banks, healthcare, and wages.[87] Those without identification cards bearing Bulgarian names were eventually prohibited from registering births or marriages as well.[87]
Shortly before the renaming began, Internal Affairs Minister Dimitar Stoyanov stated the Bulgarian government's intentions:[88]
The winter months must be used and the work must be basically completed within the specified time frame... I will mention a number that should remain between us. We are talking about several tens of thousands of people who we need to separate from the Bulgarian Turks, i.e. to reduce the so-called population of Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria by 10-12 percent.
Initial campaigns
edit
From 1950 to 1951, the communist government around 150,000 ethnic Turks from the country.[89][90] From 1962, the government barred Slavophone Muslims from attending Turkish-language schools, and in 1972, it banned Turkish-language schools.[91][92] The government forced many Muslims to change their names; by 1974, around 150,000 Slavophone Muslims and 200,000 Turks had been forced to adopt new names.[93][94][95]
In 1971, the government adopted a new constitution that supported assimilation policies and weakened minority protections, though it still guaranteed rights relevant to the Revival Process.[18][96][97] Officials replaced the term "national minorities" with "citizens of non-Bulgarian origin", and their discourse framed minority identities as compatible with eventual assimilation.[18][98][99][100]
In 1978, the government tried to replace traditional and religious observances with approved socialist ones.[101][102] It sent officials to Islamic funerals to ensure participants carried out approved socialist rites and prayed in the Bulgarian language.[101] The prescribed rituals combined Bulgarian Christian elements with Marxist-Leninist atheism.[103]
In the period leading up to the Revival Process, the state intensified its assimilationist education policies by promoting mixed marriages and subjected Turkish-minority teachers to ideological training.[60][104] Between 1981 and 1983, authorities forced around 100,000 people, mainly Muslim Roma, to change their names.[105][106] It then extended the measure to Crimean Tatars and Alians, a Bulgaria-based Shia group, shortly before the Revival Process began in 1984.[105][107] The government also resolved to issue around 250,000 identity papers bearing new Bulgarian names to Muslim Roma.[108][85] Before it was implemented, many people already felt the government was moving toward a campaign like the Revival Process.[109][110]
Start of the Revival Process
editThe BCP resolved on June 19, 1984, to carry out a "unification" campaign, and informed leaders of regions with substantial Muslim populations that autumn.[41] Orders to begin preparations for the implementation of the Revival Process were issued on December 10, 1984.[41][111][112] The Revival Process began on Gregorian Christmas 1984.[j][40][113] A Central Committee plenum in mid-February 1985[k] endorsed the campaign after Zhivkov had already extended it nationwide.[64][114]
Approved name lists
editAfter disputes over which names should count as Bulgarian, officials compiled a list of approved names.[115][116][117] The list included many Christian names, including names linked to Eastern Orthodox saints and the church calendar, though it also included "neutral" names.[115][118] This list was originally meant for people in mixed marriages, but it later expanded in scope.[110][116] Officials did not complete the "Classifier of Bulgarian Names" before the start of the Revival Process, but the state provided indices from which people were required to choose their new names.[116] Officials accepted some names of foreign origin, including Turkish, Armenian, and Arabic names, if they could be written in Bulgarian.[116] In addition, some Bulgarian family names were of Turkish origin, which presented a dilemma to the state.[116] The same body also sought to create an acceptable foreign-name classifier.[116]
Renaming
editBy late 1984, Bulgarian authorities had already renamed many non-Turkish Muslims, and then extended the policy to Turks.[119][111] Officials summoned individuals in their villages and required them to replace their Turkish names with Bulgarian ones chosen from approved lists.[115] Officials enforced the name changes through intimidation, which was often backed by security forces and military vehicles.[120][121][119][122] Employers also renamed Turks at the direction of officials.[123][124] The government required municipalities to enforce the use of the new names in public and private life.[125] Some Turks who accepted name changes were later labeled as "collaborators" by other Turks.[126] The government described the renaming as voluntary, although human rights groups and later scholarship described it as coerced.[127][128][129]
At first, authorities required only Turks living in or from the Rhodopes to change their names.[12][41][130][131] Around 310,000 people in Haskovo and Kardzhali provinces had been renamed by January 18, 1985.[40][64][132] After receiving reports on the initial renaming actions, the BCP's Politburo ordered the expansion of the campaign.[64][133] Authorities implemented the order in February 1985, and on March 31 that year, the Bulgarian government declared the process completed and issued new identity documents to those affected.[119][134] The government seized the old identity documents and planned a census that year using the new documents.[135][136][137] Authorities conducted the census from December 4 to 12 and gradually released the results until the end of 1987.[138] They did not publish the final census results until 1988.[138][139] "Turks" and "Muslims" disappeared as categories in this census.[140] Despite the census data, sources differ on the number of people renamed:
| Number renamed | Time frame / scope | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 800,000[12][111] | Christmas 1984–January or February 1985[12][111] | — |
| 822,588[141] | Revival Process up to June 1985[141] | — |
| 850,000[142][143][65][144] | Late 1984–Early 1985[142][143][65][144] | — |
| 850,000–1,100,000[145] | Revival Process[145] | — |
| Nearly 1 million[50] | December 1984–January 1985[50] | — |
| 1,306,000[141] | 1984–1985[141] | According to the source, this estimate might combine totals for Turks, Gypsies, and Pomaks, including name changes from mixed marriages.[141] |
Other policies
editThe Bulgarian government banned the use of the Turkish and Romani languages in public, although up to 70 percent of the Turkish minority could not speak Bulgarian.[146][147][148] The government extended the prohibition to Turkic Christian communities and banned public use of their language.[149] Signs warning it was "forbidden to speak" either "French"[l] or "in a foreign language" were posted in public spaces in the majority Turkish areas.[151] Authorities fined people who spoke Turkish in public five leva or more, and sometimes imprisoned or exiled them.[121][152][41][153] One Turk was imprisoned for five years for persistently using Turkish, and another was exiled from Bulgaria for two years.[152]
The government had already banned visible markers of Muslim identity, such as religious clothing, so people used substitutes.[154] For example, dark raincoats became substitutes for veils.[154] During the Revival Process, officials barred Islamic burials and traditional headstone shapes.[155] Washing the dead before burial was also outlawed.[156] The state further pressured Muslims to deface Islamic symbols and Arabic inscriptions on graves.[157] At times, Turkish families buried their deceased under headstones with only a photograph because religious symbols were prohibited and they did not wish to use the assigned "Bulgarian" name.[158] Local authorities ordered the defacement of the Turkish names of 2,000 individuals on gravestones near Pavel.[159] The graves of prominent Turkish-language writers in Bulgaria were destroyed in 1985.[160] Similarly, authorities occasionally had crescents that adorned minarets removed because the symbol is associated with Turkish symbols.[161][162][163]
Authorities also barred stores and restaurants from serving women in traditional Islamic dress.[164] In some areas, the wearing of fez hats and traditional Turkish pants were banned.[165][166][167][168] Authorities also destroyed Turkish-language books and other Turkish cultural items.[157] Officials inspected the mail of Bulgarian Turks, and sometimes demanded the translation of mail written in Turkish for inspection.[169] Turkish-language music was also banned.[170][171][172] Authorities additionally sought to promote traditional Slavic gatherings of young people (Bulgarian: седянки, romanized: sedyanki) among the policy's targets.[173] With respect to Roma specifically, semi-nomadic Mahala settlements were hidden behind concrete walls.[174]
Authorities strictly enforced the ban on circumcision and required Muslim parents to sign documents promising not to circumcise their child.[175][176] Officials inspected boys for compliance;[153] parents and those who performed the circumcision faced punishment for violations.[164][177] In 1987, Amnesty International reported the state imprisoned four women for between six and eight months because they circumcised their sons or grandsons.[148] The maximum allowed punishment for violators was a fine of up to 1,000 leva or three years' imprisonment.[178]
Communist Bulgaria appointed a chief mufti and regional muftis during the Revival Process.[164][179][180] The government chose these religious officials for their loyalty rather than for their religious training.[164][179] The state-appointed chief mufti said authorities did not prevent Muslims from performing rites and declared support for the renaming policy.[164][179] The national religious body for Muslims in Bulgaria at the time was known as the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Muslim Faith.[179][181]
State media and propaganda
editThe Bulgarian government controlled most of the country's media outlets, and many journalists came from politically acceptable backgrounds or were members of the ruling party.[182][183] In January 1985, Todor Zhivkov told the Communist Party's Central Committee the party should remain silent in the press and not issue information to particular groups to avoid speculation.[19] In subsequent years, the media echoed official narratives of the essential Bulgarian origin of the Turkish minority.[121] The press published the involuntary declarations of thousands of Turks affirming a Bulgarian identity, and it insisted that Bulgarian Turks, who were referred to as "New Bulgarians", approved of the renaming program.[121][184] Opinion polling indicated indifference among the general public toward the nation's Turkish minority. According to Dimitrov, opposition to the campaign among ethnic Bulgarians was limited since the Turkish minority was heavily concentrated in two regions of the country. The government largely refrained from mobilizing ethnic Bulgarians in support of the Revival Process.[185]
Reaction and resistance
editMany targets of the policy continued to perform circumcision and speak Turkish at home.[121][186] However, public resistance was often limited and uncoordinated.[121] Some individuals tried to avoid the renaming campaign by hiding in remote areas, but submitted after a few days.[41] Those who attempted to escape the renaming were punished by being assigned names most closely associated with the Christian religion.[187]
Turkish National Liberation Movement
editOne group was the "Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria", founded in Varna on December 8, 1985.[188] Among the organization's early members were Ahmed Dogan[m] and future co-founder and later chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) Kasim Dal.[n] Ahmed Dogan played a leading role as the organization's political theorist;[192] he said the organization never sought secession or to undermine state sovereignty.[193] The movement also sought official recognition of Bulgaria's Turkish minority.[194]
Dogan's role in the organization later became controversial; sources agree he was connected to the Committee for State Security (DS), the Bulgarian equivalent of the Soviet Committee for State Security, but they differ on whether he was among its founders or later assumed leadership.[195][196][197] Some scholars also say the DS played an active role in the Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria's creation and development.[197] In 1992, former senior intelligence officer Radoslav Raykov stated Dogan was infiltrated into the organization and convicted along with other leaders to build a legend for him.[198] According to Alexei Kalyonski, the term "Liberation Movement" suggests a connection to the DS.[199]
Most of the organization's membership was arrested by mid-1986.[200] Around 200 of its members were arrested and 18 stood trial.[199] Ahmed Dogan received a ten-year sentence.[199]
Armed resistance
editWhile acts of political violence and sabotage were committed in Bulgaria during the Revival Process, observers have described resistance by Bulgarian Turks as mostly peaceful rather than as organized armed resistance.[201][202] Rumen Avramov, who was an economic advisor to Bulgaria's first non-communist president Zhelyu Zhelev, said the scale of state repression prevented the development of organized armed opposition.[201] The Bulgarian government undertook rearmament aimed at strengthening its internal security forces.[203]
Unorganized armed resistance occurred throughout the Revival Process.[169] Authorities reported more than 600 incidents they described as "terrorism", and attributed these to Turks and opposition groups, though the attribution and details of many cases are disputed.[201] For example, on March 9, 1985, an attack killed seven people in Bunovo when a train carriage reserved for mothers on a route between Burgas and Sofia was blown up.[o][204][205][206] A court sentenced the attack's perpetrators to death and the executions were carried out in late 1988.[205][207] The government used such attacks to justify tightened security measures.[207][208]
Belene labor camp
edit
During the Revival Process, the Bulgarian authorities reactivated the Belene labor camp, situated on an island in the Danube River, to detain people whom they arrested for resisting the campaign.[209][210] The BCP used Belene as a labor camp until 1959, when it was converted into a prison.[209][211] Authorities typically held Turks who resisted in Belene for two-to-three months, though they held some for much longer.[111] In 1985, authorities incarcerated more than 500 Turks there for resistance to the renaming measures.[209][211] Authorities often held detainees without judicial sentences at Belene.[212] In April 1986, prisoners in Belene began a hunger strike that lasted around 30 days.[209][211] In May 1986, authorities released most of the prisoners and then exiled them to different regions of Bulgaria.[209][211] Authorities released the remaining detainees in early 1987 in districts populated by ethnic Bulgarians.[213]
Casualties
editOn December 26, 1984, in Mogilyane, security forces opened fire on demonstrators during protests against the forced replacement of Turkish names with Bulgarian ones, killing three people, including the young child Türkan Feyzullah.[214] Security forces shot Türkan while her mother carried the child on her back.[215] Mogilyane residents later erected a monument in her memory.[214]
Some Bulgarian Turks were killed, injured, or detained at protests, like the one in Mogilyane in 1984, in opposition to official policies.[216][120][217] Others died in prison camps associated with the Revival Process, such as Belene.[217] Estimates of the number of people killed, injured, and arrested during the Revival Process varied:
| Number killed | Number injured | Number arrested | Time frame / scope[p] | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 800–2,500[217] | — | — | November 1984–February 1985[217] | This estimate covers those killed, injured, or arrested in opposition to the initial wave of name changes owing to the use of the military to facilitate the campaign.[217] |
| 1,000+[217] | — | — | November 1984–February 1985[217] | This estimate covers those killed, injured, or arrested in opposition to the initial wave of name changes. The source notes that the 1,000+ estimate may be higher if deaths from neglect or suicide in Belene are included as death certificates in Belene were regularly falsified.[217] |
| 300–1,500[216] | Several thousand[216] | Several thousand[216] | Late 1984–early 1985[216] | This estimate covers those killed, injured, or arrested in opposition to the initial wave of name changes.[216] |
| 300–1,000[120] | Several thousand[120] | Several thousand[120] | Late 1984–early 1985[120] | This estimate covers those killed, injured, or arrested in opposition to the initial wave of name changes.[120] |
International reaction
editTurkish president Kenan Evren discussed minority and emigration issues with Todor Zhivkov in 1982; Bulgarian officials interpreted the talks as closing the emigration question and treating ethnic policy as an internal matter.[19][218] Zhivkov denied the claims, as Bulgarian authorities did at first.[19][129] Following the start of the Revival Process, Turkish diplomatic responses were restrained.[19][219] Evren first formally protested the Revival Process in January 1985, sending Zhivkov a message asking that the forced assignment of Bulgarian names be stopped.[220][221] Despite official restraint, some Turkish and Western media described the Revival Process with terms such as "genocide" and "state crime" or used specific sensational headlines.[23][222]
Bulgarian Turkish children left behind after their parents fled to Turkey drew particular concern from the Turkish public.[223][224] The street outside the Bulgarian embassy in Ankara was temporarily renamed after one of these children.[225] In 1987, Turkish state television aired a dramatization titled Born Again (Turkish: Yeniden Doğmak) about families separated by events in Bulgaria, prompting a sharp response from the Bulgarian government.[226][224] Often, Bulgaria responded to these denunciations with comparisons to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.[227][228] In line with the Helsinki Accords, the Bulgarian government reduced efforts to obstruct the reception of critical Western and Turkish broadcasts to Bulgaria, though jamming of Turkish-language broadcasts in particular did not cease completely.[229][230] During the media dispute, Bulgaria promoted the film Time of Violence, a nearly five-hour historical epic about forced conversions to Islam under Ottoman rule.[226][231] Subsequent diplomatic negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey concerned the broadcast of Time of Violence and the Turkish film Belene, which documented the Belene labor camp.[232]
Turkey also raised the Revival Process before several international bodies.[233][234] The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), predecessor to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, tabled the issue in both its May 7–June 17, 1985 and October 15–November 25 meetings.[233][235] The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization did the same at its October 8–November 12, 1985, meeting.[233] The Council of Europe (CoE) adopted Resolution 846, calling on Bulgaria to end violations of the social, cultural, and religious rights of the affected minorities.[233][236]
In 1987, the Islamic Conference, a predecessor to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, sent a delegation to Bulgaria.[148][237] Following this visit, the organization published a report that was critical of Bulgaria.[148][238] Other international organizations echoed this condemnation, including the United Nations, whose Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance listed Bulgaria among countries preventing the peaceful practice of religion.[220][239][240]
Bulgarian authorities publicized supportive visits by Muslim clerics, including the chief muftis of eastern-aligned Syria and communist South Yemen in 1986 and the chief mufti of Ghana the next year.[19][241] The Soviet Union considered the treatment of Bulgaria's Turkish minority an internal Bulgarian issue, and the Soviet press remained silent on the subject.[74][242] Only Greece supported Bulgaria among the nations of the European Community, despite Greek membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alongside Turkey.[234]
Second wave of resistance
editIn the late 1980s, ranking members of the Bulgarian government expressed internal concern about the shortcomings of the Revival Process and the ineffectiveness of the assimilation policies.[243] The government undertook limited resettlement of Turks to western and northwestern Bulgaria, and the placement of Turkish children in assimilatory boarding schools.[244] Minister Pencho Kubadinski suggested people from the Soviet Union should be settled in place of resettled Turks.[244]
A second wave of organized popular resistance emerged and shaped open civil opposition to the communist government.[192][245] Most of the groups openly declaring opposition to the Revival Process, such as the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights, the independent trade union Podkrepa, the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, and Ecoglasnost formed in the context of Perestroika.[246] On November 13, 1988, the Democratic League for the Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria was established with Mustafa Yumer as chairman and grew to include several thousand members.[199][247] In April 1989, the Support Society–Vienna 89 was founded in the town of Djebel.[210]
These associations were at the heart of the "May Events" (Bulgarian: Майските събития, romanized: Maiiskite subitiya) from May 19–27, 1989.[248][249] Demonstrators, estimated at 30,000–53,000, carried out hunger strikes and mass protests, and at times clashed with police.[197] They aimed to attract the attention of the world community, especially the CSCE symposium "Freedom of the Spirit and the Human Dimension in Europe", which was held from May 30–June 23, 1989[q] in Paris, France.[158][250] From May 19–27, 1989, between 25,000 and 30,000 demonstrators took to the streets in northeastern Bulgaria.[251] Some demonstrations involved violence.[199]
Bulgaria became isolated from its Eastern bloc allies during the Revolutions of 1989.[199][252] Diplomatic pressure on Bulgaria from Turkey also increased; Turkey raised the issue in a number of international forums.[199] The president of France, François Mitterrand, visited Bulgaria in January 1989 and held meetings with dissidents at the French embassy in Sofia.[253]
The Bulgarian government responded to the protests by sending soldiers, fire brigades, and the national police (then styled as the people's militias) against the demonstrators.[199][254] Soldiers were loaded into trucks covered with opaque tarps, without prior information about their assigned task.[254] Riot-control methods, including tear gas and occasionally firearms, were used.[199][255] Sources differ on the number of protesters killed; Alexei Kalyonski estimated between seven and ten protesters were killed, and that hundreds were injured.[199] Tomasz Kamusella estimated that 30–102 protesters were killed and hundreds were injured.[158] Bulgarian authorities reported seven deaths.[158] Opposition leaders were subsequently removed from Bulgaria;[199][255] Mustafa Yumer, for example, was expelled to Turkey.[199]
1989 expulsion
editThe Bulgarian government concluded that part of the Muslim population could not be assimilated and shifted toward promoting emigration.[119] At the end of May 1989, after prominent dissidents were removed, authorities enabled mass departures by loosening travel restrictions, intimidating individuals, and later opening the border with Turkey.[256][257] Authorities framed the departures as temporary tourist travel, and propaganda referred to the episode as the "Big Excursion".[257]
From May 29 to August 1989, over 300,000 people left Bulgaria for Turkey under state pressure.[5] In August 1989, Turkey temporarily closed the border with Bulgaria, ending the forced migration.[258]
Economic effects
editIn the 1980s, Bulgaria entered economic decline, and its government undertook reforms in response.[259] As early as 1987, Bulgarian state media discussed a possible near-term financial insolvency of the country. The events of 1989 intensified the crisis.[260] Avramov writes that these events revealed economic costs associated with the Revival Process.[261]
Aftermath
editOn November 10, 1989, party leaders forced Todor Zhivkov to resign.[119][262] The new Bulgarian government restored the right of Bulgarian citizens to have Turkish names on December 29 that year.[6][262] The new government condemned the Revival Process as a "deviation from 'Leninist' norms".[263] By 1991, Bulgaria had allowed religious instruction and Turkish-language instruction to resume, and adopted a new national constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion.[264][262]
Restoration of original names
editAlthough the legal right to use Turkish names was restored, those affected still faced obstacles when restoring their previous names.[265] In March 1990, Bulgaria adopted legislation enabling that restoration, but its early implementation was burdensome, requiring a court procedure and two supporting witnesses.[266][267] The law required people who restored their names to keep Bulgarian suffixes, such as "-ov" and "-ova".[265][268] A 1990 Helsinki Watch report said fewer than one-third of Turks had restored their names nationwide.[265] For example, academic Yelis Erolova restored her Turkish name only after 1990.[269] In some areas, older Bulgarian Turks more commonly restored their names than younger people.[270] On November 16, 1990, the government adopted a reform that replaced the court procedure with an administrative process.[268][271]
Strengthening of Turkish identity
editThe Revival Process strengthened Turkish self-identification among the targeted minority, with many placing greater emphasis on Turkish identity than on Bulgarian identity.[121][272][273] This was tied to Islamic religious traditions that marked differences between Turks and ethnic Bulgarians, and was associated with increased contact with people and groups from Muslim-majority countries.[272][274] People described themselves as "Turks of Bulgaria" rather than "Bulgarian Turks".[273] Gruev and Kalyonski said these changes also strengthened distinctions between Turkish and Bulgarian identities.[275] According to Yelis Erolova, her family made her think of Turkey as her "mother nation".[269]
Nationalist backlash
editPost-communist reforms also produced nationalist opposition, especially over the restoration of Turkish names and the teaching of Turkish in schools.[276][277] In Razgrad, nationalist protesters proclaimed a "Bulgarian Republic of Razgrad", and it later came to encompass a number of municipalities and became known as the "Association of Free Bulgarian Cities".[278] The Razgrad municipal authorities also decided not to teach Turkish in local schools after nationalist pressure.[276] On October 25, 1990, the MRF club in Shumen was bombed.[276] All of this engendered a response among the Turkish population, including a boycott of schools in southeastern Bulgaria by ethnic-Turks.[276]
Nationalist protest also accompanied parliamentary debate over the restoration of Turkish names; around 200 people demonstrated outside the National Assembly during discussion of related measures.[276] Post-communist prime minister Andrey Lukanov expressed concern that Turkish-language education might be extended "unconstitutionally" to Pomaks.[276] His successor, Dimitar Iliev Popov, similarly warned against what he called "Muslim aggression".[276]
Impact on the Cold War
edit
The Eastern Bloc, including Bulgaria, is depicted in red, while the Western Bloc, including Turkey, is in blue.
Prior to the start of the Revival Process, relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Turkey were good.[45][234] Todor Zhivkov had visited Turkey in 1983.[234] Although the Revival Process was addressed in Cold War diplomatic exchanges, bilateral contacts initially continued through diplomatic channels.[159][234] The campaign strained relations and drew condemnation from NATO and other international actors.[233][227][234] The Turkish ambassador to Bulgaria, Ömer Engin Lütem, described the most difficult phase of relations during this period as a "war of notes".[19] Because relevant Russian and U.S. records remain inaccessible and scholarship is limited, the campaign's late-Cold-War effects remain unclear, but academic Tomasz Kamusuella suggests these facts point to some sort of secret negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to prevent the justification of war.[279]
Relations deteriorated further in 1989.[234] In August of that year, the United States recalled its ambassador to Bulgaria.[255][280] The issue was also raised in the United States Congress.[255] International actors organized fact-finding activity concerning human rights conditions in Bulgaria.[255][281] The Soviet Union refused to mediate between Bulgaria and Turkey when official tensions grew, although it engaged in shuttle diplomacy through its diplomatic mission in Ankara.[281][282] According to Dimitrov, the failure of these efforts convinced the Soviet leadership that Zhivkov had "outlived his usefulness" and led it to support an anti-Zhivkov faction within the Bulgarian government led by foreign minister Petar Mladenov.[283]
Legal aftermath
editIn 1990, Bulgaria implemented an amnesty for those convicted of political crimes.[284] Authorities released 31 of 81 Turks imprisoned for resistance, but kept 50 convicted under the criminal code in prison.[284] Similar legal distinctions between "political" and "criminal" offenses existed in other states where dissidents faced criminal charges.[285]
On January 18, 1990, authorities issued a warrant for Zhivkov's arrest, and he was held under house arrest.[r][286][287][288] While formally under house arrest, he was reportedly allowed to travel around Bulgaria.[289] Prosecutors charged a number of defendants for abuses associated with the Belene camp, and Zhivkov faced additional charges unrelated to the Revival Process.[286][290] Some perpetrators of the Revival Process were never charged.[290] Although legal proceedings began in 1991, they were still ongoing when Zhivkov died in 1998.[291] In 2022, prosecutors dropped the remaining charges after the final defendant, Georgi Atanasov, died.[292] The case was initially terminated after Atanasov's death, but after protests from families of Belene camp victims, the Sofia Court of Appeal ordered the Military Prosecutor's Office to continue the investigation.[292][293] The court ruled that the procedural rights of people affected by the Revival Process were not respected and that the case could not be terminated without a declaration from the Prosecutor's Office as to what crime it alleged that the defendants had committed.[293]
Legacy
editDomestic
editKutlay writes that the reversal of the Revival Process, together with moderation by both the new government and the Bulgarian Turkish community, contributed to Bulgaria's democratic transition.[294] Bulgaria's first democratically elected president, Zhelyu Zhelev, treated the Turkish political movement as a political ally and defended the nascent Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) against a legal challenge from nationalists and the post-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party that could have led to its dissolution.[294][295] According to Kutlay, MRF leader Ahmed Dogan worked to marginalize "ultra-nationalist" elements within the Turkish community and refrained from calling for autonomy or independence.[294] The MRF later joined many of early post-communist Bulgaria's governing coalitions, though Korkmaz writes that many of the Turkish minority's problems remained unresolved.[296] Kutlay further writes that the prospect of European Union (EU) membership had a moderating influence and contributed to the reintegration of Turks into Bulgarian society.[297] In 2000, the EU adopted the Race Equality Directive and later formally requested Bulgaria's compliance with it.[298] Similarly, Korkmaz writes that Bulgaria's efforts to join NATO and the EU encouraged rapid reforms aimed at reintegrating Turks and addressing the communist past.[296]
In November 2002, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church described victims of the Revival Process, including non-Christians, as "martyrs".[12] On January 11, 2012, the Bulgarian National Assembly officially condemned the Revival Process, although according to Tomasz Kamusella, scholars largely ignored the parliamentary recognition.[14][279] Kamusella also described continued public commemorations of Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, including statements by national political figures praising him.[299] After the National Assembly's declaration, the political party Ataka, described by sources as "far-right", introduced a bill contesting it.[300][301][302][303] According to the bill's authors, the declaration represented a boost for separatists; Kamusella interprets that reference as referring to Bulgarian Turks and Muslims.[303] Ataka's leader, Volen Siderov, said the declaration could expose Bulgaria to substantial compensation claims and raised the possibility that the country would be described as having carried out policies of "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing".[304] Parliament rejected the bill.[304] In a similar vein, Academic Natalya Lunkova notes that an anthology of memoirs by people targeted in the renaming campaign received mixed reactions in Bulgaria.[305] Nationalists associated with the party Revival criticized the choice of topic and said attention should instead have been paid to transgressions carried out by Turks during the Ottoman occupation of Bulgaria.[305]
The Revival Process also had lasting social and cultural effects. It affected Turkish language use in Bulgaria, and Bulgarian Turkish communities exhibit a large degree of codeswitching.[306] During the Revival Process, knowledge of Bulgarian among younger generations became nearly universal.[46] Academic Trupia writes that, as part of the collective trauma of the Revival Process, some Bulgarians of Muslim origin were left to wonder what their names would have been but for it.[307] Trupia treats the renaming campaign not as a closed historical episode, but as a trauma whose effects have been passed down within families and carried into everyday life.[308] Every year, Bulgarian Turkish groups commemorate the official end of the Revival Process – December 29 – as "Liberation Day" (Turkish: Kurtuluş Bayramı).[309] In 2013, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms called for information about the Revival Process to be included in schoolbooks.[310]
International
editIn Turkey, a number of dissident and migrant organizations were formed by people targeted by the Revival Process and the 1989 migration.[311] Book-length works published in Turkey have often focused on individual accounts of the 1989 events and have usually appeared in limited numbers.[312] Turkish media praised the 2012 Bulgarian National Assembly's parliamentary declaration condemning the events.[313]
Throughout the Revival Process, many targeted people sought refuge in countries other than Turkey, especially Austria, Germany, and Sweden.[314] Many found refuge in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[314][315]
Responsibility
edit
The red star on its spire remained at the time of the 1990 fire.[316]
The ruling communist party later placed personal blame on Todor Zhivkov.[317] The 2012 parliamentary declaration attributed the Revival Process to the "totalitarian" communist government as a whole.[14] A 1994 study found that 29 percent of ethnic Bulgarians described the Revival Process as not criminal.[318] The same study found that Bulgarian Turks generally blamed Todor Zhivkov and his "circle", while only 2 percent blamed ethnic Bulgarians generally.[318]
On August 26, 1990, a fire broke out at the Party House in central Sofia, then the headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), successor to the BCP.[316][319][320] Different sources estimated the fire burned for between four-and-seven hours, destroying forty rooms and several documents.[319][320] Academic Kamusella wrote that records related to the Revival Process may have been destroyed in the fire, though the extent of any such loss was unclear.[319][320] Accounts of responsibility for the fire varied.[320] Former National Assembly member and Sofia municipal councillor Vili Lilkov later stated in the first months after 1989, DS officers had been tasked with destroying or appropriating archives, and that many Ministry of Internal Affairs records had been stored in the Party House.[316]
In popular culture
editNaim Süleymanoğlu (Bulgarian: Наим Сюлейманоглу) was an ethnically Turkish Olympic weightlifter born in Bulgaria in 1967 as Naim Suleimanov (Bulgarian: Наим Сюлейманов).[321] During the Revival Process, authorities forced Süleymanoğlu to change his name to Naum Shalamanov (Bulgarian: Наум Шаламанов), under which he first became a world champion representing Bulgaria.[322][323] He later defected to Turkey and gave speeches about the Revival Process, bringing attention to the campaign.[323] Bulgaria asserted that "Turkish secret services" had kidnapped Süleymanoğlu.[324] Laber notes that he subsequently lived freely in Turkey.[324] Süleymanoğlu competed for Turkey in international weightlifting competitions thereafter.[322][323] Following his defection, Süleymanoğlu won the gold medal in his weight class at the Summer Olympic Games in 1988, 1992, and 1996, representing Turkey.[325] The story of Naim's life up to his defection and subsequent 1988 Olympic performance is depicted in the film Pocket Hercules: Naim Suleymanoglu.[326]
The Turkish television presenter Gülhan Şen (Bulgarian: Гюлхан Шен), who was born in Bulgaria in 1978, was also affected by the policy.[327] In 1985, authorities forced her to change her name to Galina Hristova Mihailova (Bulgarian: Галина Христова Михайлова), and in 1989 she moved to Turkey.[327] The 2005 film Stolen Eyes depicts a romance between a Bulgarian Turkish woman and a non-Muslim man during the Revival Process.[328] In 2004, author Hristo Kyuchukov published the children's book My Name Was Hussein in the United States, covering the events of the Revival Process from the point of view of a young Muslim Roma boy who is forcibly renamed.[329]
See also
editNotes
edit- ↑ Turkish identity in Bulgaria was complicated at the time. See the "Bulgarian Turks" section for further clarification.
- ↑ See the "Renaming" section for various estimates.
- ↑ See the "Casualties" section for various estimates.
- ↑ See the "Casualties" section.
- ↑ See the "Casualties" section.
- ↑ See the "1989 forced migration" section.
- ↑ See the "Casualties" section for various estimates.
- ↑ Lilov was removed from power in September 1983. He later returned and delivered the Mladenov government's official denunciation of the Revival Process in December 1989.[77]
- ↑ Sources differ on the exact date that Zhivkova held certain positions from.[30][80]
- ↑ Sources differ as to whether the campaign began on the 24th or the 25th.[40][113]
- ↑ Some sources give the date of the plenum as February 13–14, while others give February 18.[64][114]
- ↑ The authorities sought not to refer to the Turkish language directly.[150]
- ↑ Also referred to at this time as Medi Doganov.[189][190]
- ↑ Also referred to at this time as Diman Sabinov Kisimov.[191]
- ↑ Some sources instead give the number of victims as six.[204][205][206]
- ↑ These estimates exclude events such as the 1989 unrest and expulsion.
- ↑ This conference was held after the forced expulsion began, an eventuality unknown to protesters at the time.
- ↑ Sources disagree on whether Zhivkov was immediately placed under house arrest or subsequently moved to it.[286][287][288]
References
edit- ↑ Dimitrov (2000), pp. 14–16; Tahir (2013), pp. 113–114.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski (2008), pp. 139, 142; Zang Jr. (1990), pp. 1–3.
- ↑ Zang Jr. (1990), pp. 1–3; Gruev & Kalyonski (2008), pp. 33–34; Borden (2001), pp. 283–284; Eminov (1997a), p. 228.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski (2008), pp. 139, 142; Dimitrov (2000), pp. 13, 17.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 1.
- 1 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2004.
- ↑ Dimitrov (2000), pp. 2–3, 8; Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (2003), p. 89.
- ↑ Dimitrov (2000), p. 15; Laber (1987), pp. 13–14; Erolova (2025), p. 13; Poulton (1991), p. 131.
- ↑ Dimitrov (2000), p. 15; Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (2003), p. 88.
- ↑ Vaksberg (2014); Kutlay (2017), p. 18.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (2003), pp. 91, 95; Borden (2001), pp. 144–145; Kuzay (1986), p. 2; Hoyer (1989).
- 1 2 3 4 5 Trupia 2022, p. 49.
- ↑ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2004); Korkmaz (2022), p. 92.
- 1 2 3 Bulgarian National Assembly 2012.
- 1 2 Avramov 2016, pp. 22–23.
- ↑ Trupia 2022, p. 48.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 10.
- 1 2 3 Kutlay 2017, p. 10.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Kalyonski 2009a.
- ↑ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007.
- ↑ Bulgarian National Television 2015.
- 1 2 Dimitrov 2000, p. 5.
- 1 2 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 91.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, pp. 3–4.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 98.
- 1 2 Eminov 2007, p. 15.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 108.
- ↑ Eminov 2007, pp. 14–16.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 109.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dimitrov 2000, p. 8.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 21.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 129.
- 1 2 National Statistical Office 2011.
- 1 2 Dimitrov 2000, p. 12.
- ↑ Banik 2023, p. 33.
- ↑ Oprea 2014, p. 131.
- 1 2 3 4 Avramov 2016, pp. 87–89.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 123, 135.
- ↑ Ivanov & Önsoy 2022, pp. 45–46.
- 1 2 3 4 Dimitrov 2000, p. 13.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Maeva 2022.
- ↑ Aslan 2009, pp. 3–5.
- ↑ Arhsien & Howells 1981, p. 419.
- 1 2 Laber 1987, p. 30.
- 1 2 Curtis 1993, p. 56.
- 1 2 Dimitrov 2000, p. 6.
- ↑ Sevim & Aydın Sevim 2022, p. 330.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 86.
- ↑ United States Department of State 1984.
- 1 2 3 Dimitrov 2000, p. 2.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 135.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 45.
- ↑ Eminov 1997a, p. 213.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 46.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 1.
- ↑ Elchinova 2001, p. 1.
- 1 2 Marušiakova & Popov 2000, pp. 1–2.
- ↑ Borden 2001, p. 258.
- ↑ Eminov 1986, p. 508.
- 1 2 Ivanov & Önsoy 2022, p. 44.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 9.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 89.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, pp. 2–3, 8.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 22.
- 1 2 3 4 Korkmaz 2022, p. 89.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 150.
- ↑ Tahir 2013, p. 113.
- ↑ Tahir 2013, pp. 113–114.
- ↑ Petkova 2002, p. 49.
- 1 2 3 Dimitrov 2000, p. 11.
- ↑ Baeva 2012, p. 13.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 87.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 150.
- 1 2 Bojkov 2004, p. 357.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, pp. 89–90.
- 1 2 Karahasan-Çınar 2005, pp. 213–214.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 136.
- 1 2 Stoyanov 1998, p. 162.
- ↑ 168 Chasa 2021.
- 1 2 Atanasova 2004, p. 288.
- ↑ Ivanova 2022, pp. 563, 570.
- ↑ Atanasova 2004, p. 296.
- ↑ Ivanova 2022, p. 574.
- ↑ Atanasova 2004, p. 314.
- 1 2 3 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 129.
- ↑ Council of Ministers 1977.
- 1 2 Laber 1987, p. 20.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 104.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 10.
- ↑ Petkova 2002, pp. 44–45.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 7.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, pp. 15–16.
- ↑ Eminov 2007, p. 7.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, pp. 100, 133–136.
- ↑ Şimşir 1988, p. 274.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 43.
- ↑ Eminov 1986, p. 512.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 44.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, p. 3.
- ↑ Ivanov & Önsoy 2022, p. 39.
- 1 2 Eminov 1997a, p. 227.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, pp. 18–19.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 103.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 87.
- 1 2 Şimşir 1988, p. 275.
- ↑ Pashova 2009, p. 108.
- ↑ Eminov 1997a, p. 232.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 85.
- ↑ Vachkov 2018, p. 193.
- 1 2 Tahir 2013, p. 112.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 139.
- ↑ Ivanov & Önsoy 2022, p. 46.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 139, 142.
- 1 2 Dimitrov 2000, p. 14.
- 1 2 3 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 69.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kalinova & Baeva 2009, pp. 175–184.
- ↑ Tahir 2013, p. 114.
- ↑ Kalinova & Baeva 2009, p. 178.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Vaksberg 2014.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Zang Jr. 1990, p. 2.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dimitrov 2000, p. 15.
- ↑ Laber 1987, pp. 13–14.
- ↑ Erolova 2025, p. 13.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 131.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 94.
- ↑ Trupia 2022, pp. 57–58.
- ↑ Laber 1987, pp. 12–13.
- ↑ Erolova 2025, p. 10.
- 1 2 Kuzay 1986, p. 1.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 21.
- ↑ Tahir 2013, pp. 114, 116.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 142.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, p. 13–14.
- ↑ Eminov 1997b, p. 87.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 139–140.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 127.
- ↑ Eminov 1986, p. 514.
- 1 2 Foreign Broadcast Information Service 1986, p. 1.
- ↑ Central Statistical Office 1988.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, pp. 141, 143.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Avramov 2016, p. 110.
- 1 2 Büchsenschütz 2000, p. 104.
- 1 2 Kalinova 2016, p. 125.
- 1 2 Tahir 2013, p. 116.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 12.
- ↑ Zang Jr. 1990, pp. 2–3.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 143.
- 1 2 3 4 Hoyer 1989.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 160–161.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 46.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, pp. 45–46.
- 1 2 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 88.
- 1 2 Borden 2001, p. 283.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 33–34.
- ↑ Mayuhtar-May 2014, p. 104.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 136.
- 1 2 Avramov 2016, pp. 665–669.
- 1 2 3 4 Kamusella 2019, p. 44.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 143–144.
- ↑ Eminov 1989, p. 12.
- ↑ Borden 2001, p. 284.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 132.
- ↑ Mahon 1999, p. 157.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Eminov 1997a, p. 228.
- ↑ Zang Jr. 1990, p. 3.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 159.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 18.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 137.
- 1 2 Borden 2001, p. 285.
- ↑ Maeva 2017, p. 99.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, pp. 136–137.
- ↑ Öz 2024, p. 204.
- ↑ Erolova 2025, p. 11.
- ↑ Marušiakova & Popov 2000, p. 6.
- ↑ Dayıoğlu 2012, p. 8.
- ↑ Öz 2024, pp. 204–205.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, pp. 135–136.
- ↑ Poulton 1991, p. 135.
- 1 2 3 4 Grand Mufti's Office.
- ↑ Öz 2024, p. 205.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 48.
- ↑ Borden 2001, p. 289.
- ↑ Trifonova Price 2022, p. 2.
- ↑ Borden 2001, p. 286.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, p. 10.
- ↑ Zafer 2010.
- ↑ Bojkov 2004, p. 358.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, p. 16.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 148.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, p. 155.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, p. 156.
- 1 2 Gorcheva 2009.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, p. 46.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, pp. 248–249.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, pp. 5–7, 155.
- ↑ Hristov 2012.
- 1 2 3 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 179.
- ↑ Capital 1997.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Kalyonski 2009b.
- ↑ Angelov 2009, p. 258.
- 1 2 3 Kamusella 2019, p. 35.
- ↑ Dechev 2024.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 177.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 36.
- 1 2 3 Bulgarian National Radio 2016.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 138.
- 1 2 Büchsenschütz 2000, p. 105.
- ↑ Curtis 1993, p. xxxvii.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Belene Island Foundation, History.
- 1 2 Mediapool 2009.
- 1 2 3 4 Pametbg.
- ↑ Erolova 2025, p. 3.
- ↑ Kutlay 2017, p. 28.
- 1 2 Bulgarian National Radio 2023.
- ↑ Kırcaali Haber 2018.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Laber 1987, pp. 3–4.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Kamusella 2019, p. 34.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 71.
- ↑ Central Intelligence Agency 1985.
- 1 2 Borden 2001, p. 287.
- ↑ Demirhan 2019, p. 265.
- ↑ Sevim & Aydın Sevim 2022, p. 329.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 146.
- 1 2 Sevim & Aydın Sevim 2022, p. 328.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 146–147.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 41.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 144.
- ↑ Forestier-Peyrat 2021, p. 183.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, pp. 47, 97.
- ↑ United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1988, p. 81.
- ↑ Yolcu 2021, p. 79.
- ↑ Ragaru 2023, pp. 66–67.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Kuzay 1986, p. 2.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Petkova 2002, p. 47.
- ↑ United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1985, pp. 53, 182–183.
- ↑ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1985.
- ↑ Kamberi, Rexhepi & Kamberi 2024, pp. 64–66.
- ↑ Kamberi, Rexhepi & Kamberi 2024, pp. 66–67.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 95.
- ↑ United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1988, pp. 1–2.
- ↑ Stoyanov 1998, p. 195.
- ↑ Petkova 2002, p. 48.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 163–166.
- 1 2 Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 164–165.
- ↑ Elchinova 2001.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 176.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 180.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, pp. 180–182.
- ↑ Kalaitzaki 2001, pp. 273–274.
- ↑ Kalaitzaki 2001, p. 274.
- ↑ Ivanova 2024.
- ↑ Lévesque 1997, p. 170.
- ↑ Bulgarian National Radio 2019.
- 1 2 Hristov 2014.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Human Rights Watch 1989.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, pp. 46, 47–49.
- 1 2 Martino 2009.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 3.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, pp. 314–315.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 315.
- ↑ Avramov 2016, p. 317.
- 1 2 3 Malakchiev 2025.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, p. 17.
- ↑ Kutlay 2017, p. 18.
- 1 2 3 Zang Jr. 1990, pp. 5–6.
- ↑ Zang Jr. 1990, p. 5.
- ↑ Trupia 2022, p. 54.
- 1 2 Dayıoğlu 2007, p. 94.
- 1 2 Erolova 2025, p. 14.
- ↑ Salifova 2002.
- ↑ Human Rights Watch 1991.
- 1 2 Maeva 2008, pp. 100–108.
- 1 2 Trupia 2022, p. 59.
- ↑ Eminov 2007, p. 17.
- ↑ Gruev & Kalyonski 2008, p. 157.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Poulton 1991, p. 170.
- ↑ Vassilev 2010, p. 302.
- ↑ Vassilev 2010, p. 301.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2020, p. 2.
- ↑ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2003, p. 101.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 68.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, p. 16.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, pp. 16–17.
- 1 2 Zang Jr. 1990, p. 4.
- ↑ Human Rights Watch 1994.
- 1 2 3 Kolev 2015.
- 1 2 Marica 2020.
- 1 2 United Press International 1990.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 151.
- 1 2 Vaksberg 2010.
- ↑ Mediapool 2003.
- 1 2 Сега 2022.
- 1 2 Bulgarian National Radio 2022.
- 1 2 3 Kutlay 2017, pp. 16–21.
- ↑ Dimitrov 2000, pp. 18–19.
- 1 2 Korkmaz 2022, p. 92.
- ↑ Kutlay 2017, pp. 21–24.
- ↑ Kutlay 2017, p. 23.
- ↑ Kamusella 2018.
- ↑ Meznik & Thieme 2012, pp. 205–207.
- ↑ Katsikas 2011, p. 64.
- ↑ Rensmann 2011, p. 133.
- 1 2 Kamusella 2019, p. 117.
- 1 2 Martinova 2012.
- 1 2 Lunkova 2019, p. 220.
- ↑ Rudin & Eminov 1990, p. 158.
- ↑ Trupia 2022, p. 56.
- ↑ Trupia 2022, pp. 47–49, 51–53.
- ↑ Sofia Globe 2018.
- ↑ Standart 2013.
- ↑ Korkmaz 2022, p. 93.
- ↑ Kamusella 2020, p. 10.
- ↑ Kamusella 2019, p. 115.
- 1 2 Maeva 2008, pp. 227–229.
- ↑ Hillgren 2009.
- 1 2 3 Kolev 2020.
- ↑ Büchsenschütz 2000, p. 106.
- 1 2 Popova & Hajdinjak 2006, p. 113.
- 1 2 3 Kamusella 2019, p. 145.
- 1 2 3 4 Vladimirova 2023.
- ↑ Oliver 2017.
- 1 2 Socrates Dergi.
- 1 2 3 Korkmaz 2022, p. 90.
- 1 2 Laber 1987, p. 32.
- ↑ International Olympic Committee.
- ↑ NTV 2022.
- 1 2 Haber61 2019.
- ↑ Bulgarian National Film Archive 2026.
- ↑ Kyuchukov 2004.
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