The amendment of 1986 was a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Greece to limit the powers of the president of the Republic. Eleven articles were amended, primarily targeting the responsibilities of the president of the Republic, transposing the text of the Constitution into demotic Greek, and the removal of the secret ballot for the presidential elections. These amendments transformed the liberal democracy of Greece— based on the constitution of 1975, into a populist democracy with a majoritarian parliamentary system and a prime minister acting as a "parliamentary autocrat."[1][2]
The proposal was a political gamble by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who suddenly withdrew his backing for President Konstantinos Karamanlis's second term and instead promoted his own choice, Christos Sartzetakis. At the same time, Papandreou announced a constitutional revision to remove the powers of the president that acted as checks and balances against an already dominant office of the prime minister.
Despite the political and constitutional crisis that emerged from the unconstitutional procedures in electing Sartzetakis, as later court rulings concluded, the revised Constitution of 1975/1986 was accepted by all political powers after the polarized 1985 Greek parliamentary election.
Background
editFirst stage
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On 6 March 1985, the centre-right New Democracy party announced that it would support Konstantinos Karamanlis's second term as president, while on the same day, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) declared that it would put forward its candidate. The press anticipated that Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou would also support Karamanlis,[3] since he had assured Karamanlis of his support in person.[4] However, on 9 March, at the meeting of the Central Committe of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Papandreou sided with the left wing of the party, which instead backed Supreme Court justice Christos Sartzetakis. Sartzetakis, known for his handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis, was viewed favorably by the left.[3][4] The announcement occurred at the Central Committee of PASOK on 9 March.[3]
The move surprised some of Papanderou's ministers, much of his party's rank-and-file, and Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance.[3] Journalist Robert McDonald reported that Papandreou claimed that the choice was done without Sartzetakis's knowledge to present his decision as spontaneous, however, Sartzetakis knew in advance in addition to the two senior judicial figures who had refused the nomination.[5] At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for constitutional reform, which rekindled debate on the type of republic Greece should be and damaged the existing consensus between PASOK and New Democracy that had existed since 1981.[6]
Papandreou also argued that it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform since much of the 1974 constitution was influenced by Karamanlis.[7] Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of creating a constitutional crisis in order to remove Karamanlis from office and establish a totalitarian constitution.[8] Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis, as he could not bring himself to do so in person.[9] In response, Karamanlis resigned from the presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the termination of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, who served as constitution of 1974.[7]
Parliamentary votes for president & colored ballots
editThe presidential vote was conducted by the Hellenic Parliament in a tense and confrontational atmosphere due to constitutionally questionable procedures by Papandreou.[10] Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating the constitutional principle of secret ballot (Article 32)[11] by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots.[10][12] However, Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed because PASOK controlled the majority in the Parliament.[10] Despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance to spot potential defectors.[13][12] Sartzetakis received 180 votes, which was the minimum stipulated by the constitution, and Alevras, as president of the Hellenic Parliament, cast the decisive vote.[13] Mitsotakis deemed the vote illegal and threatened to remove Sartzetakis from the presidency if they won the upcoming elections, intensifying the constitutional crisis.[14]
Constitutional proposals & debate
editIn contrast with the constitutional violations raised during Sartzetakis' election,[15] PASOK's procedure in proposing constitutional amendments was constitutional.[5] However, the surprising announcement of constitutional reform amidst tense political conditions with limited input from constitutional scholars increased the possibility of the crisis intensifying.[16] An additional constitutional amendment was added following the controversial presidential vote: the removal of a secret ballot for president.[17] Papandreou's proposals were designed for easing future changes to the constitution in Article 110, requiring amendments to be approved by a parliamentary majority in one rather than two successive parliaments and reducing the powers of the president.[18] While the former proposal was eventually abandoned due to its controversial nature,[18] he was determined to eliminate presidential powers. His argument was the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of kings of Greece to intervene in political life since the creation of the modern Greek state.[19] PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to parliament with the following argument:
Invoking the lack of use of some provisions, their lack of implementation is by no means an argument to keep them in the current constitution. The question is what is our guiding principle? When provisions directly or indirectly contradict the principle of popular sovereignty, we object to them. [...] We support that the president is neither directly appointed by nor elected by the people. We are not a presidential, we are a parliamentary democracy. It is not the president who resorts to the people, so that the people deliver a verdict by majority voting. It is the legitimate government. It is the political parties. If the president resorts to the people, then he inevitably either sides with one party against others or attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution. Nevertheless, as soon as he attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution, then he embarks upon the formation of his own decisions of governmental nature. Then the government, directly or indirectly, fully or partially, is abolished.[20]
Scholars considered such changes unnecessary since no president had used these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until Papandreou raised the issue.[21][19] Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented the following argument against the proposed reforms in parliament:
This is the achievement of the 1975 Constitution: A miraculous balance between the Parliament, the Government and the President of the Republic, namely these state organs which express popular sovereignty and always pose the risk of de facto usurping it. [...] It is also interesting to see where these competencies of the President of the Republic are transferred. They are removed from him, but where do they go? To popular sovereignty and the Parliament, as the parliamentary majority claims? Dear colleagues, all of them go to the government, either directly or indirectly through the parliamentary majority controlled by it. Because the parliament is now subjugated to the parliamentary majority through party discipline. [...] Dear colleagues, the conclusion from the amendments suggested by the government or the parliamentary majority is the following: Power is transferred completely to the government. Hence, we have every reason to be afraid and suspect and mistrust about the future of Greece. [...] I want to stress the following, so that we, the Greek people, understand well: that with the suggested amendments you turn government and government majority into superpowers.[22]
Benaki-Psarouda effectively argued that this type of majoritarianism would damage the quality of Greek democracy.[22] Scholars also noted that the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful, "autocratic," position in the Greek state, as there would not be any constitutional restraints to their authority.[1][2]
Revised provisions
edit| Chapter One: Election of the President | ||
| Provision subject to revision | Result after revision | |
|---|---|---|
| Article 32 | §§1, 4 |
The provision for the dissolution of Parliament if the required majority is not achieved in the third ballot was repealed by the Ninth Revisionary Parliament in 2019. |
| §2 | The reference to the presidential authority, following an unsuccessful third vote for the election of a new President, to have the decree dissolving the Parliament signed by the incumbent President alone, was moved to a subsequent article, without explicitly assigning the authority to sign this decree to the President of the Hellenic Parliament in the absence of the President of the Republic. | |
| Chapter Two: Powers and responsibility arising from the President’s acts | ||
| Provision subject to revision | Result after revision | |
| Article 35 | §1 |
|
| §2 |
| |
| §3 |
| |
| Article 37 | §§2-4 | Reordering of the clauses of the paragraphs concerning the procedure for electing a leader by a parliamentary group, in the exceptional case where the party lacks a leader and representative or its leader was not elected as a member of parliament, so that it may receive a mandate to form a government or an exploratory mandate. Establishment of the timeframe for assigning the mandate. |
| §3 |
| |
| Article 38 | §1 |
|
| §2 |
This provision was amended again by the Seventh Revisionary Parliament in 2001. | |
| §3 |
| |
| Article 39 | §§1-2 |
|
| Article 41 | §1 |
|
| §2 | Rearrangement of the provision stipulating that a Parliament, which was convened following the dissolution of the previous Parliament, upon a government proposal, to renew the popular mandate in order to address a national issue of exceptional importance, may not be dissolved again for the same issue. | |
| §4 |
| |
| It is expressly stated that the decree dissolving Parliament in any case (not only that initiated by the government) must mandatorily include the calling of elections within thirty days and the convening of the new Parliament within thirty days thereafter. | ||
| Article 42 | §§1-3 |
Henceforth, the President may only review them formally (i.e., regarding their legality) and not substantively (i.e., regarding their appropriateness), while retaining the exercise of administrative powers either to issue and publish them or to refer them back to the Parliament with a statement of reasons for possible re-voting with an increased majority (that of an absolute majority of the total number of members of Parliament). |
| Article 43 | §3 |
|
| Article 44 | §2, para. a |
|
| §2, subparagraph b |
| |
| §3 |
| |
| Article 47 | §3 |
|
| Article 48 | §§1, 4 |
|
| §2 |
| |
Aftermath
editElections of 1985
edit
The confrontation from the presidential election continued into the general election campaigns and polarized Greek society.[25] On one hand, Papandreou invoked memories of the Greek Civil War of 1946 until 1949 and the junta of 1967 until 1974, associating New Democracy with authoritarian right-wingers of the past with the slogan "Vote PASOK to prevent a return of the Right."[26] The communists, persecuted by right-wing parties in the 1950s, protested against Papandreou's rhetoric, pointing out that the 1980s were not the same as the 1950s.[26] Papandreou further characterized the upcoming elections as a fight between light and darkness in his rallies, implying that PASOK represented the "forces of light" since its logo was a rising sun.[27] On the other side, Mitsotakis declared that "in voting, the Greek people will also be voting for a president,"[17] also warning of the danger of sliding towards an authoritarian one-party state.[28]
In the election, PASOK was re-elected with 45.82% of the vote, losing approximately 2.3% from 1981, while New Democracy increased its share of the vote by 4.98% to 40.84%.[29] Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained from far-left voting blocs, covering the losses from centrist voters, and appealed to socialist voters who rejected Karamanlis's perceived hindrance of PASOK's policies.[30][5] Papandreou had the upper hand over Mitsotakis in that he argued that a vote for Mitsotakis is a vote for a constitutional anomaly for threatening to remove the president once elected,[31] convincing a significant fraction of Greek voters.[5][31]
After the election results, Mitsotakis accepted Sartzetakis as president and head of the state.[32] Papandreou's constitutional proposals took effect in 14 March 1986.[24]
Court ruling
editThe case also reached the courts, with the plenary session of the Council of State ruling that the direct judicial review of the election of the president was inadmissible[33] and the Athens One-member Magistrates’ Court ruling in passing that the election of the president was "irregular" and "amounted to an abrogation of popular sovereignty",[a] while it considered that the subsequent political legitimacy assumed by PASOK's victory in the 1985 election did not negate the unconstitutionality of the act.[b] Constitutional scholar Christos Papastylianos noted this as an instance which marked the limits of judicial jurisdiction in Greece: the courts can deem an action as unconstitutional but unable to prevent it.[36]
Scholarly assessment
editScholars generally view the constitutional revision of 1985 as a calculated maneuver which aimed to consolidate power and reshape Greece's democratic institutions, criticized as "unnecessary" and driven by partisan motives rather than genuine institutional reform. Specifically, the constitutional amendments weakened the democraticness of the constitution due to the concentration of power in the prime minister's position along with the emerging statist bureaucracies and technologies aimed at controlling the popular will.[c][38] It marked a shift from a liberal democracy to a "populist democracy," characterized by a more centralized and populist model of governance.[39]
Analysts outlined different motives behind this move. First, the constitutional revision was a pretext for removing a respected conservative figure from head of state, a move that appealed to left-wing voters eager for change after decades of conservative rule in the lead-up to the national elections.[40] Second, the public discourse was dominated by the nature of the constitutional revisions and the dubious conduct of the presidential election, effectively diverting public attention from worsening economic conditions, marked by high inflation, growing trade deficits, and surging unemployment.[41][42][43] Third, scholars also opted that Papandreou had long-term constitutional designs to reinforce his government party against an impotent parliament.[21]
Overall, scholars note that the constitutional revision was not a direct threat to democracy; however, it eroded the long-term legitimacy of the constitutional order.[12][32][44] Scholars have advocated for strengthening individual rights and institutions as a counterweight to the executive branch led by the prime minister.[45] Other constitutional scholars have suggested partially reversing the removal of presidential powers to mitigate the negative effects of majoritarian politics while avoiding potential conflicts between the president and prime minister.[46]
References
editNotes
edit- ↑ κατάργηση στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση του Εκλογικού Σώματος ως οργάνου εξουσίας και κατάλυση στην πράξη της αρχής της λαϊκής κυριαρχίας."[34]
- ↑ "[...] ανεξάρτητα του ζητήματος της θεμελίωσης της νομιμοποιήσεως της εξουσίας του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας στη κανονιστική δύναμη των πραγμάτων που ρύθμισαν οι εκλογές και της αναγνωρίσεως του αποτελέσματος της ρυθμίσεως."[35]
- ↑ Samatas also highlighted PASOK's use of the junta's military surveillance for political gains.[37] This was accompanied by populist rhetoric and patronage networks aimed at mobilizing and controlling the masses, ultimately safeguarding Papandreou's position both within the party and as prime minister.[37]
Footnotes
edit- 1 2 Katsoudas 1987, p. 28.
- 1 2 Featherstone 1990, p. 183.
- 1 2 3 4 Clogg 1985, p. 105.
- 1 2 Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 86.
- 1 2 3 4 McDonald 1985, p. 134.
- ↑ Grigoriadis 2017, p. 43.
- 1 2 Clogg 1985, p. 106.
- ↑ Clogg 1985, p. 107.
- ↑ Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 114.
- 1 2 3 Clogg 1985, p. 109.
- ↑ Greek Constitution 1975, p. 631.
- 1 2 3 Kalyvas 1997, p. 97.
- 1 2 Clogg 1985, pp. 109–110.
- ↑ Clogg 1985, pp. 110–111.
- ↑ Manesis 1989, p. 66.
- ↑ Manesis 1989, p. 7.
- 1 2 Clogg 1985, p. 110.
- 1 2 Clogg 1987, pp. 104–105.
- 1 2 Alivizatos 1993, p. 66.
- ↑ Grigoriadis 2017, pp. 43–44.
- 1 2 Katsoudas 1987, pp. 27–28.
- 1 2 Grigoriadis 2017, p. 44.
- ↑ Greek Constitution 1986a.
- 1 2 Greek Constitution 1986.
- ↑ Carabott & Sfikas 2004, p. 267.
- 1 2 Clogg 1987, p. 108.
- ↑ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 166.
- ↑ Clogg 2013, p. 194.
- ↑ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, pp. 166–167.
- ↑ Clogg 1985, pp. 111–112.
- 1 2 Clogg 1987, p. 116.
- 1 2 Clogg 1985, p. 112.
- ↑ Plenary ruling of Council of State.
- ↑ Magistrate's Court ruling, pp. 563–574.
- ↑ Magistrate's Court ruling, p. 574.
- ↑ Papastylianos 2023, p. 25.
- 1 2 Samatas 1993, p. 47.
- ↑ Manesis 1989, pp. 6–102.
- ↑ Pappas 2014, pp. 28–29, 36.
- ↑ Manesis 1989, pp. 13–14.
- ↑ IMF, Greece's inflation rate.
- ↑ IMF, Greece's unemployment.
- ↑ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, pp. 164–166.
- ↑ Katsoudas 1987, pp. 26, 28.
- ↑ Manesis 1989, pp. 100–102.
- ↑ Alivizatos 2020, pp. 112–113.
Sources
editConstitutions of Greece
- "Greek Constitution of 1975". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 111/1975 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
- "Voting, publication, and entry into force of the revised provisions of the Constitution". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 22/1986 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
- "Greek Constitution of 1986". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 23/1986 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
Court decisions
- 2862/1985 Plenary decision (Council of State 1985).
- 84464/1985 Αρχείον Νομολογίας (Magistrate's Court (Μονομελούς Πλημμελειοδικείου Αθηνών) 1985).
Books
- Carabott, Philip; Sfikas, Thanassis D., eds. (2004). The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences. Surrey: Ashgate. ISBN 9780754641322.
- Clogg, Richard (1987). Parties and elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy. North Carolina: Duke University Press. ISBN 0822307944.
- ——————, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781349230563.
- Alivizatos, Nikos C. "The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s". In Clogg (1993), pp. 65–77.
- —————— (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107656444.
- Featherstone, Kevin; Katsoudas, Dimitrios K., eds. (1987). Political change in Greece: Before and after the colonels. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000992144.
- Katsoudas, Dimitrios K. "The Constitutional framework". In Featherstone & Katsoudas (1987), pp. 14–33.
- ——————; Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2015). Prime Ministers in Greece, The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198717171.
- Featherstone, Kevin; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A., eds. (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198825104.
- Alivizatos, Nikos C. "Greek constitutionalism and patterns of government". In Featherstone & Sotiropoulos (2020), pp. 103–116.
- Γρηγοριάδης, Ιωάννης N., ed. (2017). Democratic transition and the rise of Populist Majoritarianism: Constitutional Reform in Greece and Turkey. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319575551.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. "The Rising Tide of Populist Majoritarianism in Greece". In Γρηγοριάδης (2017), pp. 14–33.
- Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781444314830.
- Manesis, Aristovoulos (1989). Η συνταγματική αναθεώρηση του 1986 [Constitutional resivion of 1986] (in Greek). Athens: Παρατηρητής. ISBN 9789602603543.
- Pappas, Takis (2014). Populism and crisis politics in Greece (in Greek). Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781137410580.
- Papastylianos, Christos (2023), Σύνταγμα, Ερμηνεία κατ' άρθρο, Άρθρο 120 [Constitution, Interpretation per Article, Article 120]
- Pridham, Geoffrey, ed. (1990). Securing Democracy, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415023269.
- Featherstone, Kevin. "Political Parties and democratic consolidation in Greece". In Pridham (1990), pp. 179–202.
Journals
- Clogg, Richard (1985). "The 1985 Constitutional Crisis in Greece". The Journal of Modern Hellenism. 2 (1): 103–112.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (1997). "Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 23 (1): 83–104.
- McDonald, Robert (1985). "Greece after PASOK's Victory". The World Today. 41 (7): 133–136. JSTOR 40395748.
- Samatas, Minas (1993). "The Populist Phase of an Underdeveloped Surveillance Society: Political Surveillance in Post-Dictatorial Greece". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 19 (1): 31–70.
Web and other sources
- "Greece's unemployment (%)". International Monetary Fund.
- "Greece's inflation rate (%)". International Monetary Fund.