Wikipedia

Draft:Deep-Sea Mining and the European Union

  • Comment: There are a lot of citations here (some of which are broken) indicative of possible LLM use. gilgongo (talk) 16:00, 31 December 2025 (UTC)

Deep-Sea Mining and the European Union refers to the EU’s role in regulating and debating the extraction of mineral resources from the deep seabed. The deep seabed contains polymetallic nodules that hold high concentrations of cobalt, nickel, copper, and other critical raw materials.[1] These materials support high-technology industries, the green transition, and defence applications.[2] Interest in deep-sea mining has therefore increased alongside rising demand for critical raw materials.[3] At the same time, global supply is highly concentrated, while domestic EU production accounts for roughly 3% of total global metallic mineral output.[4] This contributes to the EU's dependence on imports from a small number of supplier countries, particularly China.[5]

Deep-sea mining also raises concerns about ecological harm to the ocean. EU debates, therefore, centre on a trade-off between supply security and environmental protection.[6] In its external positioning, the EU applies a precautionary approach. At the 2025 UN Ocean Conference, European Council President António Costa called for a moratorium and argued to support science-based ocean governance.[7]

This stance matters because the EU is a major maritime actor in global ocean politics.[8] EU member states hold about 6 million square kilometres of exclusive economic zones.[8] Including overseas territories and outermost regions, EU waters constitute collective exclusive economic zones of roughly 25 million square kilometres, with a coastline of around 70,000 kilometres.[9]

Commercial deep-sea mining has not yet occurred within the jurisdiction of EU member states.[4][10][11] Within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) has issued exploration licences since 2001, including to EU member states and to contractors they sponsor, covering roughly one million square kilometres of seabed for critical minerals.[12][13][14] No exploitation licences have so far been granted by the ISA.[13] The EU has no dedicated sector-specific legal framework for deep-sea mining.[10][15] Regulation, therefore, relies on environmental law, broader strategies, and raw materials policies that shape the issue indirectly.[16]

International Law

edit

The EU’s authority over deep-sea mining depends on where activities take place. Within member state jurisdiction, actors must comply with EU environmental law and with the competences conferred on the Union.[10][15] Beyond national jurisdiction, UNCLOS provides the overarching framework, with the ISA governing mineral-related activities in the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil.[17] Under UNCLOS art. 1, this is also known as “the Area”.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and EU accession

edit

UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994. The literature often describes it as “the constitutional framework” for the oceans.[18] It defines maritime zones and governs all activities in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction and exclusive economic zones.[19] Part XI treats mineral-related activities in “the Area” as the “common heritage of humankind” and mandates the ISA to organise and control these activities.[20][21] As of 2025, the ISA had not yet adopted a Mining Code for seabed mineral extraction.[22]

All EU member states are parties to UNCLOS and are therefore members of the ISA.[8][23] The EU signed UNCLOS in 1984 and acceded in through Council Decision 98/392/EC. Accession enables the EU to participate in UNCLOS bodies within its competencies and to coordinate member state positions on law-of-the-sea issues.[24] Hence, the EU is also bound by ISA rules adopted under UNCLOS.[24]

Within the ISA, the EU participates with voting rights in the Assembly.[16] In the ISA Council, which conducts the main negotiations on the Mining Code, the EU holds observer status because it is not a state and has only partial competence in this field.[23] However, the ISA Assembly retains the authority to approve the rules adopted by the ISA Council.[25]

The BBNJ Agreement

edit

The Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) is a treaty adopted under UNCLOS to regulate biodiversity governance in “the Area”.[26] The BBNJ agreement was concluded in 2023 and provides rules for establishing marine protected areas, conducting environmental impact assessments and managing activities that may affect biodiversity.[26] The agreement, therefore, creates a complementary governance layer relevant to future deep-sea mining activities.

The EU negotiated the BBNJ agreement as a single actor on behalf of its member states.[27] Its participation was enabled by UN General Assembly Resolution 72/249 and a 2018 EU Council mandate authorising the Commission to negotiate EU competencies.[23]

Scholars argue that the EU’s unified stance in the BBNJ negotiations enhanced its influence compared with settings where member states act individually.[28] Research also note that several BBNJ themes, especially on environmental assessment and protection, overlap with ongoing ISA negotiations on the Mining Code for deep-sea mining in “the Area”.[23]

Positions of EU institutions on deep-sea mining

edit

EU institutions adopt different but partly converging approaches to deep-sea mining. The European Commission promotes a precautionary pause on commercial exploitation, the European Parliament calls for an international moratorium, and the Council of the European Union has not agreed on a common position.[6][29][30][31] These differences shape how far the EU can act as a unified, international actor in the ISA. Table 1 summarises these positions.

Table 1: EU institutional positions on deep-sea mining[6][29][30][31]
EU Institution Overall position on deep-sea mining
European Commission Supports a precautionary pause
Council of the European Union No common position; member state divergence
European Parliament Supports an international moratorium

Several EU bodies outside the main institutions align with the precautionary or moratorium lines. As of 2025, the European Investment Bank does not finance deep-sea mineral extraction, which is listed among its excluded activities under its environmental, social, and ethical standards.[32] Advisory bodies, including the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, the Pelagic Advisory Council, and the Long Distance Fleet Advisory Council, have also supported an international precautionary pause or moratorium.[33][34][35]

The European Commission

edit

The Commission supports a precautionary pause on deep-sea mining. In its 2022 International Ocean Governance agenda, it stated that it will work to “prohibit deep-sea mining until scientific gaps are properly filled, no harmful effects arise from mining, and the marine environment is effectively protected”.[30] In recent years, the Commission has reiterated this position.[36][37]

This line sits in tension with parts of the EU competitiveness debate. The Draghi report presents deep-sea mining as a potential geoeconomic option to strengthen supply security and recommends that the EU “carefully explore” this possibility.[2] However, Commission representatives rejected this proposal, insisting that any move towards exploitation must remain conditional on the precautionary principle and adequate risk knowledge.[36]

Institutionally, the Commission has sought to increase EU coherence in the ISA. In 2021, the Commission proposed an EU Council decision under Article 218(9) TFEU to establish a common EU position for ISA meetings.[25] The proposed position aligned with the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and would have required member states to act jointly on the basis that exploitation should not proceed until sufficient assessment clarifies impacts and risks, and technology can demonstrate that it will not cause serious harm.[6][16][29][38][39] The Council did not adopt the decision, and the Commission therefore lacks a formal mandate comparable to the one used in the BBNJ negotiations.[38] Instead, the Commission shapes the ISA process indirectly by coordinating with EU member states, submitting written input on ISA draft texts, and supporting initiatives such as the ISA’s Sustainable Seabed Knowledge Initiative.[39]

The Council of the European Union

edit

The Council determines whether the EU adopts a formal position in international bodies under Article 218(9) TFEU, including the ISA, where decisions may affect EU law. Therefore, the key issue is not whether the legal option exists, but whether member states can agree to use it. The Council did not adopt the Commission’s 2021 proposal, which indicates that member states did not converge on a unified EU line for the Mining Code.[25][38]

The literature explains the missing adoption of the proposal as a function of heterogeneous national interests and competence sensitivities. Some member states regarded ISA matters as primarily national competencies[28]; others were concerned about setting a precedent for expanding EU authority in related areas.[23] A further constraint is divergent economic and strategic interests: several member states sponsor ISA exploration contracts in “the Area”, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia, and France, while others have limited or no industrial involvement.[39] This divergence makes agreement on a restrictive common line costly and forces trade-offs between environmental protection, industrial strategy, and supply security.[29] Table 2 summarises member state positions.

Table 2: Overview of EU member state positions on deep-sea mining[6][28][38][40][41]
Member state Position ISA exploration contract ISA Council member
Austria Supports precautionary pause No No
Belgium Mixed; supports deep-sea mining but calls for strong safeguards and more research Yes Yes (2023, 2025)
Bulgaria Position unclear Yes (via the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization consortium) No
Croatia Supports precautionary pause No No
Cyprus Supports precautionary pause No No
Czechia Position unclear Yes (via the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization consortium) No (member 2023-2024)
Kingdom of Denmark Supports precautionary pause; covers Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands No No
Estonia Position unclear No No
Finland Supports precautionary pause No No
France Supports complete ban / strong opposition Yes Yes (2024-2026)
Germany Supports precautionary pause; retains contracts and research pending safeguards. Yes No (member 2023-204; member again in 2026)
Greece Supports precautionary pause No No
Hungary Position unclear No No
Ireland Supports precautionary pause No No (was member until end of 2025)
Italy Opposes moratorium or pause; promotes seabed technologies domestically. No Yes (2023-2026)
Latvia Supports precautionary pause No No
Lithuania Position unclear No No
Luxembourg Supports precautionary pause No No
Malta Supports precautionary pause No No
Netherlands Unclear; prioritises impact minimisation and liability work, without supporting a moratorium No Yes (2023, 2025; member again in 2027)
Poland Most supportive of deep-sea mining; favours advancing exploitation Yes Yes (2023-2028)
Portugal Supports precautionary pause No No (was member until end of 2025)
Romania Supports precautionary pause No No
Slovakia No formal position; holds contracts but limited ISA engagement Yes (via the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization consortium) No
Slovenia Supports precautionary pause No No
Spain Supports precautionary pause No No (member 2023-2024; member again in 2026-2028)
Sweden Supports precautionary pause No No

Although the Council has not adopted a binding common position, some documents indicate growing convergence around precaution. A 2022 draft of Council conclusions on International Ocean Governance stated that member states support an ISA approach based on the precautionary principle, high environmental standards, and sufficient scientific knowledge.[42]

The European Parliament

edit

The European Parliament has been the most explicit EU institution, calling for limits on deep-sea mining. Since the mid-2010s, it has highlighted risks to biodiversity, lack of limited scientific knowledge, and potential tension with “the common heritage of humankind” principle. In 2018, it adopted a resolution urging the Commission and member states to support an international moratorium on commercial deep-sea mining until environmental and socio-economic impacts are better understood and regulatory frameworks can manage the risks.[43] Scholars have treated this resolution as an early EU-level endorsement of a moratorium and a key moment in politicising the issue.[29]

The Parliament reinforced this line in 2021 in its resolution on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030. It stated that deep-sea mining is likely to cause irreversible biodiversity loss and that the precautionary principle should guide any sectoral development.[44] In 2024, it adopted a resolution in response to Norway’s decision to open parts of its continental shelf for seabed mining, arguing that scientific baselines and regulation were still insufficient and repeated its call for a moratorium or, at least, a precautionary pause.[45] Studies suggest that these interventions contributed to put political pressure on Norway’s plans, which were subsequently deferred.[28]

Relevant EU strategies and legislation

edit

Integrated Maritime Policy (2007) and Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008)

edit

The Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) was launched in 2007 and provides the overarching framework for coordinating EU actions across maritime sectors.[46][47] Its environmental pillar is the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), adopted in 2008, which is the main IMP instrument relevant to potential deep-sea mining within EU waters.[8][48] However, a 2014 Commission report concluded that the MSFD does not in itself prohibit deep-sea mining in EU waters but functions as a conditional framework: any such activity would have to demonstrate compatibility with the directive’s objectives and with member states’ duties to protect marine ecosystems.[10]

The MSFD requires member states to achieve or maintain “good environmental status” in their waters, covering the water column, seabed, and subsoil. It obliges them to assess ecosystems, monitor pressures and adopt measures to prevent or reduce significant harm, and it promotes regional cooperation where marine ecosystems extend beyond EU jurisdiction.[8]

Institutionally, the IMP led to the creation of the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE), which strengthened the Commission’s capacity to steer maritime policy.[8] However, responsibilities remain distributed across several Directorates-General and the European External Action Service. The literature views this fragmentation as a structural limit to fully integrated policymaking on cross-cutting issues such as deep-sea mining.[8]

Blue Growth Strategy (2012)

edit

The Blue Growth Strategy was adopted in 2012 and reframed the IMP as an agenda for the “blue economy”. It aimed to expand maritime activities while maintaining environmental sustainability.[8][49] The strategy identified deep-sea mining as one of five sectors with high growth potential.[50] The 2012 Limassol Declaration, which was adopted by EU maritime ministers and the Commission, echoed this agenda by linking EU maritime policy to “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” and to job creation and competitiveness.[51][52]

The 2012 strategy framed extraction of seabed minerals as a response to EU supply-security concerns for materials such as cobalt, copper, and zinc. It concluded that seabed mining could reach up to 10% of global mineral extraction by 2030 and generate around €10 billion in revenues.[50] However, a later DG MARE report rejected these projections and estimated that deep-sea mining would account for at most 2-4% of global mineral extraction by 2050.[10]

Academic studies have also criticised the 2012 strategy for prioritising growth while downplaying environmental risk, despite its stated balance between economic and ecological objectives.[14][47][52][53] This critique and the revised estimates contributed to a more cautious EU approach on deep-sea mining. In 2021, the Commission updated the strategy, aligned it with the European Green Deal, and made support for deep-sea mining conditional on robust scientific knowledge and evidence that technologies and practices can avoid serious environmental harm.[54]

EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (2021)

edit

The EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 was published in 2021 as part of the European Green Deal. It sets targets to restore ecosystems and reduce pressures on biodiversity, including in marine areas.[55]

On deep-sea mining, it adopts a precautionary external approach. It states that the EU should argue in global negotiations that minerals in “the Area” must not be exploited until research, technologies, and practices can demonstrate that mining will not cause serious harm to the marine environment.[55] Although the strategy is not legally binding, the literature treats it as politically significant because it links EU biodiversity policy to calls for a moratorium or precautionary pause in international fora.[29]

The strategy reflects the precautionary principle in Article 191 TFEU and informed the Commission’s 2021 revision of the Blue Growth approach, which set similar conditions for any future exploitation.[16][55] Some studies read this as a shift from growth-oriented to risk-based governance.[16][40] Others highlight a tension with continued EU funding for deep-sea mining research, which may sustain the sector’s long-term prospects despite stated restraint.[56]

Critical Raw Materials Act (2024)

edit

Regulation 2024/1252 (Critical Raw Materials Act, CRMA), was adopted on May 3, 2024, as part of the EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan.[57] The act aims to strengthen EU access to critical raw materials, including through Commission-designated “Strategic Projects”.

The act addresses deep-sea mining by setting a strict condition for any such designation. Recital 18 states that the Commission cannot “recognise deep sea mining projects as Strategic Projects before the effects of deep-sea mining on the marine environment, biodiversity and human activities are sufficiently researched, the risks are understood and technologies and operational practices are capable of demonstrating that the environment is not seriously harmed”.[57] “Strategic Projects” are defined in the law as raw-material projects designated by the Commission as essential to the EU's security of supply, triggering a faster approval process and advantageous financing options.[57] However, by conditioning any Strategic Project status for deep-sea mining on a high evidentiary threshold, the act limits the scope for treating seabed extraction as a near-term instrument of supply security.[57]

European Ocean Pact (2025)

edit

In June 2025, the Commission presented the European Ocean Pact as a holistic framework to improve coherence across EU ocean policies and to strengthen the “EU ocean diplomacy and international rules-based governance”.[9] On international governance and deep-sea mining, it states that current scientific knowledge is insufficient to assess “environmental, biodiversity, and socio-economic impacts”.[9] Furthermore, it invites the Council to join this approach and commits the EU to continue promoting a rules-based process in the ISA.[9]

The Pact also announces that the Commission will propose an “Ocean Act” by 2027 to strengthen maritime spatial planning as a cross-sector tool for managing EU maritime spaces.[9] Although the European Ocean Pact itself does not change EU law on seabed activities, it reinforces the precautionary line and signals that future ocean governance will treat deep-sea mining within broader ecosystem-based planning.

EU-funded research

edit

The EU has funded deep-sea mining research since the early 2000s. The literature distinguishes between two tracks: technology-oriented projects that develop tools for exploration and potential extraction, and environmental projects that explore deep-sea ecosystems and assess mining impacts.[6][58] Environmental projects have produced baselines on biodiversity, ecosystem resilience, and impact pathways that feed into regulatory debates in the ISA.[23]

Most funding has been channelled through the EU Framework Programmes (FP6, FP7, Horizon 2020, Horizon Europe), with additional initiatives from individual Directorates-General.[40] Table 3 aggregates the reported allocations across these streams.

Table 3: EU Framework Programmes and initiatives funding deep-sea mining technology and environmental research[40][59]
Programme / Directorate-General Technology projects Environment projects Total
FP6 (2002 – 2006) € 0 € 15,500,000 € 15,500,000
FP7 (2007 – 2013) € 16,428,774 € 26,567,132 € 42,995,906
Horizon 2020 (2014 – 2020) € 84,028,292 € 38,787,157 € 122,815,449
Horizon Europe (2021 – 2027) € 11,845,430 € 478,330 € 12,323,760
DG GROW € 2,920,418 € 0 € 2,920,418
DG MARE € 1,300,000 € 1,749,814 € 3,049,814
DG RELEX € 0 € 4,400,000 € 4,400,000
Other € 0 € 1.051.500 € 1.051.500
Total € 116,522,914 € 88,533,933 € 205,056,847

The compilation in Table 3 is sensitive to how mixed projects are classified, especially where technology development and impact research are combined. Some estimates are lower. In 2023 for example, the European Parliament stated that EU research programmes have invested “more than €80 million” in deep-sea mining-related projects, which implies narrower inclusion criteria than the literature-based compilation.[60]

The distribution in Table 3 supports the argument that technology-oriented funding has at times outpaced environmental funding, despite persistent knowledge gaps about deep-sea ecosystems.[40] Other studies describe this as a structural dilemma: the EU promotes a precautionary pause while financing research that can lower barriers to exploitation.[16][23][56]

References

edit
  1. ↑ Abramowski, Tomasz; Stoyanova, Valcana (2012). "Deep-Sea Polymetallic Nodules: Renewed Interest as Resources for Environmentally Sustainable Development". International Multidisciplinary Scientific GeoConference : SGEM. 1. Sofia: 515–521. ProQuest 1443920171.
  2. 1 2 European Commission. European Political Strategy Centre. (2024). The future of European competitiveness.Part A, A competitiveness strategy for Europe. LU: Publications Office. doi:10.2872/1823372. ISBN 978-92-68-22715-2.
  3. ↑ Hein, James R.; Koschinsky, Andrea; Kuhn, Thomas (2020-02-24). "Deep-ocean polymetallic nodules as a resource for critical materials". Nature Reviews Earth & Environment. 1 (3): 158–169. Bibcode:2020NRvEE...1..158H. doi:10.1038/s43017-020-0027-0. ISSN 2662-138X.
  4. 1 2 European Parliament. Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union. (2020). The blue economy: overview and EU policy framework : in depth analysis. LU: Publications Office. doi:10.2861/253712. ISBN 978-92-846-6261-6.
  5. ↑ Gauß, Roland; Burkhardt, Carlo; Carencotte, Frédéric; Gasparon, Massimo; Gutfleisch, Oliver; Higgins, Ian; Karajić, Milana; Klossek, Andreas; Mäkinen, Maija; Schäfer, Bernd; Schindler, Reinhold; Veluri, Badrinath (2021). "Rare Earth Magnets and Motors: A European Call for Action. A report by the Rare Earth Magnets and Motors Cluster of the European Raw Materials Alliance". EIT KIC Publications.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pim, Joám Evans (2024). "The Changing Seascape of Deep-Sea Mining in Europe". Seas at Risk. Brussels.
  7. ↑ Costa, António (2025). "Statement by President António Costa at the Ocean Pact Side Event at the 2025 UN Ocean Conference".
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Bueger, Christian; Rafaly, Vonintsoa (2025). "Chapter 37: The European Union and Global Ocean Politics". In Lucarelli, Sonia; Sperling, James (eds.). Handbook of European Union Governance. Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 527–539. doi:10.4337/9781803925189. ISBN 9781803925172.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 European Commission (2025). "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Ocean Pact".
  10. 1 2 3 4 5 ECORYS (2014). Study to Investigate the State of Knowledge of Deep-Sea Mining. Final Report, FWC MARE/2012/06 - SC E1/2013/04. Rotterdam / Brussels: European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.
  11. ↑ European Commission. Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.; European Commission. Joint Research Centre. (2020). The EU blue economy report 2020. LU: Publications Office. doi:10.2771/363293. ISBN 978-92-76-19726-3.
  12. ↑ Cuyvers, Luc; Berry, Whtiney; Kristina, Gjerde; Torsten, Thiele; Caroline, Wilhelm (2018-06-09). Deep seabed mining: a rising environmental challenge (1 ed.). IUCN, International Union for Conservation of Nature. doi:10.2305/IUCN.CH.2018.16.en. ISBN 978-2-8317-1921-4.
  13. 1 2 Singh, Prandeep A. (2021). "The Two-Year Deadline to Complete the International Seabed Authority's Mining Code: Key Outstanding Matters That Still Need to Be Resolved". Marine Policy. 134 104804: 1–10. Bibcode:2021MarPo.13404804S. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104804.
  14. 1 2 Thompson, Kirsten F.; Miller, Kathryn A.; Currie, Duncan; Johnston, Paul; Santillo, David (2018). "Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed". Frontiers in Marine Science. 5 480: 1–12. Bibcode:2018FrMaS...5..480T. doi:10.3389/fmars.2018.00480.
  15. 1 2 Arnesen, Finn; Greaves, Rosa; Pozdnakova, Alla (2020-01-07), Banet, Catherine (ed.), "European Union Law and the Seabed", The Law of the Seabed, Brill | Nijhoff, pp. 315–334, doi:10.1163/9789004391567_016, ISBN 978-90-04-39156-7, retrieved 2025-12-18{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  16. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Cassotta, Sandra; Goodsite, Michael (2024). "Deep-Seabed Mining: An Environmental Concern and a Holistic Social Environmental Justice Issue". Frontiers in Ocean Sustainability. 2 1355965: 1–6. Bibcode:2024FrOS....255965C. doi:10.3389/focsu.2024.1355965.
  17. ↑ Paasivirta, Esa (2015). "The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea". Fordham International Law Journal. 38 (4): 1045–1072.
  18. ↑ Mendenhall, Elizabeth (2019-02-21), Harris, Paul G. (ed.), "The Ocean Governance Regime: International Conventions and Institutions", Climate Change and Ocean Governance (1 ed.), Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–42, doi:10.1017/9781108502238.002, ISBN 978-1-108-50223-8, retrieved 2025-12-18{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  19. ↑ Koschinsky, Andrea; Heinrich, Luise; Boehnke, Klaus; Cohrs, J Christopher; Markus, Till; Shani, Maor; Singh, Pradeep; Smith Stegen, Karen; Werner, Welf (2018-06-01). "Deep-sea mining: Interdisciplinary research on potential environmental, legal, economic, and societal implications". Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management. 14 (6): 672–691. Bibcode:2018IEAM...14..672K. doi:10.1002/ieam.4071. ISSN 1551-3777. PMID 29917315.
  20. ↑ Banet, Catherine (2020-01-07), "The Law of the Seabed", in Banet, Catherine (ed.), Brill | Nijhoff, pp. 1–18, doi:10.1163/9789004391567_002, ISBN 978-90-04-39156-7, retrieved 2025-12-18 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  21. ↑ Conde, Marta; Mondré, Aletta; Peters, Kimberley; Steinberg, Philip (2022). "Mining Questions of "What" and "Who": Deepening Discussions of the Seabed for Future Policy and Governance". Maritime Studies. 21 (3): 327–338. Bibcode:2022MarSt..21..327C. doi:10.1007/s40152-022-00273-2.
  22. ↑ Kröger, Kerstin; Collins, Richard; Wheeler, Andrew J.; Dias, Heidy; Collins, Patrick Colman (2025-11-20). "The legal landscape for deep-sea mining in the Area: A primer for practitioners". Elem Sci Anth. 13 (1) 00072. Bibcode:2025EleSA..1300072K. doi:10.1525/elementa.2024.00072. ISSN 2325-1026.
  23. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ardito, Giovanni (2023). "The European Union at the International Seabed Authority: A Question of Competence on the Brink of Deep-Sea Mining". Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal (MarSafeLaw Journal). 134: 20–39.
  24. 1 2 Council of the European Union. 98/392/EC Official Journal of the European Communities, L 179 (1998). "Council Decision of 23 March 1998 Concerning the Conclusion by the European Community of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 and the Agreement of 28 July 1994 Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention".{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  25. 1 2 3 European Commission (2021). "Proposal for a Council Decision on the Position to Be Taken on the Union's Behalf at Meetings of the Council and the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority".
  26. 1 2 United Nations (2023). "Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement)".
  27. ↑ Ricard, Pascale (2020), Ribeiro, Marta Chantal; Loureiro Bastos, Fernando; Henriksen, Tore (eds.), "The European Union and the Future International Legally Binding Instrument on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction", Global Challenges and the Law of the Sea, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 379–399, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-42671-2_20, ISBN 978-3-030-42670-5, retrieved 2025-12-18{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  28. 1 2 3 4 Gernigon, Lola; Binachon, Martin (2025). Deep-Sea Mining at a Crossroads: Why the EU Must Lead on a Precautionary Pause. Brussels: Europe Jacques Delors.
  29. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bedendi, Matteo; Schiano di Pepe, Lorenzo (2025-03-27). "A New Chapter of Ocean Governance and the European Union: Codification Efforts and Prospects of a Moratorium at the International Seabed Authority". The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 40 (2): 403–422. doi:10.1163/15718085-bja10222. ISSN 0927-3522.
  30. 1 2 3 European Commission (2022). "Setting the Course for a Sustainable Blue Planet - Joint Communication on the EU's International Ocean Governance Agenda".
  31. 1 2 European Parliament (2022). "A Sustainable Blue Economy in the EU: The Role of Fisheries and Aquaculture".
  32. ↑ European Investment Bank (2025). "EIB Group Excluded Activities".
  33. ↑ "Deep-Sea Mining: Assessing Evidence on Future Needs and Environmental Impacts". easac.eu. 2023-08-06. Retrieved 2025-12-18.
  34. ↑ Long Distance Advisory Council (2019). "LDAC Opinion on Deep-Sea Mining" (PDF).
  35. ↑ Long Distance Advisory Council; North Western Waters Advisory Council; Pelagic Advisory Council; South Western Waters Advisory Council (2024). "Joint LDAC-NWWAC-PELAC-SWWAC Advice on Deep-Sea Mining and Fisheries – Recommendations on Deep-Sea Mining (DSM) and Its Impacts on Fisheries" (PDF).
  36. 1 2 Canton, Joan (2024). "NGOs' Concerns Regarding References to Deep Sea Mining in Mario Draghi's Report: The Future of European Competitiveness - Reply from the European Commission" (PDF).
  37. ↑ European Commission (2024). "Answer given by Mr Kadis on Behalf of the European Commission".
  38. 1 2 3 4 Dewulf, Seppe (2024). "A Deep-Sea Dilemma: An Analysis of EU Member States' Positions on Deep-Sea Mining in International Waters". GIES Honours Papers. 3: 1–15.
  39. 1 2 3 Singh, Pradeep A.; Campanella, Virginie Tassin; Maes, Frank (2023). "The European Union and Seabed Mining". Routledge Handbook of Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea. London: Routledge. pp. 290–313. doi:10.4324/9780429426162-25. ISBN 9781138387614.
  40. 1 2 3 4 5 Pim, Joám Evans; Dom, Ann (2021). "At a Crossroads: Europe's Role in Deep-Sea Mining" (PDF). Seas at Risk. Brussels.
  41. ↑ Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (n.d.). "Voices Calling for a Moratorium: Governments and Parliamentarians".
  42. ↑ Council of the European Union (2022). "Draft Council Conclusions on International Ocean Governance - Approval".
  43. ↑ European Parliament (2018). "International Ocean Governance: An Agenda for the Future of Our Oceans in the Context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals".
  44. ↑ European Parliament (2021). "European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2018 on international ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans in the context of the 2030 SDG".
  45. ↑ European Parliament (2024). "European Parliament Resolution of 7 February 2024 on Norway's Recent Decision to Advance Seabed Mining in the Arctic".
  46. ↑ European Commission (2007). "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union".
  47. 1 2 Germond, Basil (2018). "Clear skies or troubled waters: The future of European ocean governance". European View. 17 (1): 89–96. doi:10.1177/1781685818761594. ISSN 1781-6858.
  48. ↑ European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2008). "Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)".
  49. ↑ Lee, Ki-Hoon; Noh, Junsung; Khim, Jong Seong (2020). "The Blue Economy and the United Nations' sustainable development goals: Challenges and opportunities". Environment International. 137 105528: 1–6. Bibcode:2020EnInt.13705528L. doi:10.1016/j.envint.2020.105528. PMID 32014791.
  50. 1 2 European Commission (2012). "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions: Blue Growth - opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth".
  51. ↑ European Commission (2012). "Declaration of the European Ministers Responsible for the Integrated Maritime Policy and the European Commission, on a Marine and Maritime Agenda for Growth and Jobs the "Limassol Declaration"" (PDF).
  52. 1 2 Guerreiro, José (2021). "The Blue Growth Challenge to Maritime Governance". Frontiers in Marine Science. 8 681546. Bibcode:2021FrMaS...881546G. doi:10.3389/fmars.2021.681546. ISSN 2296-7745.
  53. ↑ Germond, Basil; Germond-Duret, Celine (2016). "Ocean governance and maritime security in a placeful environment: The case of the European Union". Marine Policy. 66: 124–131. Bibcode:2016MarPo..66..124G. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2016.01.010.
  54. ↑ European Commission (2021). "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – On a New Approach for a Sustainable Blue Economy in the EU: Transforming the EU's Blue Economy for a Sustainable Future".
  55. 1 2 3 European Commission. Directorate General for Environment. (2021). EU biodiversity strategy for 2030: bringing nature back into our lives. LU: Publications Office. doi:10.2779/677548. ISBN 978-92-76-36472-6.
  56. 1 2 Cassotta, Sandra; Goodsite, Michael (2023). "Sustainable and Just Deep-Sea Mining for the Energy Green Transition: A Conundrum Without Legal, Governance or Technological Solutions. The Case of the EU". European Energy and Environmental Law Review. 32 (6): 268–282. doi:10.54648/EELR2023017.
  57. 1 2 3 4 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2024). "Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 Establishing a Framework for Ensuring a Secure and Sustainable Supply of Critical Raw Materials".
  58. ↑ Sakellariadou, Fani; Gonzalez, Francisco J.; Hein, James R.; Rincón-Tomás, Blanca; Arvanitidis, Nikolaos; Kuhn, Thomas (2022). "Seabed mining and blue growth: exploring the potential of marine mineral deposits as a sustainable source of rare earth elements (MaREEs) (IUPAC Technical Report)". Pure and Applied Chemistry. 94 (3): 329–351. doi:10.1515/pac-2021-0325. ISSN 0033-4545.
  59. ↑ European Commission (n.d.). "Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021 to 2027)".
  60. ↑ Sinkevičius, Virginijus (2023). "Answer given by Mr Sinkevičius on Behalf of the European Commission (E-000945/2023)".
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Deep-Sea_Mining_and_the_European_Union&oldid=1331877199"