Wikipedia

Hwasong-7

(Redirected from Rodong-2)

The Hwasong-7 (Korean: 《화성-7》형; lit. 'Mars Type 7') is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles.[1] US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.[2]

Hwasong-7
Artist rendition of the missile
TypeMedium-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
In service1998−present
Used bySee § Operators
Production history
Produced1990–present
Specifications
Length15.6 m (51 ft)
Diameter1.25 m (4 ft 1 in)
WarheadConventional, possibly nuclear
Warhead weight700–1,000 kg (1,500–2,200 lb) (estimated)
PropellantTM-185 and AK-27I
Operational
range
1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi) (estimated)
Flight altitude160 km (99 mi) (lofted trajectory)
Guidance
system
Inertial
Accuracy190–2,000 m (620–6,560 ft) CEP

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile,[3] as well as the Iranian Ghadr-110.[4][5]

Description

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Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles, including Hwasong-7[6]

Hwasong-7 is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of 1.25 metres (4 ft) and a length of 15.6 metres (51 ft). The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial.[7]

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere.[7] The Hwasong-7 uses the liquid propellant combination of TM-185 (20% gasoline and 80% kerosene) and AK-27I (27% N2O4 and 73% HNO3).[8] Unlike modern missiles, Hwasong-7 can only be fueled when vertical, meaning it cannot be fueled before transport. With a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) warhead, its range is estimated to be 900 km (560 mi).[7] Further range analysis includes a range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi)[9] to a high-end estimation of 2,000 km (1,200 mi), meaning all South Korean territories, as well as Japan, Russia and China are covered by Hwasong-7's range.[10]

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of 1,000–2,000 m (3,300–6,600 ft), but it can be reduced to between 190 m (620 ft) and 1,000 m (3,300 ft) with GPS guidance.[8][11] North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.[12][13]

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM),[14] and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.[15]

Naming

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The "Hwasong-7" is the North Korean internal designation for the missile.[16] The missile is also known by external designations from Western analysts, including Rodong-1, No Dong-1,[17] Rodong,[18] Nodong, Scud-D,[19] Scud Mod-D and Nodong-A.[20]

Variant for reconnaissance satellite testing

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Hwasong-7 has a variant with white livery for reconnaissance satellite cameras testing.[21] On 18 December 2022, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles from Sohae Satellite Launching Station, flying 500 km (310 mi) with an apogee of 550 km (340 mi).[22] According to North Korea, the test was organized by the National Aerospace Development Administration to evaluate reconnaissance satellite components, including camera and data transmission system.[23] Released images included an photo indicating the missiles appeared to be a derivation from Hwasong-7 or Scud missile.[22]

History

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It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea.[24] A test launch happened at the same time, but likely failed, since burn marks were captured by photographs at the launch site. Later, low-rate production started in January 1991 and North Korea conducted another test-fire of Hwasong-7 in May 1993. Also, between 1993 and 1994, North Korea had produced a sufficient number of Hwasong-7 missiles to be considered operational,[25] and five years later, Hwasong-7 became deployed.[9]

North Korea test-fired Hwasong-7 missiles in 2006, 2009,[17] as well as 2014, in which North Korea fires two missiles that flew 650 km (400 mi).[26][27]

Although it has an estimated range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi), launches in March 2014 flew only 650 km (400 mi), as the missiles flew to an altitude of 160 km (99 mi) because of lofted trajectory. The missiles achieved a maximum speed of Mach 7 (8,600 km/h). U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to 400 km (250 mi).[14]

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles into the Sea of Japan, these missiles achieved about 1,000 km (620 mi) range. Initially, these missiles were believed to be Hwasong-7,[28] however, it was later revealed that the missiles used for this launch were Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER).[22][29] The United States strongly condemned the launch.[28]

Exporting

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The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7.[4][30] The May 1993 test of Hwasong-7 is believed to be observed by Iranian and Pakistani delegations.[25] Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.[31]

Operators

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Current

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Unconfirmed

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Failed bids

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  • Iraq − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles.[38]

See also

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References

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  1. ↑ Dominguez, Gabriel; Gibson, Neil (16 August 2016). "South Korea's military to increase number of Hyunmoo missiles, says report". Janes Information Services. Archived from the original on 30 July 2017. Retrieved 13 July 2017.
  2. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 25.
  3. ↑ Elleman, Michael (22 September 2016). "North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation". 38 North. Retrieved 6 March 2021.
  4. 1 2 Brügge, Norbert (2 May 2020). "The North-Korean/Iranian Nodong-Shahab missile family". Norbert Brügge. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
  5. ↑ U.S. Department of Defense (2001). Proliferation: Threat and Response (PDF). DIANE Publishing. p. 38. ISBN 1-4289-8085-7.
  6. ↑ "How potent are North Korea's threats?". BBC News. 15 September 2015. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
  7. 1 2 3 Schiller, Markus (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
  8. 1 2 Vick, Charles P. "No-Dong 1 - North Korea". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
  9. 1 2 Kim, Dueyon (1 July 2013). "Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs". The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Archived from the original on 18 June 2016. Retrieved 5 November 2024.
  10. ↑ "Hàn Quốc lo ngại Triều Tiên lắp đầu đạn hạt nhân cho tên lửa tầm trung" [South Korea concerns that North Korea may mount nuclear warhead on medium-range missile]. Gia Lai TV (in Vietnamese). Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 7 April 2016. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  11. ↑ Schilling, John; Kan, Henry (2015). The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems (PDF) (Report). US-Korea Institute at SAIS. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 April 2015. Retrieved 30 April 2015.
  12. ↑ Song, Sang-ho (4 March 2013). "Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea". The Korea Herald. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
  13. ↑ Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (PDF). National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Report). Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency. April 2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09.
  14. 1 2 "NK's March missile test aimed at evading interceptor systems: sources". Yonhap News Agency. 19 June 2014. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
  15. ↑ Yoo, Seungki (4 August 2016). "Shift in THAAD site in S. Korea nothing to solve controversies". Xinhua News Agency. Archived from the original on 5 August 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
  16. 1 2 IISS 2024, p. 282.
  17. 1 2 "Hwasong-7 (Nodong 1)". Missile Threat. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 9 August 2016. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
  18. ↑ "North Korean nuclear forces (2021)" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. p. 6. Retrieved 3 May 2026. Assuming that North Korea is able to produce a sufficiently compact warhead, independent assessments indicate that the size, range and operational status of the Hwasong-7 (Nodong or Rodong) MRBM make it the system most likely to be given a nuclear delivery role.
  19. ↑ Krebs, Gunter D. "Hwasong-7 ("Nodong") MRBM". Gunter's Space Page. Retrieved 3 May 2026. The North Korean Hwasong-7, also known as Nodong (or Scud-D), missile is a North Korean development of the Scud technology [...] The Nodong designator is a western designation.
  20. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Hess, Ashley (2013). The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Missile, DPRK and ROK Nuclear Forces, and External Nuclear Forces. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-4422-2520-6.
  21. ↑ Brügge, Norbert. "NADAS's [sic] small launcher to testing a camera for reconnaissance satellite". b14643.eu. Norbert Brügge. Retrieved 10 January 2025.
  22. 1 2 3 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. 12 November 2024. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
  23. ↑ "NADA Conducts Important Test for Development of Reconnaissance Satellite". Korean Central News Agency. 19 December 2022. Retrieved 10 January 2025. For images, see 1 and 2.
  24. ↑ Bluth, Christoph (31 July 2011). Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 9781597975773. Retrieved 17 March 2017.
  25. 1 2 Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. (1999). A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK (PDF). Center for Nonproliferation Studies. pp. 21–22. Retrieved 3 May 2026.
  26. ↑ "North Korea test-fires 'ballistic' missiles". BBC News. 26 March 2014. Retrieved 26 March 2014.
  27. ↑ Choe, Sang-Hun (25 March 2014). "North Korea Launches Two Midrange Missiles". New York Times. Retrieved 31 March 2014.
  28. 1 2 Griffiths, James; Kwon, K.J. (5 September 2016). "North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles; Japan calls it 'serious threat'". CNN. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
  29. ↑ Schiller, Markus; Schmucker, Robert H. (8 November 2016). "Flashback to the Past: North Korea's "New" Extended-Range Scud" (PDF). 38 North. Retrieved 1 January 2025.
  30. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 23.
  31. ↑ Pinkston 2008, pp. 20, 70.
  32. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 354.
  33. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678.
  34. ↑ IISS 2024, p. 301.
  35. ↑ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on". Military Balance Blog. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Retrieved 6 November 2024.
  36. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Nerguizian, Aram; Popescu, Inout C. (2008). Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. pp. 204−205. ISBN 978-0-313-35521-9.
  37. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 386.
  38. ↑ Pinkston 2008, p. 20.

Bibliography

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