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Convoy PQ 13

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Convoy PQ 13 was a British Arctic convoy that delivered war supplies from the Western Allies to the USSR during the Second World War. The convoy was subject to attack by German air, U-boat and surface forces and suffered the loss of five ships and an escort vessel. Fifteen ships arrived safely.

Convoy PQ 13
Part of the Arctic Convoys of the Second World War

HMS Trinidad
Date20–29 March 1942
Location
Arctic Ocean
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Gottfried Pönitz [de] Leslie Saunders
Strength
  • 6 U-boats
  • 3 destroyers
Casualties and losses
1 destroyer sunk
  • 1 cruiser damaged
  • 1 freighter sunk

Background

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Arctic convoys

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In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft more than already promised.[1][a] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[3]

By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who liaised with the escort commander and directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships.[4][b]

Signals intelligence

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Bletchley Park

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Photograph of a German Enigma coding machine

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships. [6]

B-Dienst

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The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[7] B-Dienst broke Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic.[8]

Prelude

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Luftflotte 5 tactics

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As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, Fliegerführer Nord (West) would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted, aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three Fliegerführer were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. Fliegerführer Lofoten would begin the anti-convoy operation east to a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) would take over using his and the aircraft of Fliegerführer Lofoten, that would fly to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range. Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Arkhangelsk. [9]

German air-sea rescue

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Example of a Heinkel He 59 search and rescue aircraft (1940)

The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with the Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18s and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained.[10]

Convoy

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Convoy PQ 13 comprised seven British ships, including the tanker SS Scottish American, four US freighters, one Polish, four of Panamanian and one ship of Honduran registry. The Convoy Commodore was D. A. Casey in River Afton. The convoy was escorted for the first stage of its voyage, from its departure from Loch Ewe in Scotland on 10 March to Iceland, by a Local Escort Group, comprising two destroyers and an ASW trawler. For the second stage, from Iceland to the Soviet Union, departing on 20 March, the convoy had an ocean escort of two destroyers and two trawlers, augmented by three whalers being transferred to the Soviet Navy. The Ocean escort was commanded by Capt. Leslie Saunders, in the cruiser HMS Trinidad.[11]

Home Fleet

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In support of the convoy escort, guarding against a sortie by the German battleship Tirpitz, was a Heavy Cover Force from the Home Fleet, comprising the battleships Duke of York (Vice Admiral Alban Curteis commanding) King George V, battlecruiser Renown, aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, the cruisers Kent and Edinburgh and sixteen destroyers, Ashanti, Bedouin, Echo, Escapade, Eskimo, Faulknor, Foresight, Icarus, Inglefield, Ledbury, Marne, Middleton, Onslow, Punjabi, Tartar and Wheatland. The Heavy Cover Force was to follow the track of the convoy at long distance, until the convoy was past Bear Island and then cover Convoy QP 9 the reciprocal convoy.[12]

Voyage

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20−23 March

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The first stage escort, three ships bound from Reykjavík to Murmansk and the close escort for the voyage, joined Convoy PQ 13 and sailed from Reykjavík on 20 March. The convoy was helped by a powerful south-westerly wind and soon after noon on 23 March, when around 120 nmi (220 km; 140 mi) to the south-east of Jan Mayen the convoy turned to the east after the Admiralty had received a decrypted Enigma signal giving the position of U-boat search line and during the unscheduled turn, the fleet oiler Oligarch and its escort, Lamerton made rendezvous with the Home Fleet to fuel its destroyer escorts.[13]

24 March

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At noon, when at 69°20′N, 00°20′E, the convoy turned back to the north-east for Bear Island but the diversion had brought nearer to the Luftwaffe base at Bardufoss and was 40 nmi (74 km; 46 mi) further on than planned and was making nearly 9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph); the heavy Home Fleet covering force was on a parallel course about 250 nmi (460 km; 290 mi) further back. Trinidad sailed away from the convoy to the south-east for the night and during the long night of the Arctic winter, the wind rose to a gale and began to blow from the north-east. The merchant ships had serious trouble in station-keeping as the gale blew head-on, filling the air with spray, reducing visibility, making the ships wallow and take on more water. The cold froze the water that did not drain through the scuppers and stuck to the superstructure, masts, aerials and guns.[14]

25–26 March

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Map of Norway showing the Lofoten Islands, just inside the Arctic Circle

The convoy was disrupted by the storm; keeping a look-out became difficult, affecting station-keeping, ships had to be steered taking in the view from one wave peak to the next and while not requiring exceptional seamanship the convoy began to lose formation. The convoy escorts had their own problems, the smaller ships bucking and rolling. The misery of the destroyer crews, many of them inexperienced wartime conscripts and pre-war yachtsmen, was exceptionally bad. men on duty had no hot food to go with the cold, wet and the gyrations of the superstructure. During the evening, Saunders broke wireless silence to the Admiralty and to Rear-Admiral Richard Bevan the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, then broadcast a convoy rally point to the south of Bear Island for 27 March. In the afternoon of 26 March, Ballot, Empire Starlight, Induna and Silja, claimed a German aircraft shot down. The group was later joined by Dunboyne, Effingham and Mana, the eastern-most segment of the convoy. A long way to the south-west, the aircraft carrier Victorious and the destroyer Tartar had been damaged in the storm and the Home Fleet ships had turned for home.[15]

27 March

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By dawn on 27 March, the storm had blown for 36 hours and none of the ships were near the rally point. During the day the weather continued stormy with poor visibility, overcast and freezing wind. An Admiralty warning arrived of a surface attack but the senior officer of the ocean escort was to gather the merchant ships. Just before noon, Fury received a signal from Sumba that it was 50 nmi (93 km; 58 mi) north-east of Bear Island, making little headway and had almost run out of fuel. A wireless operator got a bearing on the signal and the captain turned west-south-west, found Sumba at 4:00 p.m. and spent nearly five hours refuelling Sumba with a pipe over the stern, an easy target for a U-boat.[16][c] River Afton could make no headway or steer less than 60° off the wind direction, bringing the ship ever closer to Lofoten Islands, until the gale diminished around noon, then it began a solo run to Murmansk.[17]

During the worst of the storm, HMS Nigeria a Fiji-class cruiser, covering the reciprocal Convoy QP 9 west of Bear Island, was about 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) south-west of the island, when it met Trinidad.[17]

30 March

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On 30 March four Halcyon-class minesweepers of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla, Gossamer, Harrier, Hussar and Speedwell arrived after sailing from Murmansk on 28 March. U-209 and U-456 fired torpedoes but failed to hit any of the ships. Induna was sunk by U-376 and Effingham by U-435. On 1 April U-436 sank a straggler, probably the whaler HMS Sulla and U-589 fired at and missed a destroyer. The destroyer Fury obtained an asdic contact, thought to be a U-boat, attacked it and was credited with the destruction of U-585.[d] The last stragglers reached port on 1 April. Six ships had been lost from the convoy.[18]

Aftermath

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Analysis

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Five ships sunk caused alarm at the Admiralty and to Admiral John Tovey, the commander of the Home Fleet who predicted that the Germans were assembling a maximum effort against the Arctic convoys. In 2025, Andrew Boyd wrote that the Naval Intelligence Division produced an accurate assessment of the German operation against the convoy that gave emphasis to the German change to a combined arms model of anti-shipping operations. The storm that disrupted the convoy and the fact that only unescorted stragglers had been sunk was noted, as was the fact that the loss of a destroyer and a U-boat made the German success a costly one. The captain of Trinidad reported that the speed in which it disabled the destroyer Z 26 was due to its Type 284 radar that had done all that was expected of it. The increasing numbers of aircraft and submarines would make convoys more vulnerable, especially during the forthcoming longer days and better weather of the Arctic summer, when the ships would still be limited by the polar ice from sailing further from the Norwegian coast.[19]

The Convoy PQ 13 – Convoy QP 9 escort operation exposed the British lack of destroyers for convoy escort. When destroyers were committed to screening the aircraft carriers and battleships of the Home Fleet, not many were left for convoys and this was made worse by the decision that henceforth convoys must have ten escorts. Ships had been drawn from Western Approaches Command (WAC) when necessary but the Admiralty decided on a permanent policy of the WAC being responsible for finding most of the close escorts. If the Arctic convoy route maintained a 14-day departure schedule, at least 10 per cent of the destroyers of the WAC would be involved in the convoys, potentially forgoing an Atlantic convoy and its reciprocal. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, the professional head of the navy, had the same concerns a Tovey and on 10 April, after the departure of Convoy PQ 14 he said to the other service chiefs of staff that convoys had not been dispatched against the new extent. of air and submarine attack.[20]

The advantage of geography lay with the Germans and more losses of ships and escorts could make the convoys impossible to maintain. In comparison with Operation Halberd (24–27 September 1941) in the Mediterranean, the sailing of fortnightly Arctic convoys put far more strain on the escorts; the ships were vulnerable to air, surface and submarine attack, the operations took place far from friendly bases and the Arctic convoys had little benefit from land-based air cover. The Soviet Northern Fleet was never able to emulate the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm (FAA) effort from Malta. Pound took the view that despite the difficulties, delivering supplies should remain a maximum effort. In 2025, Andrew Boyd wrote that perhaps Pound underestimated the difficulties that the Germans faced. Kriegsmarine ships were also far from adequate anchorages and repair facilities and were suffering from an acute fuel shortage, that was well known to the British from Ultra decrypts.[21]

The position of the British in the war at sea was at its lowest ebb. The Shark cypher was introduced on 1 February, the U-boats along the east coast of the US were enjoying the Second Happy Time, the Regia Marina had gained control over the central Mediterranean and the Imperial Japanese Navy had the Indian Ocean at its mercy. On 5 March Pound met the defence committee and said,

If we lose the war at sea, we lose the war. We lose the war at sea when we can no longer maintain those communications which are essential to us.[21]

when claiming more air support. A few days afterwards, the War Cabinet noted that convoy protection was an increasing problem with an increase in US ships for the Arctic route, with possibly 40 ships per month arriving at Iceland for the navy to escort to the USSR. If the 12 British ships were counted as well, this amounted to convoys of 25 ships every two weeks. The Home Fleet could escort convoys no larger than this and that it would be better to run monthly convoys. The First Protocol was due to expire in June and after the loss to Convoy QP 10 of two ships to aircraft and two to U-boats, it was agreed that the increasing danger to the convoys should be stressed o the Soviet authorities.[22]

The German analysis of the anti-shipping operation was far from triumphant. The Seekriegsleitung (SKL, Naval Command) view was that five ships sunk was insufficient compensation for the loss of Z 26 and most of its crew, given the acute shortage of destroyers. Without adequate intelligence of British naval movements and with the chronic fuel shortage there was no possibility of committing the big ships to an operation. The ease with which Trinidad had knocked out Z 26 with radar-directed gunnery was another cause for concern.[19]

Casualties

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The Germans sank five freighters, Trinidad was damaged and the German destroyer Z26 had been sunk. Fourteen ships had arrived safely, more than two-thirds of the convoy. The freighter SS Tobruk was credited with shooting down one bomber and another probable on 30 April.[23] The Germans had lost U-655 on 23 March, when attacking Convoy QP 9, having been rammed by HMS Sharpshooter a Halcyon class minesweeper, the only German offensive effort against the convoy. U-585 was sunk on 30 March by a loose mine off the Rybachy Peninsula.[24]

Allied order of battle

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Convoyed ships

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Loch Ewe–Reykjavík−Murmansk[25]
ShipYearGRTFlagNotes
Loch Ewe to Reykjavík
SS Groenland19141,220 Merchant NavyLoch Ewe to Reykjavík only
Lars Kruse19231,807 Merchant NavyLoch Ewe to Reykjavík
Manø19251,418 Merchant NavyLoch Ewe to Reykjavík
Reykjavík to Murmansk
SS Ballot19226,131 PanamaJoined Reykjavík
SS Bateau19264,687 PanamaJoined Reykjavík, sunk 29 March, Z26, c. 40† 7 surv[26]
SS Dunboyne19193,515 United States
SS Effingham19196,421 United StatesStraggler, sunk 30 March, U-435, 70°28′N35°44′E, 12† 31 surv
SS El Estero19204,219 Panama
SS Eldena19196,900 United States
SS Empire Cowper19417,164 United Kingdom
SS Empire Ranger19417,008 United KingdomStraggler, 28 March, Ju88s, 72°10′N, 30°00′E, crew POW
SS Empire Starlight19416,850 United KingdomMurmansk, bombing 3 April – 1 June, sunk
SS Gallant Fox19185,473 Panama
SS Harpalion19325,486 United Kingdom
SS Induna19255,086 United KingdomStraggler, sunk 30 March, U-376, 70°55′N, 37°18′E, 31† 19 surv
SS Mana19203,283 Honduras
SS Mormacmar19395,453 United States
SS New Westminster City19294,747 United Kingdom3 April bombed at Murmansk, beached, 3†
SS Raceland19104,815 PanamaSunk, bombers
SS River Afton19355,479 United KingdomConvoy Commodore, Captain Denis Casey
SS Scottish American19206,999 United KingdomJoined Reykjavík, Escort oiler
HMS Silja—251 Royal NavyAuxiliary minesweeper (T-107 in Soviet service)
HMS Sumba—251 Royal NavyAuxiliary minesweeper (T-106 in Soviet service)
HMS Sulla—251 Royal NavyAuxiliary minesweeper, sunk 1 April, U-436, c. 20†[27]
SS Tobruk19427,048 Poland

Merchant ships sunk

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After SS Ballott was attacked on 28 March 1942, 16 members of the crew launched a lifeboat, were taken on board Silja and then transferred to Induna.

Allied shipping losses[18]
DateShipGRTSunkArmNotes
Merchant ships sunk
28 MarchRaceland4,815 Panama Luftwaffe72°40′N 20°20′E / 72.667°N 20.333°E / 72.667; 20.333 45 crew, 13†, 32 surv.
28 MarchEmpire Ranger7,008 United Kingdom Luftwaffe72°10′N 30°00′E / 72.167°N 30.000°E / 72.167; 30.000 55 crew, 0†
29 MarchBateau4,687 Panama KriegsmarineSunk, Z26, 72°30′N 27°00′E / 72.500°N 27.000°E / 72.500; 27.000 47 crew, 6†, 41 surv.
30 MarchInduna5,086 United Kingdom KriegsmarineSunk, U-376, 70°55′N 37°18′E / 70.917°N 37.300°E / 70.917; 37.300 66 crew, 42†[e]
30 MarchEffingham6,421 United States KriegsmarineSunk, U-435, 70°28′N 35°44′E / 70.467°N 35.733°E / 70.467; 35.733 42 crew, 12 surv.
1 AprilHMT Sulla— Royal Navy KriegsmarineSunk, U-436
Merchant ships lost in harbour or return Convoy QP 10[23]
3 AprilEmpire Starlight6,850 United Kingdom LuftwaffeBombed at Murmansk, 68 crew, 1†
3 AprilNew Westminster City4,747 United Kingdom LuftwaffeBombed at Murmansk, 52 crew, 2†
11 AprilEmpire Cowper7,164 United Kingdom LuftwaffeSunk, Convoy QP 10, 68 crew, 18† + 1
13 AprilHarpalion5,486 United Kingdom KriegsmarineSunk, U-435, Convoy QP 10, 52 crew, 0†

Escorts

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Escort forces (in relays)[28]
NameNavyClassNotes
Loch Ewe to Reykjavík
ORP Błyskawica Polish NavyHunt-class destroyer10–17 March
HMS Lamerton Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer10–16 March
HMS Sabre Royal NavyS-class destroyer11–17 March
HMS Saladin Royal NavyS-class destroyer11–17 March
Reykjavík to Murmansk
HMS Trinidad Royal NavyFiji-class cruiser23–25 March
HMS Eclipse Royal NavyE-class destroyerJoined 23 March
HMS Fury Royal NavyF-class destroyerJoined 23 March
HMS Lamerton Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer23–25 March
HMS Wheatland Royal NavyHunt-class destroyerdetached 23 March
HMT Bute Royal NavyIsles-class trawler
HMT Celia Royal NavyShakespearian-class trawler
HMT Blackfly Royal NavyASW TrawlerJoined 23 March
HMT Paynter Royal NavyASW TrawlerJoined 23 March
Distant cover (Home Fleet)
HMS Victorious Royal NavyIllustrious-class aircraft carrier
HMS King George V Royal NavyKing George V-class battleship
HMS Duke of York Royal NavyKing George V-class battleship
HMS Renown Royal NavyRenown-class battlecruiser
HMS Kent Royal NavyCounty-class cruiser
HMS Edinburgh Royal NavyTown-class cruiser
HMS Ashanti Royal NavyTribal-class destroyer
HMS Bedouin Royal NavyTribal-class destroyer
HMS Eskimo Royal NavyTribal-class destroyer
HMS Punjabi Royal NavyTribal-class destroyer
HMS Tartar Royal NavyTribal-class destroyer
HMS Echo Royal NavyE-class destroyer
HMS Escapade Royal NavyE-class destroyer
HMS Faulknor Royal NavyF-class destroyer
HMS Foresight Royal NavyF-class destroyer
HMS Icarus Royal NavyI-class destroyer
HMS Inglefield Royal NavyI-class destroyer
HMS Marne Royal NavyM-class destroyer
HMS Onslow Royal NavyO-class destroyer
HMS Ledbury Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer
HMS Middleton Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer
HMS Wheatland Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer
Eastern local escort
Gremyashchiy Soviet NavyGnevny-class destroyer27 March
Sokrushitelny Soviet NavyGnevny-class destroyer27 March
HMS Oribi Royal NavyO-class destroyer29 March, found boats of Empire Ranger, sighted Silja adrift
HMS Harrier Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper28 March
HMS Hussar Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper28 March
HMS Gossamer Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper30 March, found Scottish American, Effingham and Dunboyne
HMS Speedwell Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper28 March

Force Q

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Fleeet oiler and escort[28]
NameNavyClassNotes
Reykjavík to Murmansk
HMS Lamerton Royal NavyHunt-class destroyer23–25 March
RFA Oligarch United KingdomOl-class tanker6,897 GRT, fleet oiler

German order of battle

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Notes

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  1. ↑ In October 1941, the unloading capacity of Archangel was 300,000 long tons (300,000 t), Vladivostok 140,000 long tons (140,000 t) and 60,000 long tons (61,000 t) in the Persian Gulf ports.[2]
  2. ↑ By the end of 1941, 187 Matilda II and 249 Valentine tanks had been delivered, comprising 25 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks in the Red Army, making 30–40 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks defending Moscow. In December 1941, 16 per cent of the fighters defending Moscow were Hawker Hurricanes and Curtiss Tomahawks from Britain and by 1 January 1942, 96 Hurricane fighters were flying in the Soviet Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily, VVS). The British supplied radar apparatus, machine tools, Asdic and commodities.[5]
  3. ↑ Lieutenant-Commander Colin Campbell, the captain of Fury, reported that the short range of the whalers and the breaking of wireless silence made these vessels a menace.[17]
  4. ↑ Post-war analysis found that U-585 was lost elsewhere.
  5. ↑ Twelve were from SS Ballot

Footnotes

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  1. ↑ Woodman 2004, p. 22.
  2. ↑ Howard 1972, p. 44.
  3. ↑ Woodman 2004, p. 14.
  4. ↑ Woodman 2004, pp. 22–23.
  5. ↑ Edgerton 2011, p. 75.
  6. ↑ Macksey 2004, pp. 141–142; Hinsley 1994, pp. 141, 145–146.
  7. ↑ Kahn 1973, pp. 238–241.
  8. ↑ Budiansky 2000, pp. 250, 289.
  9. ↑ Claasen 2001, pp. 201–202.
  10. ↑ Claasen 2001, pp. 203–205.
  11. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 83.
  12. ↑ Woodman 1994, pp. 83−84.
  13. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 85.
  14. ↑ Woodman 1994, pp. 85–86.
  15. ↑ Woodman 1994, pp. 86−87.
  16. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 86.
  17. 1 2 3 Woodman 1994, p. 87.
  18. 1 2 3 Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 153.
  19. 1 2 Boyd 2024, p. 215.
  20. ↑ Boyd 2024, pp. 215–216.
  21. 1 2 Boyd 2024, p. 216.
  22. ↑ Boyd 2024, pp. 216–217.
  23. 1 2 Miciński, Huras & Twardowski 1999, pp. 319–324.
  24. ↑ Boyd 2024, p. 214.
  25. ↑ Jordan 2006, pp. 107, 141, 159, 186, 400, 404, 406, 498, 500, 505, 508, 580, 593; Mitchell & Sawyer 1990, pp. 52, 87, 125–126; PQ 13 2025; Gothro 2017; Miciński, Huras & Twardowski 1999, pp. 315–316.
  26. ↑ Bateau 2009.
  27. ↑ Sulla 2020.
  28. 1 2 3 Ruegg & Hague 1993, p. 29.

Bibliography

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  • Budiansky, S. (2000). Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. New York: The Free Press (Simon & Schuster). ISBN 0-684-85932-7 – via Archive Foundation.
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  • Miciński, Jerzy; Huras, Bohdan; Twardowski, Marek (1999). Księga statków polskich 1918–1945. Tom 3 [Polish Ships Book 1918–1945] (in Polish). Vol. III. Gdańsk: Polnord Wydawnictwo Oskar. ISBN 83-86181-45-1.
  • Mitchell, W. H.; Sawyer, L. A. (1990) [1965]. The Empire Ships: A Record of British-built and acquired Merchant Ships during the Second World War (2nd ed.). London (New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong): Lloyd's of London Press. ISBN 1-85044-275-4.
  • Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 1-86176-257-7.
  • Ruegg, R.; Hague, A. (1993) [1992]. Convoys to Russia: Allied Convoys and Naval Surface Operations in Arctic Waters 1941–1945 (2nd rev. enl. ed.). Kendal: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-66-5.
  • "Russian Convoys Series". ConvoyWeb. 2025. Retrieved 31 August 2025.
  • "SS Bateau (+1942)". Wrecksite.eu. 22 February 2009. Retrieved 19 June 2026.
  • Woodman, Richard (1994). Arctic Convoys 1941–1945 (Hardback ed.). London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5079-3.
  • Woodman, Richard (2004) [1994]. Arctic Convoys 1941–1945. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-5752-1.

Further reading

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  • Blair, Clay (1996). Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–42. Vol. I. London: Cassell. ISBN 0-304-35260-8.
  • Boog, H.; Rahn, W.; Stumpf, R.; Wegner, B. (2001) [1990]. Der globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel zur Initiative 1941 bis 1943 [Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943]. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Germany and the Second World War). Vol. VI. Translated by Osers, Ewald; Brownjohn, John; Crampton, Patricia; Willmot, Louise (eng. trans. Cambridge University Press, London ed.). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt for the Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. ISBN 0-19-822888-0.
  • Haynes, John L. (2010). Frozen Fury, The Murmansk run of Convoy PQ-13. Baltimore: Publish America. ISBN 978-1-4512-0156-7.
  • Kemp, Paul (1993). Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 1-85409-130-1 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Mills, Morris O. (2000). Convoy PQ13 – Unlucky for Some. Bramber: Bernard Durnford Pub. ISBN 0-9535670-2-8.
  • Niestlé, Axel (2014). German U-boat losses During World War II: Details of Destruction (ebook ed.). London: Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-4738-3829-1.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956]. The Period of Balance. History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. II (3rd impr. ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 174453986.
  • Sharpe, Peter (1998). U-Boat Fact File. Leicester: Midland Publishing. ISBN 1-85780-072-9.
  • Schofield, Bernard (1964). The Russian Convoys. London: BT Batsford. OCLC 862623.
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